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Abstract 
Economists typically assume perfect information, but households are not always well 
informed, and face a high degree of uncertainty regarding the quality of goods or value of 
their assets. As a consequence, information from mass media is a main part of our 
everyday lives. Coverage in popular media outlets can catch the attention of millions of 
households and, therefore, news media may influence their decisions in several ways.  
 
This thesis investigates the roles of news media in an urban economy and for housing 
markets. Each of the three empirical essays provides insights into how information from 
the media can shape the economic decisions of households as either homebuyers, 
homeowners, or consumers. While the first and the second chapters estimate the causal 
effects of publicity, in particular positive information, on house prices and non-housing 
consumption, respectively, the last chapter explores how media coverage may affect the 
link between house prices and homeowner spending. This thesis places particular 
emphasis on understanding the mechanisms through which news media may affect 
economic outcomes by empirically identifying potential channels. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The roles of news media, information, and quality uncertainty have become increasingly 
important in recent decades, making the study of media and information interesting both 
to academics and practitioners/policy makers. While economists typically assume perfect 
information, households are not always well informed, and face a high degree of 
uncertainty regarding the quality of goods or value of their assets. As a result, information 
from mass media is a main part of our everyday lives. Coverage in popular media outlets 
can catch the attention of millions of households and, therefore, news media may influence 
their decisions in several ways. News articles often contain rather vague, ambiguous, stale, 
or false information, but many people still base their decisions on such information 
(Barber and Loeffler, 1993; Tetlock, 2011; Oliver and Wood, 2014; Silverman and Singer-
Vine, 2016; Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017). 
By investigating the roles of news media in an urban economy and for housing markets, 
this thesis provides an interesting and interdisciplinary perspective on urban economies, 
and broadens the scope of urban and real estate economics. Each of the three empirical 
essays provides insights into how information from the media can shape the economic 
decisions of households as either homebuyers, homeowners, or consumers. While the first 
and the second chapters estimate the causal effects of publicity, in particular positive 
information, on house prices and non-housing consumption, respectively, the last chapter 
explores how media coverage may affect the link between house prices and homeowner 
spending. This thesis places particular emphasis on understanding the mechanisms 
through which news media may affect economic outcomes by empirically identifying 
potential channels.  
I begin my journey by investigating whether homebuyers are responsive to media 
information in Chapter 1. Media outlets release a variety of best places lists every year. 
Such media opinions about city quality or livability could affect household location choices 
and investment decisions, thereby increasing demand for the listed towns. In this chapter, 
I exploit the Money magazine’s “50 Best places to Live in America” lists to identify the causal 
impact of the quality information on local housing prices. The empirical results 
demonstrate that list inclusion has a statistically significant effect on local home prices: a 
1-3% or approximately $ 3,000-9,000 increase per housing unit over two years. The finding 
indicates that third-party media information can affect homebuyers’ decisions in the U.S. 
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housing markets. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to find the evidence 
that quality information or recommendations on neighborhood quality can affect local 
housing prices. However, this paper leaves an important question unanswered: What 
drives such significant effects? Do homebuyers respond to the magazine’s positive 
opinion? Or simply, does an increasing awareness raise demand for the listed towns?  
To answer this question, Chapter 2 examines the potential channels through which 
publicity can affect consumer demand. As consumers’ expectations of product quality are 
a primary determinant of demand, positive publicity could lead consumers to believe that 
the product is of high quality, thereby increasing demand (vertical sorting). Meanwhile, 
media exposure could increase product awareness, which improves a match between 
heterogeneous consumers and products (horizontal sorting). By exploiting New York 
Times restaurant reviews, I identify the two potential channels. First, using the number of 
very localized taxi drop-offs as a proxy of restaurant demand, I find that consumer 
responses are statistically significant when reviews are positive: a 4.6% increase in taxi 
passengers, or approximately $1,560 weekly sales growth. By inferring diners’ 
characteristics from destinations of post-dining taxi trips, I also show that demographic 
characteristics of locations have a significant effect on restaurant choices even when 
reviews are not positive; in response to non-positive reviews, a 10% larger share of 
Hispanic residents in a restaurant tract attracts 12.0% more Hispanic diners. The results 
imply that publicity could boost urban consumption not only by signalling product quality 
but also by informing consumers about the existence and characteristics of products. 
Overall, my contribution is twofold: 1) I suggest a novel way to measure real-time local 
economic activities and to identify socio-economic interactions between locations by 
utilizing taxi trip records. 2) This chapter makes an important contribution to the 
literature, as empirical evidence on the effect of awareness is scarce. 
Chapter 3 provides further robust evidence on the awareness effect of news media in a 
different empirical setting. Housing wealth can affect a wide range of economic and social 
outcomes. Existing literature typically assumes that households make fully informed 
decisions, but homeowners may not have high level of awareness of their housing wealth. 
By exploiting local newspaper contents in the US, this chapter finds that more newspaper 
articles conveying house price information can make homeowner consumption more 
elastic with respect to regional housing prices. An increase of one standard deviation in 
the number of housing price news articles is associated with a 0.08 increase in 
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homeowners’ consumption elasticity. In contrast with the view that household decisions 
reflect fully informed and rational behaviors, the result suggests that providing relevant 
information can alter households’ economic decisions by helping them to make more 
informed choices or making the information salient to the individuals. Thus, this chapter 
has a potential to dramatically broaden our understanding of the role of news media and 
information disclosure across a large number of settings. 
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Do Homebuyers Pay a Premium for  
“Best Places to Live” Cities? 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In early fall 2005, Cecile Druzba and her husband, Matt, were looking to make a change in their 
lives. They lived outside Woodstock, N.Y., but wanted to move to a community where the schools were 
great, jobs plentiful and their three school-aged kids could hop on their bikes to go to soccer practice, 
the library and a quaint downtown. 
So, they began the search by typing the words "Best Places to Live" into an internet search engine. Up 
came Money magazine's list for 2005 and immediately the couple zeroed in on No. 7 - Middleton. 
They visited once, fell in love with the place and moved to town that winter. 
- Milwaukee Wisconsin Journal Sentinel1  
Every year American media outlets release a variety of “best places” lists such as best places 
to live, best places for young couples, best places for retirees, and so forth. Although there 
is no empirical evidence, a lot of anecdotal stories tell us that the lists influence homebuyers’ 
decisions. Homebuyers could value such lists not only because information about city quality 
or livability is difficult to obtain, but also because the quality of cities or neighborhoods is 
hard to judge before experience or residency. Nelson (1970) terms “experience goods” 
products or services of which quality can be fully evaluated only after consumption or 
purchase. The paper suggests that quality information is crucial particularly for durable and 
high-priced experience goods. Indeed, many consumers base their purchase decisions on 
recommendations from families, friends and consumer magazines/newspapers; in 
particular, when these decisions could affect their everyday lives in subsequent years. Thus 
perception of product quality can have substantial effects on consumer behaviors and 
choices. As Friberg and Grönqvist (2012) point out, lack of information often prompts 
 
1 The source: http://archive.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/50987652.html 
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consumers to choose what others have chosen, potentially leading to herding behavior. In 
contrast, more information could result in efficiency gain by leading to better sorting 
between consumers and products. A wide range of methods have been used to convey such 
quality information to consumers such as ranking/ratings, user reviews, expert opinions or 
reviews, branding and advertising.  
This study identifies an independent effect of neighborhood quality information on housing 
prices, by exploiting the Money magazine’s annual reports, “50 Best places to Live in America”, 
which is one of the most popular and influential lists in the United States. The top 50 towns 
are publicly announced in rank order,2 and the listed towns receive substantial attention 
from social media, local newspapers, city governments and homebuyers.3 The role of the 
quality information has been little studied in the context of housing or neighborhoods, as 
experience goods. Studies on hedonic prices, or urban quality of life, typically assume that 
consumers have perfect information about inter-regional differences in local amenities, so 
differences in rent or land prices are largely explained by the differences in amenity or quality 
of life (Roback, 1982; Blomquist et al., 1988; Greenwood et al., 1991; Gabriel et al., 2003; 
Albouy and Lue, 2015; Albouy, 2016). However, many homebuyers face a high degree of 
uncertainty regarding the quality of neighborhoods and, therefore, such quality information 
could influence household location choices by informing buyers about city quality. People 
may overreact to the magazine lists, as summarized information, since their time and 
cognitive resources are too limited to process full information such as publicly available 
market statistics (Hong and Stein, 1999; Dellavigna and Pollet, 2009; Luca, 2016). It is also 
possible that positive tone of the magazine reports could lead homebuyers to believe that 
the listed towns are of higher quality than the other towns. 
A key empirical challenge in this paper is how to isolate the independent effect of the quality 
indicator from effects of underlying city characteristics used in the listing procedure. Despite 
the theoretical potential of quality information to influence consumer choices, only a 
handful of studies have identified its causal effect on consumer demand for experience 
goods such as wines (Hilger et al., 2010; Friberg and Grönqvist, 2012), books (Berger et al., 
2010), and movies (Eliashberg and Shugan, 1997; Reinstein and Snyder, 2005; Chen et al., 
 
2 The magazine listed 100 towns until 2012  
3 For a few examples, see local governments’ webpages (https://www.mckinneytexas.org/1017/1-Best-Place-to-Live, http://www. 
peachtree-city.org/index.aspx?NID=774) and newspaper articles (http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/phillylists/Local-town-No-2-
for-Best-Places-to-Be-Rich-and-Single.html,  https://www.bizjournals.com/denver/stories/2010/07/12/daily9.htm)  
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2012). The limited empirical evidence is mainly because of a potential endogeneity issue. 
Products that receive positive reviews are likely to experience high sales even in the absence 
of positive information. For instance, Figlio and Lucas (2004) find that school grades 
assigned by the state have an independent effect on house prices and residential locations 
even when school attributes like test scores are controlled for. Kuang (2017) also shows that 
an effect on house prices of the quality of nearby restaurants is more significant when such 
information is made easily accessible from Yelp.com, a social network for user reviews on 
local businesses. 
This paper addresses the empirical concern through two different approaches. By relying on 
difference-in-differences (DiD) estimators combined with propensity score matching, I 
show that list inclusion has a statistically significant effect on house prices: 1-3% over two 
years, which approximately corresponds to $3,000-9,000 per housing unit. However, the 
baseline estimators assume that the magazine lists are not true reflections of city quality. To 
identify an independent effect of the magazine reports without imposing the assumption, 
this paper also exploits local newspaper coverage on the magazine lists, and find that the 
lists have a significant effect on house prices during the one-year post-treatment period only 
when listed towns are introduced in local newspapers. This result identifies an independent 
effect of the magazine lists, as one would not expect such insignificant effects of list 
inclusion if the list inclusion truly reflects the quality of each city and if the underlying city 
characteristics are the only house price driver. However, a limitation is that the effect of 
local media coverage itself may not be causally interpreted due to potential endogeneity of 
newspaper reporting.4  
1.2 Backgrounds 
Since July 2005 when the magazine released 2005’s 100 best places list, house prices in the 
listed towns have substantially outperformed those in the other towns within the same 
county for the following ten years (Figure 1.1). However, house price indices of the treated 
and untreated groups were in nearly parallel trends during the five-year pre-treatment period. 
This is probably because, by spatial sorting, towns within a county are more likely to have 
already been in spatial equilibrium and thus have substantially similar prior price trends. 
 
4 To address the concern, related studies exploit exits/entries of newspapers (Gentzkow et al., 2011; Gao et al., 2018), or reductions in 
media coverage caused by newspaper strikes (Peress, 2014). 
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Figure 1.2 shows us consistent and more convincing results by plotting the pre- and post-
treatment trends from seven lists (2005-2011). People who have read the reports may believe 
that the media’s goal is just to entertain readers so the lists contain no new information 
about local fundamentals. In that case, one would not expect to observe any significant 
association between the list publication and house price growth. However, these analyses 
provide strong visual support for the link.  
 Pre- and post-treatment house price trends of towns listed in 2005 
 
Notes: Figure 1.1 shows normalized average house price indices for three different 
groups of towns over the five-year pre-treatment and the ten-year post-treatment 
periods; each index is equal to 100 when the magazine list of 2005 was published. The 
first group (red solid line) consists of towns included in the 2005’s top 100 list. The 
second group (blue dot line) compiles the other towns within the same county of each 
listed town. The last group (grey dash line) is the other towns within the same state of 
each listed town, including the second group of towns.   
 Pre- and post-treatment house price trends of towns listed in 2005-2011 
 
Notes: Figure 1.2 displays time-series house price trends of the three groups 
described in Figure 1.2, but the first group consists of the towns included in the 
magazine’s seven lists from 2005 to 2011. As a result of using more lists, the post-
treatment period is five years long.   
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Still, one may be concerned that the listed towns are fundamentally different from the others 
so the different price trajectories are purely due to different city quality, despite the fact that 
the two graphs above confirm clearly parallel pre-treatment trends followed by significant 
post-treatment price deviations. Therefore, a central empirical question to identify is 
whether the magazine reports affect homebuyers’ decisions/choices, or simply reflect local 
fundamentals that drive house prices up. On the one hand, the information on city quality 
or livability may facilitate better matches between agents and locations. Informed 
households may migrate toward towns of higher quality (vertical sorting) or to towns of which 
characteristics best meet their idiosyncratic needs (horizontal sorting5). As a result, housing 
markets in listed towns will experience higher demand as displayed in the figures. On the 
other hand, it is perfectly possible that the list inclusion is simply a proxy for positive past 
information. Indeed, it is told that the listed towns are selected based on superior city 
characteristics. If local fundamentals used by the magazine are not yet incorporated into 
local house prices, then one would also observe a positive relationship between the list 
publications and house price returns. To investigate this possibility, I begin with looking 
into the magazine’s selection process as the first step.  
1.2.1 Listing and Ranking Procedure 
Basically, the magazine selects 50 places based on their own editorial constraints and 
statistics on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. For the ranking of 2015, the 
magazine started with data on 3,625 U.S. towns with populations of 10,000 to 50,000, and 
ranked the towns on factors including job growth, diversity, and ease of living; giving the 
most weight to economic opportunity, housing affordability, education, and safety. They 
factored in more data on health, taxes, real estate, culture, and the economy; and limited the 
results to three places per state, one per county. These places were then sorted to represent 
all regions evenly. Thus they argue that all the listed towns have an above-average median 
income, a highly educated and growing population, low crime, good schools, healthy real 
estate appreciation and a thriving job market.6   
 
5 A seminal paper (Tiebout, 1956) argues that households choose neighborhoods that fit their heterogeneous preferences for public goods. 
While a primary assumption of the paper is that households have perfect information, they may not be well informed about the quality of 
multiple neighborhoods. Therefore, the magazine rankings may trigger the Tiebout sorting.   
6 Money August 2005 issue 
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Yet their ranking process depends on their subjective judgement about qualitative and 
intangible city characteristics. The magazine reporters visit the listed towns, interview 
residents, assess traffic, parks, and gathering places, and consider intangibles like community 
spirit. Eventually, the magazine determines the rank orders of the finalists and selects a 
winner based on reporting and the data collected by their reporters7. 
1.2.2 Nature of the rankings 
In several respects, the magazine rankings are different from typical quality information 
from a third-party media outlet. An oft-cited paper, Dranove and Jin (2010), defines quality 
disclosure as an effort by a certification agency to systematically measure and report product 
quality for a nontrivial percentage of products in a market. Third-party information senders 
act as the intermediary of quality disclosure and are believed to report unbiased and accurate 
information in areas, particularly healthcare, education and finance. However, the magazine 
lists lack those considerations. The media lists only a tiny percentage of towns in the U.S.; 
out of thousands of American towns, only 50 towns are selected. More importantly, the 
rankings are not based on a transparent scoring system, and consequently are not stable over 
the years. The magazine has used slightly different criteria, methodology and data sets in 
their listing and ranking procedure over time; although precise variables, weights and 
functional forms are not disclosed. As Guterbock (1997) points out, indicator variables are 
added, and some dropped, and factors do not appear to be weighted exactly the same each 
year. As a result of this inconsistent criteria, methodologies and various editorial constraints, 
rankings are highly volatile over years.  
 Population limits in 2005-2016 
2005 : >14,000 
2006 : >50,000 
 
2007 : 7,500 - 50,000 
2008 : 50,000 - 300,000 
2009 : 8,500 - 50,000 
2010 : 50,000 - 300,000 
2011 : 8,500 - 50,000 
2012 :  50,000 - 300,000 
2013 :  10,000 – 50,000 
2014 :  50,000 - 300,000 
2015 :  10,000 – 50,000 
2016 :  50,000 - 300,000 
Notes: The magazine’s population limits differ each year. For the first two years, 2005 and 2006, the 
press used only lower limits, but since 2007, they have applied both lower and upper limits to narrow 
down candidate towns.    
First of all, target groups differ each year. Recently, they have focused on very small towns 
in odd-numbered years, and large towns in the other years; a group of towns are listed in 
alternate years due to the different population limits (Table 1.1). Since 2007, population 
limits have been 50,000-300,000 in even-numbered years, and below 50,000 in the other 
 
7 For further details, see the webpage (http://time.com/money/3985631/best-places-2015-methodology/) 
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years. Even when comparing two odd-numbered years, 2013 and 2015, only 21 towns were 
listed in the both years (Table 1.2). Moreover, McKinney, Texas topped the 2014 list, but 
dropped out of the 2016 list. Some places are getting better to live whereas others are getting 
worse, but such changes are very slow at the city level. More than half of the towns included 
in the top 50 list are not likely to significantly decline within only two years. Indeed, most of 
the factors used by the magazine are time invariant or only marginally time varying during 
the short period of time: for example, weather, distance to airport, the number of schools, 
colleges, universities, movie theaters, etc. Perhaps, most volatile are only some of the 
economic indicators. Importantly, this great inter-period volatility cannot be explained even 
by different variables used each year. Any new indicator is likely to covary with others already 
in use, so it would be highly unusual for the addition of one or two indicators to cause great 
fluctuations over years (Guterbock, 1997).  
More importantly, listed and non-listed towns are not directly comparable across counties 
or states as a result of some editorial constraints. For instance, the magazine uses state and 
county quota limits, which slightly change over time. The magazine selects up to only three 
places per state and one per county in 2015 probably because one of their editorial goals is 
that the lists represent all U.S regions evenly. However, a plenty of desirable places might 
be located in a handful of states such as California; it is plausible that the magazine selects 
three from a cluster of good places in a certain year and another three two years later. Thus 
listed towns in Iowa are not necessarily of better quality than non-listed towns in California. 
Editorial reasons play a more crucial role in the listing procedure than local fundamentals 
do, and therefore the lists are more like the magazine’s opinions or recommendations about 
good places to live rather than credible and reliable city rankings. Provoking controversy 
among readers and entertaining them may be more important for the for-profit media 
company than providing more reliable and credible city rankings that are believed to reflect 
true quality of cities. Luckily, discontinuities from the unstable rankings create an 
opportunity to test the effects of list inclusion on housing prices. First of all, cities listed in 
a specific year were not listed in the previous year8. Also, nearly half towns were not listed 
even two years ago. If a group of towns stay listed every year and the rankings stay stable 
over time, then there would be little time-series variation I can exploit for identification. 
More detailed research design is discussed in the following section.  
 
8 By population limits, towns could be listed only in 2005 and 2006 in a row 
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 2013-2016 “50 Best Places to Live” rankings by Money  
Rank 2013 2014 2015 2016 
1 Sharon, MA McKinney, TX Apex, NC Columbia, MD 
2 Louisville, CO Maple Grove City, MN Papillion, NE Eden Prairie, MN 
3 Vienna Town, VA Carmel, IN Sharon, MA Plano, TX 
4 Chanhassen, MN Castle Rock, CO Louisville, CO West Des Moines, IA 
5 Sherwood, OR Kirkland City, WA Snoqualmie, WA Parsippany/Troy Hills, NJ 
6 Berkeley Heights, NJ Columbia/Ellicott, MD Sherwood, OR Highlands Rancho, CO 
7 Mason, OH Clarkstown, NY Chanhassen, MN Clarkstown, NY 
8 Papillion, NE Ames, IA Coppell, TX Weston, FL 
9 Apex, NC Rochester Hills, MI Simsbury, CO Beaverton, OR 
10 West Goshen, PA Reston, VA Solon, OH Naperville, IL 
11 Westford, MA Eagan, MN Acton, MA Woodbury, MN 
12 Parker, CO Woodbury, MN Rosemount, MN Pflugerville, TX 
13 Montville, NJ Centennial, CO Erie, CO Centennial, CO 
14 Farmington, UT Irvine, CA Westborough, MA Sammamish, WA 
15 Shrewsbury, MA Newton, MA Edina, MN West Hartford, CT 
16 Hillsborough, NJ Parsippany/Troy Hills, NJ Johnston, IA Nashua, NH 
17 Apple Valley, MN Mansfiled, TX Mason, OH Eastvale, CA 
18 Westfield, IN South Jordan, UT Draper, UT Euless, TX 
19 Newcastle, WA Cary, NC Woodbury, NY Edison, NJ 
20 The Colony, TX Pflugerville, TX Hewitt, TX Irvine, CA 
21 Savage, MN Brookline, MA Bedford, NH San Ramon, CA 
22 Waukee, IA Gilbert, AZ Twinsburg, OH Ashburn, VA 
23 Merrimack, NH Boulder, CO North Laurel, MD Franklin, NJ 
24 Firestone, CO Rockville, MD West Goshen, PA Appleton, WI 
25 Draper, UT Orem, UT Wylie, TX Broomfield, CO 
26 Brookfield, CT Franklin, NJ Dr. Phillips, FL Cherry Hill, NJ 
27 Farmington, MI Piscataway, NJ Nether Providence, PA Hoffman Estates, IL 
28 Menomonee Falls, WI Bowie, MD Berkley, MI Hunter Mill, VA 
29 Lindon, UT Milpitas, CA Sahuarita, AZ Overland Park, KS 
30 Windham, NH West Chester, OH Hillsborough, NJ Fishers, IN 
31 La Palma, CA Pleasanton, CA Damascus, MD Newton, MA 
32 Coppell, TX Pembroke Pines, FL Menomonee Falls, WI Novi, MI 
33 Suwanee, GA Naperville, IL Maryland Heights, MO Koolaupoko, HI 
34 Horsham, PA Bellevue, NE Tolland, CT Oyster Bay, NY 
35 Leesburg, VA Amherst, NY Urbana, MD Sioux Fall, SD 
36 Mill Creek, WA Chapel Hill, NC Springville, UT Wellington, FL 
37 Ankeny, IA Dale City, VA Germantown, WI Cary, NC 
38 Twinsburg, OH Bolingbrook, IL West Linn, OR Hamden, CT 
39 Cheshire, CT Overland Park, KS Mccandless, PA Huntington NY 
40 Ballwin, MO Johns Creek, GA Colchester, VT Greenwich, CT 
41 Montgomery Village, MD O'Fallon, MO Harrisburg, NC Levittown, PA 
42 Solon, OH Franklin, TN Waukee, IA Matoaca, VA 
43 Evans, GA Ann Arbor, MI La Palma, CA Lee’s Summit, MO 
44 Pflugerville, TX Fairfield, CT Heber, UT Spring, TX 
45 Spring Hill, TN West Hartford, CT Cheshire, CT Central Pasco, FL 
46 Buffalo Grove, IL Bensalem, PA Stallings, NC Fremont, CA 
47 Pelham, AL St. George, UT Mukilteo, WA Ames, IA 
48 Peachtree City, GA White Plains, NY Vienna, VA Edmond, OK 
49 Walnut, CA Meridian, ID Walnut, CA West Chester, OH 
50 Simsbury, CT Casper, WY Woodstock, GA Scottsdale, AZ 
Notes: The magazine listed 100 towns until 2012, and has listed 50 best places since 2013. 2013 and 2015 lists include only small 
towns of population between 10,000 and 50,000, but 2014 and 2016 lists consist of mid-sized cities with 50,000 – 300,000 residents. 
As a result, none of towns were listed for two consecutive years.  
 
 21 
 
1.3 Identification Strategy 
In this section, I obtain more robust results by partialling out the effects of some local 
characteristics that might have predictive power on future house prices. Despite the previous 
two graphs (Figures 1.1 and 1.2) providing a solid support for the relation, identifying the 
causation is still challenging as the lists are not completely random. How can we tell whether 
the lists affected the market response, or whether some local fundamentals of listed towns 
simultaneously drove both the list inclusion and market responses? It may be the case that 
some pre-determined city characteristics have lagged or anticipatory effects on future house 
price trends. Most of such fundamentals used in the listing procedures should have already 
been incorporated into house prices before release of the list. But some may be very slowly 
capitalized into local house prices. For example, cities with lower unemployment rates last 
year are more likely to be included in this year’s list attracting more households during this 
year, or even next year, than the other cities. It is also possible that there exists more or less 
autocorrelation of local fundamentals; places that outperformed neighboring places in 
economic growth are likely to do so in subsequent years. Thus simply comparing the mean 
values of outcomes for the listed and non-listed towns without any control variables could 
seriously overestimate the effect of the magazine reports.  
For this reason, this study estimates the effect of list inclusion only. Statistical information 
and the magazine’s various constraints determine which cities are included in a list whereas 
the ranking procedure relies upon the magazine’s self-collected database on qualitative and 
intangible city characteristics, which are unmeasurable and unobservable. By focusing on 
the list inclusion and thus by not considering rankings at all, I can rule out any possibility of 
results being affected by such unmeasurable fundamentals.  
1.3.1 Baseline Specification 
Most of the studies that attempt to examine a causal impact of quality information face an 
empirical concern: omitted variable bias (OVB). In order to isolate the effects of list 
inclusion from those of the underlying statistical data, this study must control for all of the 
variables used in the magazine’s listing procedure. Yet the factors used by the magazine are 
not fully disclosed. To partially address the issue, I control for county fixed effects. The 
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magazine does use not only city-level characteristics but also county-, MSA9- or state-level 
characteristics such as property tax rates. It is probably because only a few of the statistics 
are collected and published at the city level in the US; most of the major statistics are 
compiled at the county or MSA level. Even, a large portion of city-level statistics do not 
cover all small towns which are the primary focus of the magazine. For this reason, the 
county-fixed effects are expected to substantially alleviate the empirical issue by controlling 
for all county-, MSA- and state-level characteristics. Thus city-level pre-treatment 
characteristics will be a main source of the OVB in this research. 
To further overcome the problem, this study employs a difference-in-differences approach, 
which will cancel out most of factors that are time constant or in parallel trends. Indeed, a 
great part of house price fluctuations are explained by common factors such as 
macroeconomic conditions, and federal- or state-level policies, so price trends across towns 
within a county are highly parallel over time. Moreover, many city characteristics are time 
invariant or have little time-series variation during short-term periods. Thus those variables 
are expected to have at most only marginal effects on price differences between treated and 
control groups in DiD regressions. 
 City-level characteristics used in the magazine’s listing procedure 
Time varying factors Factors with no or little time-series variation 
median family income, median home price  
population growth, job growth, unemployment rate 
family purchasing power 
violent crime rates, property crime rates 
 
share of residents completed at least college 
share of students attending public schools 
median commute time  
racial diversity, median age of residents 
share of residents married 
number of schools, colleges, universities 
number of movie theaters, restaurants, bars 
number of libraries, museums 
number of public golf courses, ski resorts  
number of doctors and hospitals, cancer mortality 
rainfall, temperature, air quality 
distance to airport 
Notes: Table 1.3 presents determinants of the magazine rankings that have been explicitly mentioned in the reports. As you may 
note, most of them have no or little time-series variation over the short-term period of two years, but the magazine rankings are 
very unstable. 
 
 
 
9 MSA stands for Metropolitan Statistical Areas MSA, a US geographical core area containing a substantial population nucleus, together 
with adjacent communities having a high degree of economic and social integration with that core (https://www.census.gov/programs-
surveys/metro-micro/about.html). 
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 Time window for Diff-in-Diff (example of the 2011 list) 
 
Notes: This figure describes the time window for the Difference-in-Differences estimator used in 
this study. The estimator measures the 1-year relative house price growth (from July 2011 to July 
2012 in this example) in response to the list that was determined by statistics of 2010 and published 
in August 2011. Publicly available statistics are published with a lag of several months, which may 
affect the release date of the magazine list.   
A central consideration in DiD approaches is the length of a time window. As seen in Figure 
1.3, for example, the list for 2011 is based on statistical information of 2010, and this study 
measures the house price changes during the one-year period following the list release. 
However, housing markets will not react to such information immediately. Also, the effect 
of list inclusion will be further slowly observed due to time lags between list release and 
transaction closing; since the transaction process of buying a home takes several months, 
which includes searching for a neighborhood, a home, and then a mortgage lender. Thus 
this study takes post-treatment periods up to two years. Since 2006, not a single town has 
been listed for two consecutive years, so the two-year post-treatment period is not likely to 
cause any serious identification issue. 
Now, a central question is whether pre-treatment statistical information has any anticipatory 
effects on post-treatment house price growth. If prior information has predictive power 
then the standard two-period DiD model should be as below; 
(1.1)   𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 × 𝐿𝐿) + 𝑿𝑿′𝒊𝒊 𝜸𝜸𝟏𝟏 + (𝑿𝑿′𝒊𝒊 × 𝐿𝐿 ) 𝜸𝜸𝟐𝟐  +  𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 + (𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 × 𝐿𝐿) + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
where  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 is the primary focus, an indicator for whether individual city 𝐿𝐿 is included in a 
list, and 𝐿𝐿 is equal to 1 for post-treatment and 0 for pre-treatment. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is a vector of city-level 
covariates used in the listing process, and  𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 is county fixed effects. Individual city-level 
differencing will derive the following model from the Equation 1.1;  
(1.2)  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,0 = 𝛽𝛽2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿′𝒊𝒊 𝜸𝜸𝟐𝟐 + 𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 + (𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖,1 − 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖,0) 
ln(HPJUL 2012)-ln(HPJUL 2011)
JUL 2011 JUL 2012
AUG 2011
Treatment (A new list is released)
DEC 2010
Statistics
Statistics of 2010 determines the list of 2011
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By pooling all available cross-sectional data sets (10 lists from 2005 to 2014), I can obtain 
the following baseline specification; 
(1.3)  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑿𝑿′𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟎𝟎.𝟓𝟓 𝜸𝜸 + 𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
where  𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 denotes County × Year fixed effects and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. Simply, the list is 
released in year 𝐿𝐿, and then regressions estimate the capitalization between year 𝐿𝐿 and 𝐿𝐿 + 1. 
The subscript, 𝐿𝐿 − 0.5 in 𝑿𝑿 indicates the 7-8 month time gap between underlying statistics 
and list publications. Therefore, the coefficient 𝛽𝛽 provides a DiD estimate of the causal 
impact of list inclusion conditional on prior city-level covariates. 
To further recover the causal effect, I add two lagged terms, and one lead term on treatment 
(Equation 1.4). Because list inclusion effects may persist, grow or fade as time passes, the 
lag terms simply capture how long the effects can persist, and also control for previous list 
inclusion. The lead term is used both for a placebo test and for a reverse causality test. If the 
treatment causes future outcomes but not vice versa, then the dummy for future treatment 
should not matter in the equation (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Thus, an insignificant lead 
term will be interpreted as evidence for no anticipatory effect and no reverse causation 
between treatments and outcomes.  
(1.4)   (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = 𝜇𝜇 (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−3) 
                                                     + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡+1   
                                                     + 𝑿𝑿′𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟎𝟎.𝟓𝟓 𝜸𝜸 + 𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
Another concern is serial correlation. House prices are positively autocorrelated over time. 
The degree and persistence of the momentum in house price changes is one of the 
housing market’s greatest puzzles. Case and Shiller (1989a) conclude that people seem to 
form their expectations from past price movements rather than knowledge of 
fundamentals, and the same authors’ other paper (Case and Shiller, 1989b) reports that 
around half of the citywide changes in prices tend to be followed by changes in the same 
direction in the subsequent year. To avoid the empirical concern, I add one lagged 
dependent variable, the price growth of the previous three years, which has been widely 
included across a number of studies particularly in finance literature. It is also because the 
past house price appreciations are a factor used in the listing procedure. Importantly, 
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adding the term could alleviate a concern that the lists may be more appealing to 
homebuyers living in places where house prices went up10.  
1.3.2 Matching 
A main empirical challenge might be still the omitted variable bias arising from city 
characteristics that are used in the listing procedure but are missing in my data set. Even 
after conditioning on observables, there may be systematic differences between treated and 
untreated outcomes due to the unobserved variables. Most city-level aggregated 
characteristics except economic indicators do not change drastically over time, especially in 
the short run of one year or two. Yet the assumption that most omitted variables do not 
critically bias the empirical results may not be plausible, either. However, it is nearly 
impossible to address this issue by controlling for all city characteristics. This analysis 
controls for a range of pre-treatment city characteristics, particularly the most time-varying 
economic indicators, used in the selection process, but some might still be missing because 
the precise variables, weights and formula have not been disclosed and also because the 
magazine’s methodology and criteria differ year by year. Moreover, this study could not have 
secured some data sets provided by commercial database vendors.  
Thus the credibility of this analysis depends on how comparable a counterfactual is in the 
absence of some determinants. Many papers on place-based policies also report that it is 
challenging to find comparison areas. For this reason, a matching estimator is often 
combined with a DiD estimator in some recent papers on such place-based policies. 
Gobillon et al. (2012) take advantage of the French enterprise zone program, which provides 
wage subsidies for firms to hire local workers. In order to measure the direct effect of the 
program on unemployment duration, they estimate propensity scores of being designated as 
a municipality comprising an EZ and then restrict the control group to contain only 
municipalities whose estimated propensity score belongs to the same support as that of 
treated municipalities. Busso et al. (2013) compare census tracts in federal urban 
Empowerment Zones to those in rejected and later round zones with similar characteristics. 
To identify the causal impacts of EZ designation, they construct a set of control zones based 
upon data on the rejected tracts and use a DiD estimator adjusted by implicit propensity 
score weights, Oaxaca-Blinder estimator. More recently, Kline and Moretti (2014) employ 
 
10 A caveat is that most lagged dependent variable models are subject to endogeneity issues due to a common error term.   
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the same estimator to examine the effect of a regional development program, the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA) program. To make treatment and control groups more comparable, 
they use as controls authorities that were proposed but never approved by Congress and 
also drop from their models control counties which appear to be substantially different from 
TVA counties.  
Following this literature, I combine the DiD specifications with the propensity score 
matching (PSM hereafter) to further increase comparability of treated and untreated towns. 
Basically, this matching technique would make the control group as comparable as possible 
by omitting from the models most of the untreated observations which are substantially 
different from listed towns based on their observed city characteristics. It is likely that some 
towns in the same county are as good as the listed towns but are excluded mainly due to the 
county quota or another constraints. In this case, PSM will make the treated and untreated 
groups more similar in the estimated probabilities of list inclusion. More importantly, the 
matching estimator is one potential solution to the omitted variable issue by making use of 
information about observables to infer information about omitted variables. Essentially, 
matching and regressions are identical in terms of the core assumption underlying causal 
inference, so the differences between the two strategies are unlikely to be of major empirical 
importance. But if there is a good reason to believe that conditional on the observed, 
treatment and control groups are similar on unobservables, PSM may help to further isolate 
the treatment effect (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Baum-Snow and Ferreira, 2015). Since most 
of city characteristics are strongly correlated with each other, towns with more similar 
observed characteristics are likely to feature more similar unobservables. 
1.3.3 Data Sources 
For empirical tests, I rely on two key data sources: (1) the Money magazine’s Best Places to Live 
lists for ten years between 2005 and 2014 and (2) the monthly Zillow Home Value Index at 
the city level from January 2000 to August 2016. The Zillow indices are created from 
estimated sale prices on every home instead of a repeat sales methodology, and behave quite 
similarly to the well-known S&P/Case-Shiller indices for most of the historical period11. 
More importantly, the time-series house price indices are available for more than 10,000 U.S. 
cities or towns, enabling this study to link more than 80% of towns included in the magazine 
 
11 For further details, see the website (http://www.zillow.com/research/zhvi-methodology-6032/) 
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rankings to monthly indices during the period. As a result, my sample includes 11,035 U.S. 
towns in total, and 461 of them were listed at least once over the period. 
 Descriptive statistics for listed and non-listed towns (2011-2014) 
 Listed towns Non-listed towns 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
median family income (USD) 98,616 20,198 65,188 28,729 
median house value (USD) 319,381 156,125 196,719 161,455 
population 53,628 42,320 13,562 31,520 
Δln(population) (%) 1.83 5.73 0.84 10.28 
unemployment rate (%) 5.88 1.65 8.93 5.11 
employers 27,646 22,141 6,265 14,733 
Δln(employers) (%) 1.30 5.91 -0.07 12.26 
median commute time (mins) 23.61 5.20 21.64 7.15 
prior-trends of house prices (t-3, t) (%) 1.09 10.15 -0.45 11.85 
share of residents with bachelor or higher (%) 48.71 13.12 24.40 16.05 
share of students attending public schools (%) 88.68 6.11 90.88 10.28 
Notes: This table summarizes descriptive statistics for variables from the American Community Survey (ACS) 
data. It presents differences in the city characteristics between the listed towns and the other towns. The sample 
includes 8,596 towns (Census places) for 2011 to 2014. prior-trends of house prices is the house price growth over 
the 3-year pretreatment period. Median family income, media house value, population, and employers take logs in the 
following regressions.  
To control for pre-treatment statistics that the magazine used, I use Census place-level 
demographic and socioeconomic variables from the American Community Survey (ACS). 
The ACS is a nationwide survey designed to provide communities with reliable and timely 
demographic, social, economic, and housing data every year. The survey data provides, for 
the first time, a continuous stream of updated information for local areas12. In particular, 
ACS 5-year estimates cover all areas in the US including very small populations called the 
Census places. Although the magazine also depends on the data source, the first release was 
the year 2009. As a result, using the data set allows this study to exploit only five years of 
the lists between 2010 and 2014, thereby losing half of the observations. My regression 
models include eight variables from the ACS: median family income, median home price, 
population growth, job (employer) growth, unemployment rate, median commute time, 
share of residents with bachelor or higher degrees, and share of students attending public 
schools13. As presented in Table 1.4, most of the city quality indicators are superior in listed 
towns. To construct a better control group, this paper uses only towns with a population 
below 500,000 and of which the median house price is below $1 million. As discussed earlier, 
the magazine uses both population limits and house price cap to focus on small affordable 
 
12 See the website (https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2008/acs/ACSGeneralHandbook.pdf) 
13 Most of them are time-varying, but a couple of variables have little time-series variation in them. Such time-invariant variables might 
have negligible impacts on future house price growth, but will help PSM to pair more comparable control towns to treatment towns. 
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towns. By adopting the same house price cap, and slightly looser population limits, this paper 
is able to further increase comparability between treated and untreated towns.  
1.4 Results 
Before including local fundamentals in regressions, I examine which factors affect the 
probability of list inclusion using a logistic probability model, which is also used to compute 
propensity scores; for this analysis, I use the same popuplation limits that the magazine used 
and differ each year (Table 1.1). Model specifications (1) to (4) in Table 1.5 vary by the 
scale of fixed effects. All of the variables are used in the listing procedure, but not every 
characteristic has a significant effect on the probabilty of being listed. As the magazine 
focuses on affordable places, high incomes and low house prices appear to be consistently 
significant factors. Above all, this table reveals that socio-demographic characteristics are 
more crucial determinants than volatile economic characteristics even though the magazine 
has emphasized the importance of economic growth in their selection process. Towns with 
more educated residents or with more students attending public schools have a higher 
probability of being listed, whereas population and employer (or job) growth consistently 
have no effect on list inclusion; after the following analyses, I drop these two growth 
indicators in order to benefit from additional one year observations14.  
  
 
14 The magazine uses levels for most variables, but changes for a few variables, such as population growth and job growth, exploiting the 
ACS data sets of previous two years. Using the change variables allows this study to use only four lists of 2011-2014. Thus I can take 
advantage of five lists by not using such growth indicators. 
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 Probability of being listed using logistic regressions (2011-2014) 
 Dependent Variable: List inclusion dummy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln(median family income)  2.886*** 3.658*** 4.921*** 3.979*** 
    (0.666) (0.833) (1.005) (1.248) 
ln(median house price) -1.458*** -1.091** -3.165*** -2.272** 
 (0.259) (0.549) (0.747) (0.906) 
unemployment rate -0.310*** -0.152** -0.181** -0.114 
   (0.0498) (0.0612) (0.0732) (0.0895) 
% bachelor+ 0.0373*** 0.0329*** 0.0483*** 0.0461** 
    (0.00939) (0.0121) (0.0147) (0.0189) 
% public school 0.0613*** 0.0709*** 0.0787*** 0.0972*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0163) (0.0183) (0.0239) 
median commute time 0.0149 0.0348* -0.00648 -0.0217 
 (0.0160) (0.0194) (0.0228) (0.0302) 
∆ ln(population) 5.081 3.188 5.162 2.872 
 (3.589) (3.804) (4.267) (4.626) 
∆ ln(employer)  -5.346 -3.391 -4.616 -2.136 
 (3.473) (3.661) (4.085) (4.480) 
∆ ln(house price) btw. t and t-3  0.0603 1.197 0.879 1.172 
 (0.782) (1.383) (1.684) (2.251) 
Fixed Effects Year Year × State Year × CBSA§ Year × County 
Observations 5,805 4,487 2,612 1,193 
Notes: This table presents results of logistic regressions with four different fixed effects specifications to infer which city 
characteristics the magazine has used in their listing procedure. The dependent variable is an indicator capturing whether the town 
is included in the magazine list of each year, and nine variables from the ACS (American Community Survey) along with the city-
level Zillow Home Value Index are used to explain the probability of being listed. % bachelor+ is the share of residents with a 
bachelor or higher degree. % public school is the share of students attending public schools. ∆ ln(house price) btw. t and t-3 denotes the 
house price growth over the 3-year pretreatment periods. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
§ CBSA stands for Core-Based Statistical Area, a U.S. geographic area that consists of one or more counties that are socio-
economically tied to an urban center of at least 10,000 people, referring to both metropolitan statistical areas and micropolitan 
areas.  
Table 1.6 shows the regression results using all covariates and lagged terms. Coefficients 
for list inclusion are consistently significant in all specifications during the first year (columns 
1-3) and the second year (columns 4-6). Given the statistical significance of the treatment 
and the lagged treatment (t-1), the list inclusion appears to have a greater contribution to 
the second year house price appreciation. Many of control variables are somewhat predictive 
of the post-treatment house price growth at least for a year. Notably, the median house price 
has negative effects on list inclusion but positive effects on house price changes, so there is 
little likelihood of mean reversion because there is no tendency that places with lower pre-
treatment house prices experience higher increases in post-treatment prices. 
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 Regression results: DiD (2010-2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Var. ln(HPt+1)-ln(HPt) ln(HPt+2)-ln(HPt+1) 
Listed (t) 0.00720*** 0.00486*** 0.00393* 0.00458*** 0.00439*** 0.00454*** 
 (0.00163) (0.00162) (0.00209) (0.00141) (0.00132) (0.00155) 
Listed (t+1) : Lead   -0.00179   0.00388* 
   (0.00178)   (0.00204) 
Listed (t-1) : Lag 1   0.00738***   0.00140 
   (0.00148)   (0.00177) 
Listed (t-2) : Lag 2   0.00222   0.000132 
   (0.00185)   (0.00148) 
ln(median family income)   0.00423** 0.00419**  -0.00133 -0.00136 
     (0.00187) (0.00187)  (0.00193) (0.00192) 
ln(median house price)  0.00511** 0.00521**  0.00348 0.00356* 
  (0.00207) (0.00207)  (0.00212) (0.00212) 
unemployment rate  -0.000145* -0.000145*  -0.000160* -0.000160* 
    (8.67e-05) (8.67e-05)  (8.42e-05) (8.41e-05) 
% bachelor+  0.000151*** 0.000146***  3.59e-05 3.21e-05 
     (3.73e-05) (3.74e-05)  (3.76e-05) (3.78e-05) 
% public school  3.97e-05 3.74e-05  1.71e-05 1.56e-05 
  (3.08e-05) (3.08e-05)  (3.15e-05) (3.15e-05) 
median commute time  0.000103** 0.000105**  0.000151*** 0.000152*** 
  (4.92e-05) (4.92e-05)  (4.82e-05) (4.82e-05) 
∆ ln(house price)   -0.0474*** -0.0475***  -0.0283*** -0.0284*** 
    between t and t-3  (0.00670) (0.00671)  (0.00613) (0.00613) 
Observations 42,155 40,030 40,030 42,140 39,630 39,630 
Notes: This table shows regression results from Equation 1.4. The outcome variable of interest is the log of house price growth during 
the first posttreatment year (columns 1 to 3) or the second year (columns 4 to 6). Listed (t) is an indicator taking the value of 1 if the 
city is included in the “50 best places to live” list of year t.  Listed (t+1) is a lead term, capturing whether the city is listed in the following 
year (t+1), for a reverse causality test. Listed (t-1) and Listed (t-2) are lagged terms for the two previous years to capture how long the 
list inclusion effects can persist, and also to control for previous list inclusion. As columns 4, 5, and 6 estimate the second-year effect, 
Listed (t-2), Listed (t-1), Listed (t), and Listed (t+1) serve as Listed (t-3), Listed (t-2), Listed (t-1), and Listed (t) in the columns, respectively. 
% bachelor+ is the share of residents with a bachelor or higher degree. % public school is the share of students attending public schools. 
All columns control for Year×County fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by Year×County. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Obviously, a picture is worth a thousand words in DiD approaches. As displayed in Figure 
1.4, listed towns outperformed the other towns in the same county by 1-2% over the two-
year pre-treatment period and keep marginally outperforming during the post-treatment 
years. However, Figure 1.5 shows that the PSM successfully replicates the pre-treatment 
house price trends of listed towns15. The pre-treatment trends of the treated and the matched 
control towns are almost parallel, followed by gradual post-treatment price deviations. Thus 
the list inclusion appears to have a causal effect on the outperforming post-treatment house 
returns, but the effect is quite lagged. Market responses to the list inclusion become more 
obvious from around the tenth month perhaps due to the transaction lag. Given these 
graphical evidences, the OVB does not seem critical16. If the treated cities experienced 
 
15 In order to compute propensity scores, this study exploits logistic regression models with aforementioned covariates. After calculating 
propensity scores using observations of each year, I match each of the listed towns to towns with the nearest propensity score within the 
same county. 
16 Nearby towns may be perceived as good as listed towns due to geographical proximity. The listed towns may also have affected nearby 
towns indirectly by causing households to move from the nearby towns to the listed towns. Either of these effects could lead to 
underestimation or overestimation of the treatment effect. 
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fundamenally different pre-treatment conditions in unobservables then the price deviations 
should have begun before or shortly after list publications.  
 Trends before matching  
(2010-2014 Lists) 
 
 Trends after PSM using 6 variables  
(2010-2014 Lists) 
 
 
 Trends after PSM using 2 variables 
(2010-2014 Lists) 
 
 Trends after NNM using past price change  
(2010-2014 Lists) 
 
Notes: Figures 1.4-1.7 show normalized average house price indices for treatment and control groups over the two-year pre-
treatment and post-treatment periods, using the magazine lists of five years from 2010 to 2014; each index is equal to 100 in the 
month when the magazine list was published. The first group (red solid line) consists of towns nominated as one of the best places 
to live by the magazine. The second group (blue dash line) compiles towns in the control group: either the other towns within the 
same county of each listed town (Figure 1.4), the towns selected on the 6-variable propensity score matching (PSM) within the 
same county (Figure 1.5), the towns selected on the 2-variable PSM (Figure 1.6), or the towns selected on the Nearest Neighbor 
Matching (NNM) using only the house price apprecition over the past three years (Figure 1.7).   
To further clarify to which extent omitted variables can bias the matching estimator, I try 
another PSM using only two variables, % bachelor+ and % public school, which are consistently 
and most significant in the previous regressions. Within a county, those two variables might 
be good enough to picture what each town looks like, but absence of all economic features 
can possibly lead to a serious mismatch between treated and untreated towns. Yet the 
control group selected on only the two variables are not substantially different from that 
using six variables (Figure 1.6). It may be the case that, as expected, most of the city 
characteristics are strongly correlated with each other. For example, towns with more 
educated residents might achieve higher median income levels and lower unemployment 
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rates. Table 1.7 confirms that the PSM estimator can substantially reduce unobservable 
imbalance by reducing observable imbalance, and also that the two-variable PSM does not 
make any noticeable distinctions compared to the six- variable model: even in regressions 
(Table 1.8). An alternative interpretation for this is that homebuyers are more interested in 
a town’s socio-demographic features, such as education attainment and school quality, than 
economic indicators (unemployment rate or income levels of a neighborhood). In particular, 
if most inter-town migrations occur within a metropolitan area, then the town-level 
economic features would be less important considerations because both departure and 
destination cities are associated with a common urban core or job center, which mainly 
determine the residents’ economic opportunities. If it is the case, such socio-demographic 
factors could be main house price drivers within a MSA. 
The marginal but distinctive pre-treatment differences in the house price trends motivates 
an estimation strategy that controls for past house price changes only. The past price change 
may be one of the most significant factors in predicting house prices in the near future. Thus 
nearby towns of similar pre-treatment house price trends are more likely to have similar local 
characteristics or to be under influence of common price determinants. To do so, I employ 
Nearest Neighbors Matching (NNM) based on the price growth of past three years, and 
Figure 1.7 and the specification (6) in Table 1.8 suggest that the estimator is as good as the 
PSM.   
 Covariate means for each group (2010-2014) 
 Treatment 
Listed towns 
Control Gr 1. 
The other towns 
in county 
Control 2. 
6-Var. PSM 
 
Control 3. 
2-Var. PSM 
 
Control 4. 
NNM 
(ln HPt/HPt-3 ) 
Panel A - Means      
median family income (USD) 96,863 90,090 99,476 98,016 93,356 
median house value (USD) 322,917 342,319 349,000 345,466 326,537 
unemployment rate (%) 5.71 7.20 5.30 5.68 6.10 
median commute time (mins) 23.52 25.22 24.03 24.08 24.67 
share of residents with bachelor or higher 47.99 37.92 46.75 46.60 40.90 
share of students attending public schools 88.59 87.32 86.80 87.12 87.11 
pre-trends of house prices (t-3, t) (%) -5.06 -7.19 -5.20 -5.19 -5.19 
Panel B - Difference in Means  ( t-tests: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
median family income (USD)  -6773*** 2613 1153 -3447 
median house value (USD)  19402 26083* 22549 -2984 
unemployment rate (%)  1.50*** -0.41*** -0.03 0.30 
median commute time (mins)  1.70*** 0.51 0.56 1.04** 
share of residents with bachelor or higher  -10.06*** -1.24 -1.39 -6.95*** 
share of students attending public schools  -1.28** -1.80** -1.47** -1.15 
pre-trends of house prices (t-3, t) (%)  -2.13* -0.13 -0.12 0.14 
Notes: Panel A shows how average characteristics of towns in each control group vary across the matching techniques. In addition, 
Panel B shows how each matching estimator can reduce imbalance in the observed city characteristic with t-test results. Control groups 
1 to 4 are the results displayed in Figures 1.5 to 1.8, respectively. 
 
 33 
 
 Regression results: Matched DiD (2010-2014) 
 Dependent Variable: ln(HPt+2)-ln(HPt) 
 (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) 6-Var. PSM (5) 2-Var. PSM (6) NNM 
Listed (t) 0.00932*** 0.00714*** 0.00674*** 0.00713*** 0.00693*** 0.01110*** 
 (0.00212) (0.00212) (0.00214) (0.00244) (0.00262) (0.00273) 
ln(median family income)   -0.0111 -0.0151**    
     (0.00726) (0.00683)    
ln(median house price)  0.00836 0.00709    
  (0.00885) (0.00892)    
unemployment rate  -0.00105* -0.000955    
    (0.000571) (0.000585)    
% bachelor+  0.000344*** 0.000349***    
     (0.000112) (0.000117)    
% public school  -2.35e-05 -3.50e-05    
  (0.000144) (0.000145)    
median commute time  -5.52e-05 -3.45e-05    
  (0.000185) (0.000187)    
∆ ln(house price) btw. t and t-3 0.0813**  0.0454    
      (0.0332)  (0.0327)    
Observations 4,750 4,843 4,750 601 599 589 
Notes: This table compares the matched Difference-in-Differences regression results (columns 4 to 6) with the OLS results (columns 1 
to 3). The dependent variable is the log of house price growth during the 2-year posttreatment periods. Listed (t), the variable of interest, 
is an indicator capturing whether the city is included in the “50 best places to live” list of year t.  Model 1 controls for house price growth 
during the past three years, ∆ ln(house price) btw. t and t-3, and Model 2 controls for basic city characteristics only. Model 3 includes both 
the city characteristics and the past house price trend. Models 4, 5, and 6 use as control groups towns paired by the six-variable propensity 
score matching, the two-variable propensity score, and the nearest neighbor matching, respectively.  % bachelor+ is the share of residents 
with a bachelor or higher degree. % public school is the share of students attending public schools. All columns control for Year×County 
fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by Year×County. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Trends before matching (2005-2014 lists) 
 
 Trends after PSM using alternative covariates (2005-2014 lists) 
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 Trends after NNM using past price change (2005-2014 lists) 
 
Notes: Each figure shows normalized average house price indices for treatment and control groups over the two-year pre-
treatment and post-treatment periods, using the magazine lists of ten years from 2005 to 2014; each index is equal to 100 in the 
month when the magazine list was published. The first group (red solid line) consists of towns included in the magazine lists. The 
second group (blue dash line) compiles towns in the control group: either the other towns within the same county of each listed 
town (Figure 1.8), the towns selected on the propensity score matching using alternative covariables (Figure 1.9), or the towns 
selected on the Nearest Neighbor Matching using only the house price apprecition over the past three years (Figure 1.10).   
 Covariate means for each group (2005-2014)  
 Treatment 
Listed towns 
Control 1. 
The other towns 
in county 
Control 2. 
PSM 
 
Control 3. 
NNM 
(ln HPt/HPt-3 ) 
Panel A - Means     
Δln(population) (%) 1.87 1.15 1.67 1.78 
unemployment rate (%) 5.07 6.48 5.38 5.63 
Δln(employers) (%) 1.30 0.98 1.41 1.74 
pre-trends of house prices (t-3, t) (%) 3.97 5.36 4.03 3.77 
Panel B - Difference in Means  ( *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
Δln(population) (%)  -0.72*** -0.20 -0.14 
unemployment rate (%)  1.41*** 0.31** 0.58*** 
Δln(employers) (%)  -0.32 0.11 0.38 
pre-trends of house prices (t-3, t) (%)  1.38 0.06 -0.33 
Notes: This table uses alternative control variables from different sources. Panel A shows how average city characteristics vary 
across the control groups, and Panel B shows whether matching estimators (Control groups 2 and 3) can reduce imbalance in the 
observed city characteristic with t-test results. Control groups 1 to 3 are the results displayed in Figures 1.9 to 1.11, respectively. 
 Regression results: Matched DiD with alternative covariates (2005-2014) 
 Dependent Variable.: ln(HPt+2)-ln(HPt) 
 (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) PSM (5) NNM 
Listed (t) 0.0183*** 0.0121*** 0.0121*** 0.00872*** 0.0132*** 
 (0.00365) (0.00358) (0.00341) (0.00260) (0.00352) 
∆ ln(population)  -0.0635 -0.0602   
  (0.0609) (0.0632)   
unemployment rate  -0.00626** -0.00737**   
  (0.00293) (0.00361)   
∆ ln(employer)  0.0176 -0.00645   
    (0.0432) (0.0340)   
∆ ln(house price) between t and t-3 -0.0534  -0.0959   
      (0.0825)  (0.0905)   
Observations 2,481 2,499 2,481 672 673 
Notes: This table presents how the size and the statistical significance of the key parameters vary across control groups. The dependent 
variable is the log of house price growth during the 2-year post-treatment periods. Listed (t) is an indicator capturing whether the city is 
included in the magazine list of year t. Model 1 controls for house price growth during the past three years, ∆ ln(house price) btw. t and t-3, 
and Model 2 controls for basic city characteristics only. Model 3 includes both the city characteristics and the past house price trend. 
Models 4 and 5 use as control groups towns paired by the propensity score matching and the nearest neighbor matching, respectively.  
All columns control for Year×County fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by Year×County. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0. 
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In order to assess the credibility of the research design, I conduct robustness tests by using 
an alternative set of covariates from different sources. I collected three variables, population 
from the US Census (2004-2013), and unemployment rate and number of employers from 
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2004-2013). These covariates allow me to use all of the 
ten lists (2005-2014) but lose nearly 85% observations in my sample because these data sets 
do not cover all of the small towns17. As displayed in Figures 1.8 – 1.10, and Tables 1.9 
and 1.10, the visual illustrations of pre- and post-treatment trends, and regression results are 
highly consistent with the previous results, thereby confirming the robustness of the finding. 
1.5 Role of Local Newspapers 
In the previous section, a key assumption for identification is that the magazine rankings are 
not true reflections of city quality based on the unstable rankings over time. Given the 
assumption, this paper estimates an independent effect by controlling for underlying, 
observable city characteristics or by carefully pairing each treated city to a comparable 
untreated city. However, if the rankings are true reflections of city quality, then none of non-
listed towns can be treated as a comparable counterfactual, and therefore the difference-in-
differences estimators suffer from an omitted variable bias. 
To identify an independent effect of the magazine reports without imposing the assumption, 
this section exploits local newspaper coverage on the magazine lists. It is hard to assume 
that most local residents obtain the information directly from the printed magazines or their 
website. The circulation of the magazine is around two million, which means that only a 
small share of the population would read the reports in the magazine. Instead, local 
newspapers may be the main source of local information to those who live in small towns 
or cities, as the media outlets in both print and electronic versions provide a wide range of 
local news, such as local jobs, opening of new restaurants, and events for kids in the 
neighborhood. After a new list is released, some listed towns receive substantial attention 
from such local media outlets, but the others do not. Thus the magazine effect is likely to 
be greater in the listed places that are introduced in their local newspapers. When the 
magazine reports are covered by a local newspaper, local residents within the media coverage 
 
17 More specifically, the variables cause a loss of more than 80% of non-listed towns but 40% of listed town, so the loss is more critical 
for control groups rather than treatment groups. As a result, the average number of towns per Year × County group reduces approximately 
from 19 to 8. In order to avoid additional observation loss, this analysis does not use the house price cap and population limits. 
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but out of the listed city might more strongly respond to the magazine lists thereby moving 
into the city. For that reason, I compare listed towns with and without attention from local 
newspapers, controlling for their ranks.  
To do so, I examined whether each of the listed towns was introduced in local media outlets. 
From Google News search, I first collected news articles that report a magazine list between 
the list publication day and the last day of the year, using a keyword combination including 
“Money” and “best places to live” in addition to the name of the listed town and the year 
of each publication. Then I identified the publisher of each article, and included in my 
sample only articles that were published by local media outlets headquartered in the state 
where each listed town is located. As displayed in Table 1.11, only from 2010 on, more than 
half of the listed towns were covered by local media outlets. A limitation of this analysis is 
that I simply depend on Google News search results. Recently, almost all local newspapers 
provide news through both printed papers and websites, but some newspapers might have 
had only print formats in the early years of analysis. Other than local newspapers, some 
websites of local real estate or travel agencies also cover the magazine list publication, 
focusing on their home or neighboring towns included in the lists. But I do not take those 
company websites into account because people do not visit the websites on a regular basis; 
in contrast, many people read local newspapers or visit their websites every day18.   
 Local newspaper coverage of listed towns by year 
Year The number of non-listed towns 
The number of listed towns 
Total Covered 
by Local Newspaper 
Not covered 
by Local Newspaper 
2005 14,767 13 83 14,863 
2006 14,772 3 88 14,863 
2007 14,766 4 93 14,863 
2008 14,767 8 88 14,863 
2009 14,769 45 49 14,863 
2010 14,762 65 36 14,863 
2011 14,771 50 42 14,863 
2012 14,764 70 29 14,863 
2013 14,814 31 18 14,863 
2014 14,813 39 11 14,863 
Total 147,765 328 537 148,630 
Notes: This table shows variation in local newspaper coverage of the listed towns.  
 
 
 
18 There are more than 1,300 daily newspapers in the United States, and more than a quarter of adults read a newspaper every day 
(https://www.statista.com/statistics/183408/number-of-us-daily-newspapers-since-1975/) 
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 Regression results: The effect of local newspaper (2005-2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Var. ln(HPt+1/HPt) ln(HPt+2/HPt+1) 
Listed 0.00801*** 0.00293 -0.00504 0.0138*** 0.0112*** -0.00247 
 (0.00307) (0.00383) (0.00416) (0.00273) (0.00325) (0.00381) 
Listed × Local Newspaper Reporting  0.0103*** 0.0158***  0.00531* 0.0122*** 
  (0.00365) (0.00400)  (0.00309) (0.00339) 
Listed × Ranking -0.000110** -8.86e-05 -7.70e-05 -9.60e-05* -8.49e-05* -2.25e-05 
 (5.55e-05) (5.53e-05) (7.05e-05) (4.98e-05) (4.98e-05) (6.26e-05) 
Fixed Effects Year × State Year × State City, Year Year × State Year × State City, Year 
Observations 101,558 101,558 101,558 101,089 101,089 101,089 
Notes: This table shows how local newspaper reporting affects the link between list inclusion and housing prices. The dependent variable 
is the natural logarithm of house price growth during the first posttreatment year (columns 1 to 3) or the second year (columns 4 to 6). 
Listed is an indicator capturing whether the city is included in each year’s list. Local Newspaper Reporting is a dummy variable taking 1 if the 
listed town received attention from local newspapers between the list release day and the last day of the year. Models 1, 2, 4, and 5 include 
Year × State fixed effects, but Models 3 and 6 include year and individual city fixed effects. All columns control for house price growth 
during the past three years. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by Year×County. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The regression results indicate that the magazine lists have an independent effect through 
the local newspaper coverage even when the rankings are assumed to truly reflect the order 
of city quality (Table 1.12). Both list inclusion and rank orders have significant effects on 
local housing prices in models (1) and (4). However, Model 2 shows that the lists have a 
significant effect on house prices during the one-year post-treatment period only when listed 
towns are introduced in local newspapers. It is also notable that homebuyers do not pay 
more for higher ranked towns conditional on local media coverage. Perhaps, higher ranked 
towns are more likely to get media attention so could experience higher price increases.  
The primary advantage of this analysis is to identify an independent effect of the magazine 
lists, rather than to identify an effect of local media coverage. If the list inclusion and the 
rank orders truly reflect the quality of each city and if the underlying city characteristics are 
the only house price driver, then one would not expect such insignificant effects of list 
inclusion and rank orders conditional on local newspaper reporting. Thus this finding 
indicates not only that the magazine lists affect homebuyers by affecting coverage decisions 
of local newspapers, but also that the results in the previous section do not suffer a serious 
omitted variable issue.  
However, interpreting the effect of local newspapers is subject to an empirical concern, 
endogeneity of newspaper reporting. Local newspapers could reflect local economic 
conditions or the preferences of local residents, their readers. The local media outlets do not 
affect the magazine reports, but it is possible that local newspapers are more willing to 
deliver such information in MSAs or counties with residents who have a stronger interest in 
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house prices. That is, the local newspapers are likely to reflect local people’s characteristics 
toward investment or asset prices, so the results could be biased by the different 
characteristics across states or towns. For this reason, I include an individual fixed effects 
model. As seen in Table 1.11, some towns did receive local media attention in some years, 
but did not in other years. Exploiting this time-series variation eliminates the typical concern 
about biases arising from different local characteristics across space. The individual fixed 
effects models (3) and (6) in Table 1.12 robustly identify the causal effect of the best place 
lists.  
1.6 Conclusion 
Most homebuyers base their decisions on information from families, friends, agents, and 
internet websites due to quality uncertainty of houses and neighborhoods. It is well 
documented that quality information could facilitate better matches and thus increase 
consumer welfare. In addition, housing accounts for a large part of household expenditures 
or family wealth in the US and many other countries (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002; Campbell 
and Cocco, 2007; Piazzesi et al., 2007; Yamashita, 2007). However, the link between housing 
demand and information on city quality has not yet been studied. By exploiting the Money 
magazine’s annual reports, “Best places to live in America” lists, this paper characterizes the 
relationship. The magazine lists are a potential source that influences local housing markets 
for a couple of reasons. First of all, the magazine has the largest circulation of any monthly 
financial magazines in the United States: nearly two million readers. Also, the annual reports 
are frequently cited by local newspapers and social media, thereby being repeatedly exposed 
to individual homebuyers. In addition, the magazine is published by the Time Inc., one of the 
world's biggest media companies, so has an excellent reputation with individuals.  
However, identifying the link is challenging. Homebuyers may pay a premium both because 
the towns are listed and because the listed towns are of better quality than the other towns. 
To estimate the causal effect, this paper relies on difference-in-differences estimators 
combined with propensity score matching, and finds that the list inclusion predicts a gradual 
increase in house prices. For further causal investigations, this paper also exploits variation 
in local newspaper coverage on the magazine lists, and show that the lists have a significant 
effect only when the listed towns are introduced in local newspapers, thereby identifying an 
independent effect of the magazine lists. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first 
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to find the evidence that quality information or recommendations from media outlets can 
affect local housing prices. Despite the fact that the empirical results robustly confirm the 
causal link, however, the mechanism behind the link is still unclear and unidentified. The 
magazine lists could make readers believe that the listed towns are far superior to the others 
and ultimately wish to purchase a home there. People may move to listed towns believing 
that the places would give them better economic opportunities or quality of life. The third-
party information also can increase demand by simply making more people aware of the 
existence and the basic characteristics of the listed cities, which potentially contributes to 
better matches between heterogeneous homebuyers and neighborhoods. This paper leaves 
the question for future research.   
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How Does Media Attention Shape Urban 
Consumption? Evidence from the Restaurant Industry 
in New York City 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Consumers face a high degree of uncertainty regarding the quality of experience goods19, 
so quality information such as critical reviews or user ratings is commonly used in relevant 
industries, and media and experts have played a key role in informing consumers about 
product quality. A wide range of papers highlight the importance of media reviews in 
guiding consumer choices, although only a handful of studies have identified its causal 
effects on consumer demand for experience goods such as wine (Hilger et al., 2010; 
Friberg and Grönqvist, 2012), books (Berger et al., 2010), and movies (Eliashberg and 
Shugan, 1997; Reinstein and Snyder, 2005; Chen et al., 2012).  
Building upon the existing literature, this paper stresses potential channels through which 
publicity can affect consumer demand. Information about product quality could increase 
consumers’ likelihood of purchasing the guided goods in two ways. Above all, positive 
reviews can lead consumers to believe that the product is of high quality,20 thereby 
increasing demand (vertical consumer sorting). Hence this study emphasizes the role of 
positive quality indicators. But it is not the only channel. When no one knows all available 
alternatives, the media attention could increase demand not only by signalling quality of 
products but also by informing consumers about the existence of the reviewed products. 
For instance, Berger et al. (2010) documents that a negative review in the New York Times 
(NYT) increased sales of books by relatively unknown authors. As a marginal effect of 
information is larger when consumers have less prior knowledge or information about 
 
19 Nelson (1970) introduces the term, ‘experience goods’ of which quality can be fully judged only after consumption. 
20 In other words, such information increases consumers’ expected utility from the good. 
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certain products, media attention is expected to be able to boost sales simply by making 
more people aware of the reviewed goods. Yet products or services in many industries are 
both vertically and horizontally differentiated so that goods differ not only by quality and 
price but also by characteristics associated with consumers’ individual preferences. Simply, 
such information can help consumers to find products that best meet their heterogeneous 
needs by reducing search costs (horizontal consumer sorting). In this sense, this paper pays 
particular attention to how publicity can catalyze interactions between characteristics of 
consumers and products.  
For empirical tests, this study relies upon the restaurant industry in New York City (NYC). 
Numerous traditional media outlets and internet blogs publish professional restaurant 
reviews every day, but not a single paper has reported any empirical evidence on the role 
of media reviews in this industry, to the best of my knowledge. First of all, this paper starts 
by identifying a causal effect of the Michelin guide, one of the most popular and iconic 
dining guidebooks in this industry. By using NYC’s yellow taxi trip record data to 
construct a weekly panel of measures for restaurant demand, I find that newly Michelin-
starred restaurants experience a 3.2% increase in the number of taxi passengers dropped 
off within a 100 feet radius from each restaurant, which approximately corresponds to 
weekly sales growth of $936. Yet an empirical limitation with the guidebook is that only 
starred restaurants receive media attention although hundreds of non-starred restaurants 
are included. Thus it is not possible to disentangle the effect of the quality indicator, 
Michelin stars, from the media effect, which increases restaurant awareness. To overcome 
this issue, I utilize another popular and influential information source, NYT restaurant 
reviews. Specifically, all of the restaurant reviews are published in the press but only 60-
70% of them are awarded positive quality indicators by NYT critics. Empirical results 
demonstrate that consumer responses to the reviews are significant when restaurants win 
the media’s positive indicators. Positively reviewed restaurants experience around 4.6% 
more taxi traffic or $1,560 more weekly revenues. This finding is consistent with existing 
literature showing that, controlling for price and quantity, positively reviewed products are 
more demanded.  
Then this paper focuses on locational factors that possibly affect consumers’ restaurant 
choices in order to identify the awareness effect. Since NYT is one of the US’s most 
influential newspapers with a large readership, the reviews could substantially improve 
awareness of the existence and characteristics of each reviewed restaurant. Considering 
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that restaurants differ not only in quality but also in many other characteristics, increasing 
awareness might be able to contribute to better matches between restaurants and 
consumers. Among many characteristics of restaurants, location is one of the most 
important considerations in restaurant choices. A consumer may visit a reviewed 
restaurant regardless of quality indicators if the venue is located in her favorite 
neighborhood. In particular, Davis et al. (Forthcoming) demonstrate that demographic 
similarity between restaurant locations and either home locations or diners’ racial/ethnical 
identity has a large impact on diner decisions. By exploiting each taxi rider’s neighborhood 
characteristics inferred from destinations of post-dining taxi trips during evening peak 
hours, I present two main findings: 1) Black and Hispanic diners have stronger preferences 
for demographic similarity than Asians. In response to NYT reviews, a 10% larger share 
of black or Hispanic residents in a restaurant tract is associated with 6.0% more black or 
5.8% more Hispanic consumers, respectively. 2) Even when the reviews are not positive, 
black and Hispanic diners significantly respond to demographic characteristics of 
restaurant locations: a 6.7% or 12.0% increase in black or Hispanic diners, respectively. 
Thus the findings suggest that demographic characteristics of locations are important 
considerations for urban retailers targeting a specific demographic group of customers. 
Given that around one thousand restaurants open each year and about 80% of them go 
out of business within the next five years in New York City 21, the findings of this paper 
have several implications. First of all, professional critics have played a critical role in 
deciding who survives and who fails in the competitive industry. Thus this research sheds 
light on the roles of food writers and media outlets by answering two questions; how much 
economic value the professional critics provide, and why many of them use star-rating 
systems in addition to informative and detailed reviews. Second, restaurants are both 
vertically and horizontally differentiated, so media information can improve matches 
between heterogeneous consumers and products even in the absence of quality indicators. 
That is, such information can increase demand both through quality indicators and 
through awareness, resulting in both vertical and horizontal consumer sorting. Last, not 
only centrality but also demographic characteristics are important locational forces 
positively affecting urban consumers’ decisions22.  
 
21 Source: a documentary film, Eat This New York (2004) 
22 Davis et al. (2016) report that restaurant consumption in NYC is only half as segregated as residence, but publicity appears to make 
urban consumption more segregated.   
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Section 2.2 further discusses the role of publicity in the restaurant industry, and the 
following section 2.3 details the explanatory and dependent variables of this research, and 
describes how a weekly panel is constructed. After identifying the causal effect of the 
Michelin guide in section 2.4, this paper carefully disentangles the effects of quality 
indicators and awareness in section 2.5, exploiting NYT reviews.  
2.2 Media Attention in the Restaurant Industry 
Considering the size of the restaurant industry, particularly in the U.S.23, the potential 
economic impacts of popular restaurants are not negligible. Increasing consumer flows to 
top restaurants benefit nearby retailers such as cafés, pubs, bars, or alternative restaurants. 
Thus if a restaurant is successful, others tend to follow in nearby locations, and the area 
possibly becomes a popular destination for dining and, sometimes, also for housing. 
Indeed, many successful retail districts are anchored by popular restaurants. The presence 
of such tenants is also a plus in leasing adjacent space, so developers or investors always 
wish to attract popular restaurants to their properties. In the meantime, such popular 
restaurants could trigger urban retail gentrification. Rents in the hot neighborhood will go 
up as a result of increasing consumer flows, so more profitable retailers will displace early 
settlers including even landmark restaurants. That is, the composition of nearby retailers 
keeps changing to convert more traffic into sales or profits. A well-known example is 
Union Square Café in New York City. This iconic restaurant lost its space in 2015 although 
the anchor tenant was believed to have helped to revive its neighborhood since opening 
in 1986. It is simply because more profitable retailers such as international chain stores, 
banks and drugstores are willing to pay higher rents,24 ultimately benefiting landlords and 
real estate investors.  
Publicity has played a crucial role in the early prosperity of such top restaurants. As quality 
of food cannot be fully evaluated before experience, many diners base their choices on 
recommendations from various sources like the Michelin Guide. The French tyre company 
Michelin has awarded Michelin stars to a list of selected restaurants and published their 
 
23 The restaurant industry is the second-largest private sector employer in the U.S., and industry sales are projected to reach at $798.7 
billion with 14.7 million employees in 2017 (National Restaurant Association, http://www.restaurant.org).  
24 The newly proposed rent for the space was $650,000 per year, and a Japanese chain restaurant moved into the location in 2016. For 
more information, see the following articles : New York Times (www.nytimes.com/2014/06/24/dining/ union-square-cafe-joins-other-
victims-of-new-york-citys-rising-rents.html?_r=0), and Urban Land Institute (urbanland.uli.org/ sustainability/food-adds-flavor-value-
real-estate-agrihoods-food-halls-food-based-concepts/). 
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guidebooks across the globe for more than a century, initially, to boost the demand for 
their car tires. There is no empirical evidence, but some anecdotal stories tell us that such 
third-party judgement has strong influences on diners’ choice. For instance, a café in 
France was overwhelmed with phone calls for a table reservation after it won a Michelin 
star by mistake.25  Even, the Michelin star has been alleged to boost nearby house prices,26 
as top restaurants are frequently considered as local amenities or attractions; a recent paper 
(Kuang, 2017) demonstrates that both quantity and quality of restaurants are capitalized 
in the value of nearby housing.  
A wide range of methods have been used to convey such quality information to diners, 
but the internet user reviews on social media are recently becoming important in informing 
consumers about restaurant quality. In response, a couple of papers estimate a causal effect 
of Yelp’s user ratings27. Since users assign a rating from 1 to 5 stars but the social media 
displays the average rating after rounding off to the nearest half star, researchers can take 
advantage of the display system by employing regression discontinuity design. Anderson 
and Magruder (2012) find that an extra half-star rating causes restaurants to sell out their 
prime time tables 19% points more frequently, using restaurant reservation availability as 
an outcome variable, and Luca (2016) reports that a one-star increase in rating leads to a 
5-9 % increase in revenue.  
Yelp might be crucial for established restaurants, and owners certainly pay a lot of 
attention to user ratings on social media. However, many newly opened retailers still 
depend on the traditional mass media to grab attention. When they cannot afford a prime 
location with high foot traffic, the new restaurateurs use various marketing strategies to 
attract traffic to their locations. In particular, quality information from seemingly neutral 
and credible third-party critics has the potential to have a great impact on demand (Nelson, 
1974). Positive publicity by an influential newspaper draws substantial attention from 
potential customers, stimulating their appetites. Therefore, retailers have strong incentives 
to draw attention from news media. For this reason, sponsored reviews have been one of 
the most controversial ethical topics among food journalists. However, the economic 
 
25 For more information, see the Telegraph article (www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/18/workmens-cafe-overwhelmed-customers-
accidentally-given-michelin/) 
26 See Financial Times  (www.ft.com/content/f72f5962-0522-11e5-8612-00144feabdc0), Telegraph (www.telegraph.co.uk/property/ 
house-prices/how-the-uks-best-restaurants-are-driving-up-property-prices/), and Country & Town House (www.countryandtownhouse 
.co.uk/property/michelin-stars-good-property-prices/). 
27 A user review website for local businesses (www.yelp.com/) 
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impacts or values of such media attention have not been studied yet in this business, to 
my knowledge, despite the fact that professional media critics have existed for a long time 
in the food and beverage market.   
2.3 Data 
For empirical tests, I rely upon 807 restaurants located in New York City. Specifically, 135 
restaurants won a Michelin star or more at least once between 2006 and 2017. The number 
of starred restaurants in NYC has increased from 40 in 2006 to 99 in 2017, and, on average, 
about 10 restaurants were newly starred every year. In the meantime, the New York Times 
reviews two restaurants nearly every week, so the sample includes 755 restaurants reviewed 
by the newspaper from 2008 to 2016. Out of the 807 venues, 78 were both NYT-reviewed 
and Michelin-starred restaurants. 
Notably, this study uses the number of taxi drop-offs or passengers as a proxy of demand 
for each restaurant. One of the key empirical issues in this kind of research is availability 
of individual restaurant-level sales data, so it is not surprising that there exist only a couple 
of empirical papers in the restaurant industry given that micro-data for restaurant revenues 
is rare or very inaccessible to researchers. To overcome the limitation, I utilize NYC’s 
Yellow Taxi Trip Record Data collected and provided to the NYC Taxi and Limousine 
Commission (TLC) through the Taxi Passenger Enhancement Program (TPEP)28. The 
records cover all trips completed in yellow taxis from January 2009 to June 2016, including 
dates, times, locations (longitudes and latitudes) for both pick-ups and drop-offs in 
addition to passenger counts, trip distances, itemized fares, etc. More than 160 million 
yellow taxi trips per year, and around 1.2 billion trips in total occurred during the period. 
To construct a panel of restaurant demand measures, I identified taxi drop-offs within a 
100 feet radius from each restaurant’s centroid29, and then counted each week’s total 
number of drop-offs. By doing so, my data set consists of weekly taxi drop-offs for the 
807 restaurants over 391 weeks; in addition to drop-offs, I also use the total number of 
passengers as a dependent variable. This indirect measure is expected to effectively capture 
consumer attention because taxis are a major mode to travel to restaurants in the crowded 
 
28 For more information on the data, see the website (www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/about/trip_record_data.shtml) 
29 More precisely, the radius is based on each restaurant’s coordinates (longitude and latitude) extracted from Google Map, using a Stata 
package, geocode3. 
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city. Consumers visiting a restaurant after release of a review might have visited the same 
venue by another transport mode. But the change of transport mode may be independent 
of the change of consumer choices. Also, increases in taxi riding customers are likely to 
be correlated with increases in ones relying upon other transportation modes. In some 
senses, the number of taxi rides is a more accurate measure for consumer attention because 
revenues reflect only traded services, but taxi rides capture both traded and untraded 
demand; when there is no available table in destination restaurants, people often choose 
nearby alternative restaurants, so realized revenues underestimate actual demand shocks 
under supply constraints of restaurants. Uber, the ride-sharing company, has already taken 
advantage of the link between taxi rides and restaurant demand, releasing multiple types 
of restaurant lists ranked by the total number of drop-offs. For example, its ‘Up-and-coming’ 
restaurants have the greatest increase in drop-offs, and ‘Brunch spots’ list is determined by 
the number of drop-offs during weekend brunch hours30.  
Figure 2.1. Pre-and post-treatment trends of passenger counts at newly Michelin-starred restaurants 
 
Notes: I investigate whether newly Michelin-starred restaurants experience higher taxi traffic 
than before. The Circle area is within a 100 feet radius from the centroid of each restaurant. 
Donut 1 is between two circles of 100 and 200 feet radiuses from the same restaurant. 
Likewise, Donut areas 2, 3, 4, and 5 are 200-300, 300-400, 400-500, and 500-600 feet far 
from each restaurant centroid, respectively. By identifying the taxis arrived at each 
restaurant, this figure shows the normalized average number of taxi passengers dropped off 
inside each of six areas over 8-week pre- and post-treatment periods. Each passenger count 
index is equal to 100 in the week when a new Michelin guide was published (week 0). This 
result is from 77 restaurants that newly won a Michelin star or more between 2009 and 
2015.   
More importantly, this real-time measure enables this study to conduct short-term causal 
investigations. As quality, price and quantity aspects of food are all time-varying but not 
 
30 For further details, visit Uber’s website (www.uber.com/info/restaurant-guide/) 
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very observable, mid- or long-term analysis is subject to serious omitted variable biases. It 
is possible that restaurants raise prices or fail in quality control in response to increasing 
demand since a media review is published. If it is the case, then the treatment effects are 
underestimated. For this reason, this study primarily focuses on short-term analyses, taking 
full advantage of the proxy. To investigate whether and how much the outcome variable 
can capture the treatment effect in the short run, I counted the number of passengers 
dropped off inside areas of one circle and five donuts centered at each newly Michelin-
starred restaurant: 0-100, 100-200, 200-300, 300-400, 400-500, 500-600 feet radiuses, 
respectively. The following visual illustration shows strongly parallel pretreatment trends, 
but distinctive deviations after treatment between the circle and donuts, suggesting that 
the treatment has a significant effect on the number of taxi riders dropped off inside the 
circle area (Figure 2.1).   
An empirical challenge is that each restaurant has a different life span. For instance, many 
restaurants are in operation only for a few years. However, the accurate dates when each 
restaurant began to operate and closed permanently are missing31. To approximate the 
open date of each restaurant, I collected the date of the first user review on Yelp.com, and 
computed the date three months before each treatment (the publication date of a Michelin 
guide or a NYT review), assuming that each restaurant was in operation at least during the 
three-month pretreatment period32. Then I treated an earlier one of the two dates as the 
open date. Likewise, I treated a later one of the last user review date and the date six-
month later as the close date. As a consequence, each restaurant’s operation periods vary 
so the panel data set used in this study is highly unbalanced.  
2.4 Impact of the Michelin Guide 
A variety of quality indicators on restaurants have been favorites of diners, and one of the 
most iconic indicators is the Michelin Guide. In this section, I investigate whether a new star 
in the guidebook can help restaurants attract more customers. The Michelin star, as a 
quality indicator, could have a significant influence on consumer choices and thus on 
demand for the starred restaurants. To identify the link, this study estimates the impact 
 
31 I treat relocated restaurants as permanently closed to construct a consistent panel data. 
32 Compared to NYT reviews, the Michelin guide reportedly takes longer time to award a star, so I assume that newly Michelin-starred 
restaurants were in operation for at least six months before treatment.  
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only on newly Michelin-starred restaurants to exploit time-series variation in treatment. In 
addition, comparing Michelin-starred restaurants to non-starred or non-NYT-reviewed 
restaurants is subject to a potential endogeneity issue because quality of restaurants is 
unobservable. Consumers could visit a restaurant not only because it has won the star but 
also because it serves or is told to serve food of high quality even in the absence of such 
treatment. To alleviate the bias, my data set includes only Michelin-starred or NYT-
reviewed restaurants because ever-treated restaurants are the best counterfactual in terms 
of quality. Thus treatment groups are newly starred restaurants each year, and control 
groups are the restaurants reviewed by NYT or starred by the Michelin guide in earlier or 
later years than the treated.  
As the firm announces a new list of starred restaurants once a year (between September 
and November), I restrict the time window of each year to 17 weeks (8 pre-treatment 
weeks, 1 treatment week, and 8 post-treatment weeks33), thereby involving 117 weeks in 
total (17 weeks × 7 years). As discussed earlier, the main reason for this short-term analysis 
is because information on changes in prices or food quality is missing. Sellers can capitalize 
such information not only through quantity but also through price. That is, supply-inelastic 
restaurants are more likely to accommodate a demand shock by raising prices rather than 
quantities. Other than price changes, quality of food, the single most important omitted 
variable, is also time varying in the long run. Although some restaurants succeed in serving 
higher quality food over time, many fail in quality control as demand increases. In this 
case, the coefficient would badly underestimate the effect of the quality information. 
Therefore, following equation measures the relative demand increase in the posttreatment 
weeks, assuming that prices and food quality stay unchanged during the short-term time 
window. 
(2.1)   𝑌𝑌 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀ℎ𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾1 𝑌𝑌 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷 + 𝛾𝛾2 𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
where, 
𝑌𝑌 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶  : the natural log of the numbers of taxi drop-offs or passengers dropped off inside a 
circle area within a 100 feet (30.48 m) radius from restaurant 𝐿𝐿 in week 𝐿𝐿. 
 
33 Technically, they are 8-week pre-treatment and 9-week post-treatment periods. 
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𝑌𝑌 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷  : the logarithm of drop-off or passenger count inside the donut area between 300 and 
400 feet34 radiuses from restaurant 𝐿𝐿 in week 𝐿𝐿. This spatially lagged dependent variable is 
mainly used to control for regional taxi traffic volumes or trends. Some of the variation in 
taxi trips is due to variation in a measurement error. In addition, some unobservables may 
drive both the treatment and the demand for each restaurant. Thus the treatment is 
possibly correlated with some omitted variables. For example, as the number of taxi trips 
is a measure for consumer flows, restaurants in more intensely developed or popular retail 
areas are more likely to serve high quality food and to have more nearby taxi trips. Also, 
emerging retail districts or neighborhoods could be closely associated with the likelihood 
of getting Michelin-starred or NYT-reviewed, becoming increasingly popular destinations 
for taxi riders. Such spatial omitted variables can be a source of serious endogeneity. Thus 
this control variable is expected to substantially address the concern.  
𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀ℎ𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 : the primary focus of this section taking the value 1 if restaurant 𝐿𝐿 is newly 
Michelin-starred and week 𝐿𝐿 is after restaurant 𝐿𝐿 is treated, and 0 otherwise. 
𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∶ an indicator that is equal to 1 if week 𝐿𝐿 is after restaurant 𝐿𝐿 is reviewed by the New 
York Times. I include this term to control for prior awareness or perception of restaurant 
quality. As mentioned earlier, hundreds of restaurants open and other hundreds close 
every year, so it is not possible that people know about many of them. When NYT, an 
influential newspaper, reviewed a restaurant, the restaurant is more likely to get Michelin-
starred because the review makes more people aware of the existence and quality of the 
restaurant, including the Michelin guide inspectors. Thus adding this term could help 
further recover the treatment effect of a Michelin star conditional on prior NYT reviews; 
if a restaurant was NYT reviewed before winning a Michelin star, the marginal effect of a 
Michelin star could be smaller because people are already aware of the existence and 
quality of the restaurant.  
As selection is based on the quality of each restaurant, a main source of OVB (omitted 
variable bias) is at an individual level, but restaurant characteristics reflecting quality of 
food are unmeasurable and unobservable in this analysis. My data set contains some 
restaurant characteristics such as zip code, neighbourhood, price range, and cuisine type. 
They could partially affect consumer flows, but might not be significantly correlated with 
 
34 Most of avenues and streets in New York City are 100 feet and 60 feet wide, respectively. Some exceptional avenues are between 60 
and 150 feet wide, while some streets are either 80 or 100 feet in width. If some taxis drop passengers off across the street or avenue, then 
a donut area between 100 and 300 feet radius could be partially affected by the treatment. For this reason, I use the donut area between 
300 and 400 feet as a spatial covariate.   
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the treatment propensity. Moreover, the number of taxi trips is affected not only by 
restaurant characteristics but also by various location-specific components that are 
potentially associated with the treatment but cannot be explained by restaurant 
characteristics. In this sense, control restaurants may not provide a good measure of 
counterfactual taxi trips in the absence of the treatment even when the quality of each 
restaurant is perfectly observable. 
For these reasons, I control for individual fixed effects (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖), which can capture both 
restaurant- and location-specific omitted variables, exploiting temporal variation. In order 
to control for time trends and seasonal variation in restaurant demand, I also include week 
fixed effects (𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡: week dummies for each of the 391 weeks represented in the sample), thus 
the number of taxi trips or passengers is determined mainly by the sum of a time-invariant 
individual effect and a week effect that is common across restaurants or locations.  
The effect of a new Michelin star by time window 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pre- and Post-treatment Periods 2 weeks 4 weeks 8 weeks 12 weeks 
Dependent Var. ln (Dropoff) ln (Dropoff) ln (Dropoff) ln (Dropoff) 
Post_Michelin 0.0355** 0.0221* 0.0328** 0.0336*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0133) (0.0131) (0.0123) 
NYT 0.0524*** 0.0515*** 0.0408*** 0.0305** 
 (0.0161) (0.0147) (0.0134) (0.0132) 
ln(DropoffD) 0.319*** 0.360*** 0.394*** 0.412*** 
 (0.0538) (0.0414) (0.0391) (0.0372) 
Observations 16,013 28,347 52,581 75,799 
Adj. R-squared 0.975 0.974 0.973 0.973 
Notes: Based on regression results from Equation 2.1, this table shows how the results vary by time window.  
The dependent variable is the log of the number of taxi drop-offs inside the circle area of each newly 
Michelin-starred restaurant. Post_Michelin is an interaction of two indicators capturing whether the restaurant 
is newly Michelin-starred, and whether the week is a post-treatment period. NYT is a dummy that is equal 
to 1 if the restaurant is reviewed by New York Times before Michelin-starred. This term controls for prior 
awareness or perception of restaurant quality. ln(DropoffD), a spatially lagged dependent variable, is the log of 
the weekly number of taxi drop-offs inside the donut area between a 300 and 400 feet radiuses from each 
restaurant, and controls for local taxi traffic trends. All models include week and restaurant fixed effects. 
Robust and neighborhood-level clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 2.1 presents that length of the pre- or post-treatment periods does not make any 
noticeable distinction in estimating the causal effect. The numbers of drop-offs and 
passengers also generate fairly similar results (Table 2.2). In response to the treatment, 
newly Michelin-starred restaurants see more than 3% increases in taxi drop-offs or 
passengers, or an increase of $ 935.735 in weekly revenues during the 8-week posttreatment 
period. Interestingly, NYT reviews, as a control variable, have a larger effect. The 
 
35 For convenient interpretation, I use approximate sales as a dependent variable. On Yelp.com, each restaurant is assigned 1-4 $ sign 
symbols, and the cost per person for a meal is displayed in Table 2.3. To approximate marginal sales in dollar terms, I take the median 
cost, and then restaurant sales are equal to (number of passengers) × (median cost per person). Hence estimated coefficients can be 
interpreted as the approximate marginal revenue of information. As the estimated sales growth is only a portion measured by increases in 
taxi-riding consumers, actual monetary growth could be greater. 
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newspaper has more circulations, so reviewed restaurants may receive more attention. 
Also, Michelin-starred restaurants may have inelastic supply due to their kitchen capacity 
and quality control. That is, they are not likely to strongly respond to demand shocks. 
Although the estimated coefficient is more significant on the trip count, I use the 
passenger count as a base dependent variable in the following regressions as it is a more 
accurate measurement for demand or consumer attention.  
 The effect of a new Michelin star by dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Var. ln(Dropoff) ln(Passenger) Passenger 
Post_Michelin 0.0328** 0.0313** 10.18 
 (0.0131) (0.0142) (9.625) 
NYT 0.0408*** 0.0463*** 24.99*** 
 (0.0134) (0.0151) (9.053) 
ln(DropoffD) 0.394***   
 (0.0391)   
ln(PassengerD)  0.334***  
  (0.0370)  
PassengerD   0.0932*** 
   (0.0116) 
Observations 52,581 52,580 52,581 
Adj. R-squared 0.972 0.964 0.960 
Notes: This table shows regression results from Equation 2.1 using three different 
dependent variables: the log of the number of taxi drop-offs inside the circle area 
of each newly Michelin-starred restaurant in Model 1, the log of the total number 
of taxi passengers (= the number of taxi drop-offs × the number of passengers of 
each taxi trip) in Model 2, and the number of passengers in Model 3. Post_Michelin 
is an interaction of two indicators capturing whether the restaurant is newly 
Michelin-starred, and whether the week is a post-treatment period. NYT is a 
dummy that is equal to 1 if the restaurant is reviewed by the New York Times 
before Michelin-starred. ln(DropoffD), ln(PassengerD), PassengerD are spatially lagged 
dependent variables to controls for local taxi traffic trends. All models include 
week and restaurant fixed effects. Robust and neighborhood-level clustered 
standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Yelp.com price information  
Notes: Based on the cost per person estimated by Yelp.com (Row 1), this study applies the approximate 
median cost per person in Row 2 to calculate approximate increases in restaurant sales (=approximate median 
cost per person × increase in taxi passengers).     
2.5 Impacts of NYT reviews 
The Michelin guide does not enable this study to disentangle effects of quality indicators 
and publicity. This is because only starred restaurants receive substantial media attention 
although the guide book includes hundreds of non-starred restaurants in NYC. To 
overcome this obstacle, I use NYT reviews since all of the reviewed restaurants are 
published in the mass media but not all of them get starred by NYT critics. Yet relying 
upon the media reviews is subject to another empirical challenge arising from the 
Yelp Price Sign $ $$ $$$ $$$$ 
Cost Per Person under $10 $11-30 $31-60 above $61 
Approximate Median Cost Per Person $ 7 $20 $45 $80 
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unbalanced panel. As each reviewed restaurant has a different publication date and a 
different life span, the composition of treated and untreated groups change every week as 
a result of new publications. Thus estimates based on variation across restaurants could 
be inconsistent varying by each weeks’ treatment-control composition. To relieve this 
concern, the baseline equation for NYT reviews depends largely on short-term time-series 
variation by replacing individual fixed effects (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) with restaurant-specific time window 
fixed effects (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖). Many of the reviewed restaurants have more post-treatment than pre-
treatment weeks. By using the same 17-week time window36, I can exploit time variation 
within the symmetric time window of each restaurant, estimating the short term response 
to the treatment. Thus only within-window variation over time is used to estimate the 
treatment effect. 
(2.2)   𝑌𝑌 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽 (𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾1 𝑌𝑌 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷 + 𝛾𝛾2 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀ℎ𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙 it + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  
where 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, the key variable of this section, is an indicator taking the value 1 if 𝐿𝐿 is a 
post-treatment week for restaurant 𝐿𝐿, whereas 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀ℎ𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙 it is a control variable indicating 
whether or not entity 𝐿𝐿 is a Michelin-starred restaurant in week 𝐿𝐿. In addition, I include 
week × zipcode × cuisine × price37 fixed effects (𝜆𝜆 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡) instead of week fixed effects (𝜆𝜆 𝑡𝑡) 
to further recover causal effects by controlling for heterogeneous demand shocks. In the 
previous section, effects of group-specific time-invariant unobservables could average out 
to zero over the weeks because the panel is perfectly balanced. But compositions of 
restaurants vary each week in this specification, so certain shocks are not likely eliminated. 
To avoid any biases associated with the group-specific demand, I exploit variation within 
week-zipcode-cuisine-price groups. It is also to more strongly restrict control groups or 
an alternative set of restaurants to more comparable restaurants that are expected to be 
under the influence of common demand shocks each week. In other words, restaurants in 
each group can be considered as a group of fairly good substitutes in the same market; 
when we decide which restaurants to go to, we comprehensively consider time, locations, 
cuisine types, and price ranges.  Thus this specification could capture whether quality 
indicators significantly affect consumer decisions, controlling for combinations of time, 
location, cuisine, and price level. This is also a more conservative approach as the 
 
36 Again, 8 pre-treatment weeks, 1 treatment week, and 8 post-treatment weeks 
37 This study categorizes cuisine types into six groups (African, American, Asian, European, Spanish/Mexican/Latin American, and the 
others), and prices into four group ($, $$, $$$, and $$$$ in Table 2.3). 
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specification generates a larger robust standard error; Table 2.4 shows that standard errors 
increase by about 64% when moving from column 1 (𝜆𝜆 𝑡𝑡) to column 5 (𝜆𝜆 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡). 
 The effect of New York Times reviews by fixed effects specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Var. ln(Passenger) ln(Passenger) ln(Passenger) ln(Passenger) ln(Passenger) 
PostNYT 0.0467*** 0.0431*** 0.0377*** 0.0431** 0.0416** 
 (0.0103) (0.0121) (0.0110) (0.0168) (0.0169) 
Fixed Effects      
  time window  YES  YES  YES YES YES 
  week  YES     
  week×zipcode    YES    
  week×zipcode×price    YES   
  week×zipcode×cuisine      YES  
  week×zipcode×cuisine×price      YES 
Observations 183,696 183,696 183,696 183,696 183,696 
Adj. R-squared 0.966 0.975 0.977 0.977 0.979 
Notes: This table shows regression results from Equation 2.2 with various fixed effects specifications. In this table, I investigate 
how the standard error and the size of coefficients vary by fixed effects specification. The dependent variable is the log of the 
number of taxi passengers. PostNYT is an interaction term of two indicators capturing whether the restaurant is reviewed by the 
New York Times (NYT), and whether the week is a post-treatment period. All models rely on 17-week time window which 
consists of 8 pre-treatment weeks, 1 treatment week, and 8 post-treatment weeks. By controlling for individual-restaurant-specific 
time window fixed effects, the models exploit within-time-window variation over time. The cuisine fixed effects consists of six 
dummies for African, American, Asian, European, Spanish/Mexican/Latin American, and the others, and the price fixed effects 
employ the four price groups in Table 2.3 ($, $$, $$ or $$$$). All models include two control variables, a Michelin star indicator 
and a spatial lag. Robust and neighborhood-level clustered standard errors are in parentheses.    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
NYT reviews increase taxi drop-offs or passengers by about 4% (Table 2.5), or weekly 
sales by $1,294, which amounts to more than $10,000 in total for the 8-week post-
treatment period. The marginal revenue also can be interpreted as the monetary value of 
the incentive for restaurants to sponsor the media critics; total marginal sales including all 
transit modes in longer terms could be larger. 
 The effect of New York Times reviews by dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Var. ln (Dropoff) ln(Passenger) Passenger 
PostNYT 0.0362** 0.0416** 30.26** 
 (0.0166) (0.0169) (12.53) 
Observations 183,699 183,696 184,011 
R-squared 0.984 0.979 0.952 
Notes: This table shows regression results from Equation 2.2 with three different 
dependent variables: the log of the number of taxi drop-offs in Model 1, the log of the 
total number of taxi passengers in Model 2, and the number of passengers in Model 3. 
PostNYT is an interaction term of two indicators capturing whether the restaurant is 
reviewed by NYT, and whether the week is a post-treatment period. Relying on a 17-week 
time window, all models include two control variables, a Michelin star indicator and a 
spatial lag, and two fixed effects, individual-restaurant-specific time window and week-
zipcode-cuisine-price. Robust and neighborhood-level clustered standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
2.5.1 Quality Indicators and Consumer Responses 
NYT reviews per se do not ensure that reviewed restaurants are of higher quality than the 
non-reviewed. Just as the Michelin guide uses star-ratings, the newspaper uses two kinds 
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of quality indicators to summarize their opinion: NYT Critics’ Pick (CP) and stars. As 
displayed in Figure 2.2, CP is a binary indicator (Yes or No). In addition to that, the chief 
restaurant critic can assign star ratings from zero to four38.  Out of 755 restaurants 
reviewed from January 2008 to December 2016, 425 won the CP, and 304 obtained at 
least one star (Table 2.6).  
Figure 2.2. NYT restaurant reviews 
Panel A. Positive review 
 
Panel B. Non-positive review 
 
Notes: This figure shows examples of positive and non-positive reviews by the New York Times (NYT). NYT uses 
two types of quality indicators, NYT Critics’ Pick (yes or no) and star ratings (0-4 stars). Panel A displays a positive 
review with both quality indicators, whereas Panel B shows a non-positive review without any of them.    
Frequency distribution of each quality indicator  
Panel A. Individual frequency distribution 
 YES 425   0 451  
Critics’ Pick NO 330  Star 1 124  
 Total 755   2 136  
     3 40  
     4 4  
     Total 755  
Panel B. Joint frequency distribution 
                                     Star 
  0 1 2 3 4 Total 
 YES 196 61 125 39 4 425 
Critics’ Pick NO 255 63 11 1 0 330 
 Total 451 124 136 40 4 755 
Notes: This table shows the frequency distribution of the two quality indicators for 755 
restaurants reviewed by NYT from 2008 to 2016. 
 
 
38 Star ratings range from zero to four stars and reflect the reviewer’s reaction primarily to food, with ambiance, service and price taken 
into consideration zero is poor, fair or satisfactory—One star, good. Two stars, very good. There stars, excellent. Four stars, 
extraordinary—according to the NYT critics (https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/packages/html/dining/info/ratings.html 
and https://dinersjournal.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/13/why-our-reviews-have-stars/). Thus reviews without any of their indicators 
can be considered as negative or at most neutral.  
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Heterogeneous effects of New York Times reviews  
Dependent Variable: ln(Passenger) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PostNYT × Pick (Yes) 0.0581***    
 (0.0212)    
PostNYT × Pick (No) 0.00851    
 (0.0241)    
PostNYT × Star (4)  0.281***   
  (0.0480)   
PostNYT × Star (3)  0.0532   
  (0.0540)   
PostNYT × Star (2)  0.0580*   
  (0.0310)   
PostNYT × Star (1)  -0.0103   
  (0.0262)   
PostNYT × Star (0)  0.0377*   
  (0.0206)   
PostNYT × Pick (Yes) × Star (Yes)    0.0625**  
   (0.0292)  
PostNYT × Pick (Yes) × Star (No)    0.0490**  
   (0.0247)  
PostNYT × Pick (No) × Star (Yes)    -0.0257  
   (0.0352)  
PostNYT × Pick (No) × Star (No)    0.0282  
   (0.0327)  
PostNYT × Positive    0.0452** 
    (0.0191) 
PostNYT × Nonpositive    0.0282 
    (0.0337) 
Observations 183,696 183,696 183,696 183,696 
Adj. R-squared 0.979 0.979 0.979 0.979 
Notes: This table shows heterogeneous effects by quality indicator. The dependent variable is the log of the number of taxi 
passengers. PostNYT, the variable of interest, is an interaction term of two indicators capturing whether the restaurant is reviewed 
by NYT, and whether the week is a post-treatment period. Pick (Yes) and Pick (No) are indicators capturing whether the restaurant 
received NYT Critics’ Pick. Star (0), Star (1), Star (2), Star (3), and Star (4) in Model 2 are dummy variables indicating the number of 
stars that the restaurant received. Star (Yes) and Star (No) in Model 3 are dummies capturing whether the restaurant received any 
stars. Positive and Nonpositive in Model 4 are indicators capturing whether the review is positive or non-positive. In this study, 
positive reviews are with any of the two quality indicators (NYT Critics’ Pick or stars), and negative reviews are without any of 
them. Relying on a 17-week time window, all models include two control variables, a Michelin star indicator and a spatial lag, and 
two fixed effects, individual-restaurant-specific time window and week-zipcode-cuisine-price. Robust and neighborhood-level 
clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
To investigate whether the marginal impact of information varies according to various 
quality groups, the key treatment dummy is interacted with each indicator dummy. 
Relevant literature, particularly in finance, points out that such indicators, as summarized 
information, could play a crucial role in consumer responses; as they have a limited amount 
of time and cognitive resources to process information, people underreact to full 
information (Hong and Stein, 1999; Dellavigna and Pollet, 2009; Luca, 2016). Indeed, 
Table 2.7 tells us that the positive quality indicators have a significantly positive impact 
on restaurant sales. Specifically, restaurants that have won any positive indicator 
significantly outperform the others, generating 4.6%39 more taxi riders (column 4) or 
 
39 exp(0.0452)-1=0.0462 
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approximately $1,560 additional weekly sales. The empirical results indicate that 
consumers selectively respond to the reviewed restaurants, confirming that the indicators 
play a critical role in boosting demand. Positive indicators may strongly influence 
consumers’ expected utility or product evaluations, thereby leading to vertical consumer 
sorting. Importantly, selection or being reviewed itself could be an outcome of gaining 
popularity, but positive indicators are the critics’ subjective judgement, so this result 
robustly confirm the causal link between quality information and restaurant demand. 
As mentioned earlier, even negative reviews could have positive effects. Given that many 
of NYT reviewed restaurants are relatively new and thus few people know about the 
restaurants, it is not surprising that reviewed restaurants experience an increase in sales 
even when reviews are not positive, as seen in column (4). Yet the link between awareness 
and demand appears weak, as the increase is statistically insignificant. To further examine 
the effect of awareness, I conduct a mid-term analysis using the following equation with 
an extended time window of 8-week pretreatment and 52-week posttreatment periods.  
Figure 2.3.  Mid-term estimates of the NYT review effect (8 pre-treatment and 52 post-treatment weeks) 
Notes: The figures display estimated coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals from Equation 2.3 during two pre-treatment 
and 13 post-treatment periods; each period is 4-week long, and thus the time window is 60 weeks in total. The missing Pre_1 is 
the baseline period. Panels A and B show the effects of a positive review and a non-positive review, respectively, over the periods. 
All models include two control variables, a Michelin star indicator and a spatial lag, and two fixed effects, individual-restaurant-
specific time window and week-zipcode-cuisine-price. Standard errors are robust and neighborhood-level clustered. 
(2.3)   𝑌𝑌 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 = 𝛽𝛽−2 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿_2𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 × 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗13𝑗𝑗=1 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 × 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 
   + 𝛿𝛿−2 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿_2𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 × 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗13𝑗𝑗=1 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 × 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖  
   + 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾1 𝑌𝑌 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷  + 𝛾𝛾2 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀ℎ𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  
Panel A. Reviews with Positive Quality Indicators Panel B. Reviews without Positive Quality Indicators 
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where each 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 or 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 dummies indicates a 4-week long pre- or post-treatment time 
period40, and the missing dummy, 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿_1 (a period from the 4th to the 1st pre-treatment 
week), is the reference period. Thus this model estimates each coefficient as the effect of 
NYT reviews during the corresponding period relative to the baseline period. 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿_2 is 
included not only to illustrate pretreatment trends but also to conduct reverse causality 
and time placebo tests. If the review is simply in response to positive demand shocks or 
if unobserved factors influence both the treatment and demand for the restaurants, then 
this term is expected to be significantly negative. Figure 2.3 visually illustrates the 
regression results, showing that the pattern persists over the period; demand is 
significantly strong only for restaurants with positive reviews, and non-positive reviews 
see mostly positive but statistically insignificant sales growth with much fluctuation.  
2.5.2 Location and Horizontal Consumer Sorting 
There is no doubt that high quality products are more demanded than low quality ones, 
ceteris paribus, as a result of vertical product differentiations. But restaurants compete not 
only through quality differentiation but also in other dimensions41 as individual diners have 
different tastes depending on their backgrounds such as race, ethnicity, income and 
education levels, and home or work locations. In reality, no one has perfect information 
on all available restaurants and their observed characteristics at any given point in time, 
and the media news informs millions of readers about the guided restaurants42. In this 
context, the media reviews could play a critical role in not only signalling restaurant quality 
but also providing consumers with details about each reviewed business. Thus publicity 
might be able to contribute to a better match between heterogeneous diners and 
restaurants even when the review is not positive.  
From the consumers’ viewpoint, one of the most important considerations in restaurant 
choices is location. Indeed, we choose a restaurant not only because of food quality or 
popularity of the venue but also because of its location, in particular where each 
neighborhood features different social and cultural characteristics. Customers may visit a 
reviewed restaurant that has no quality indicator but is located near their home/workplace 
 
40 For example,  𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿_2𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is equal to 1 if restaurant 𝐿𝐿 is reviewed by NYT and week 𝐿𝐿 is between the 8th and the 5th pre-treatment week, 
and 0 otherwise. Likewise,  𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is a dummy taking the value 1 if week 𝐿𝐿 is between the 1st and the 4th post-treatment week of newly 
reviewed venue 𝐿𝐿, and 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_13𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is from the 49th to the 52nd post-treatment week of restaurant 𝐿𝐿. 
41 In other words, services are both vertically and horizontally differentiated in the restaurant industry. 
42 The New York Times is one of the top 3 U.S. newspapers in circulation, according to Alliance for Audited Media (auditedmedia.com) 
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or in one of their favorite hangouts. In the meantime, they may be reluctant to visit a 
restaurant located in neighborhoods that they rarely travel to, even if the restaurant has 
got four stars. Consumer perceptions of restaurant quality may be determined not only by 
how many stars the restaurant was awarded, but also by to what extent observed 
characteristics satisfy their idiosyncratic multi-dimensional tastes. Hence it is plausible that 
zero-star restaurants in a popular hangout are more demanded than four-star restaurants 
in another in response to NYT reviews. For this reason, this section investigates whether 
media attention can result in restaurant-diner matches, with a focus on locational forces 
possibly affecting consumer restaurant choices.   
To do so, this study examines roles played by demographic characteristics of restaurant 
locations. As documented in Davis et al. (2018), diners are more likely to choose 
restaurants in neighborhoods that are demographically similar to their own. Hence a 
restaurant’s demand could be driven by demographic similarities between its location and 
diners’ homes or between that location and the ethnic identity of diners. However, it does 
not necessarily mean that diner decisions are directly influenced by interactions between 
restaurant and home locations. It is more likely that individuals’ unobservable preferences 
for particular sociocultural environments determine both their home and preferred 
hangout locations.  
Figure 2.4. Origins of pre-dining taxi trips and destinations of post-dining taxi trips 
  
 
 
Notes: The figures show the geographical distributions of the origins of 14,855,705 taxi trips that arrived at the NYT-
reviewed restaurants between 18:00 and 22:00 (Left panel), and the destinations of 15,224,286 taxi trips that departed from 
the same restaurants between 20:00 and 24:00 (Right panel) from January 2009 to June 2016. 
     Reviewed Restaurant 
 59 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Kernel density estimates of pre- and post-dining taxi trips 
 
Notes: This figure shows kernel density estimates of trip distances of the pre- and 
post-dining taxi trips displayed in Figure 2.4, using only taxis of which trip 
distances are within 10 miles. Pre-dining taxi trips (blue dash line) include 
14,855,705 taxis that arrived at the NYT-reviewed restaurants between 18:00 and 
22:00, and Post-dining trips (red solid line) include 15,224,286 taxis that departed 
from the same restaurants between 20:00 and 24:00 from January 2009 to June 
2016.   
Summary statistics of pre- and post-dining taxi trips 
         Pre-dining trips Post-dining trips 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Trip distance (miles) 2.1222 1.7278 2.4947 1.9588 
Fare (USD) 9.7851 5.4808 10.4339 48.1491 
Notes: This table shows summary statistics of the pre- and post-dining taxi trips 
described in Figures 2.4 and 2.5.   
I investigate locational interactions empirically by exploiting diners’ neighborhood 
characteristics as inferred from the destinations of taxis that departed NYT-reviewed 
restaurants during evening peak hours. The left and right panels of Figure 2.4 display 
origins of pre-dining taxi trips which occurred during the peak hours between 6pm and 
10pm, and destinations of post-dining trips from 8pm to 12am, respectively. The locations 
of origins and destinations may contain useful information on taxi riders. Most of the 
origins are clustered in Manhattan or near reviewed restaurants, but post-dining taxi trips 
are spread out over the larger areas including some parts out of New York City. 
Considering that a lot of consumers visit restaurants after work and take a taxi to get back 
home after dining, the origins and destinations are likely to partially reflect locations of 
work and home, respectively43. Based on this pattern, I match each destination location to 
a census tract in order to infer consumer characteristics from the tract-level demographic 
 
43 It appears that the restaurant choices are more affected by workplaces rather than residential locations. 
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characteristics44, as actual individual-level consumer characteristics are not available in this 
study. Then I relate the inferred information to locational characteristics of the restaurants 
that, presumably, they visited. Although the inferred information would not precisely nor 
fully reflect true interactions between consumers and restaurants, the difference-in-
differences estimates would be valid unless the reviews influence diners’ choice of 
transport mode or post-dining destinations in the short run. 
Summary statistics: Census tracts of Manhattan and New York City 
                        Census Tract level   
             Manhattan   New York City       Manhattan   New York City 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D.   
Share of white 56.9% 27.0% 43.6% 29.4% 57.4% 44.0% 
Share of Asian 11.9% 13.8% 12.6% 15.5% 11.3% 12.7% 
Share of black 17.1% 21.5% 27.2% 31.0% 15.6% 25.5% 
Share of Hispanic 23.4% 23.1% 26.7% 22.5% 25.4% 28.6% 
Notes: This table shows summary statistics of demographics in New York City. The first four columns are Census-tract-level 
means and standard deviations, and the last two columns are Manhattan and NYC regional statistics. 
 Summary statistics: Census tracts of restaurants and inferred individual homes 
                   Nonpositive Reviews                     Positive Reviews 
   Restaurant tracts       Home tracts Restaurant tracts      Home tracts 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Share of white 66.7% 21.6% 67.2% 10.7% 67.9% 21.1% 69.0% 9.1% 
Share of Asian 15.1% 15.9% 13.4%   5.4% 15.8% 16.1% 13.8% 4.5% 
Share of black 8.3% 13.9% 10.2%   9.3% 7.2% 12.5% 8.9% 7.8% 
Share of Hispanic 16.2% 15.3% 14.6%   7.4% 14.6% 14.7% 13.4% 6.1% 
price signs ($-$$$$) 1.98 0.79   2.59 0.97   
Notes: This table summarizes Census-tract-level demographic statistics for restaurant locations and diners’ residential 
locations inferred from the destinations of post-dining taxi trips. It presents demographic similarity between restaurant 
locations and diners’ home locations.  
Demographic characteristics of the inferred home tracts are strongly correlated with those 
of restaurant tracts. Table 2.10 summarizes tract-level demographics of the 807 
restaurants included in my sample and those of the inferred home locations. Compared to 
both Manhattan and NYC averages (Table 2.9), the reviewed restaurants are located in 
tracts with substantially more white and Asian but less black and Hispanic residents. The 
tract-level average shares of white residents are 56.9% and 43.6% in Manhattan and New 
York City, respectively. But the white population is overrepresented in the tracts of 
reviewed restaurants. Likewise, Asian residents account for only 12.7% of the NYC 
population, but more than 15% in the restaurant locations. The strong similarity between 
restaurant and home tracts is more obvious when comparing the positive and nonpositive 
review groups. Positively reviewed restaurants are in tracts with marginally more white and 
Asian but less black and Hispanic populations than nonpositively reviewed ones. 
Noticeably, consumers who visited restaurants with a positive review also come from 
 
44 The US Census Bureau provides tract-level demographic information, and this study relies upon the Census 2010 data. 
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tracts with more white and Asian but less black and Hispanic populations than those who 
visited venues with a nonpositive review. While Davis et al. (2018) suggest that 
consumption segregation might be associated with residential segregation, it appears that 
this demographic similarity is a consequence of short trip distances seen in Figure 2.5 and 
Table 2.8, as adjacent two tracts are likely to feature similar demographic characteristics.  
The effect of New York Times reviews by fixed effects specification  
 Dependent Variable: ln(Passenger) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PostNYT 0.0573*** 0.0780***   
 (0.0200) (0.0147)   
PostNYT × Positive   0.0590*** 0.0673*** 
   (0.0221) (0.0163) 
PostNYT × Nonpositive   0.0504 0.113*** 
   (0.0392) (0.0329) 
Fixed Effects     
  time window YES YES YES YES 
  week × zipcode × cuisine × price YES  YES  
  week × cuisine × price  YES  YES 
Observations 165,536 165,536 165,536 165,536 
Adj. R-squared 0.947 0.930 0.947 0.930 
Notes: This table shows regression results of Model 4 specification in Table 2.7. Columns 1 and 3 control 
for the same week-zipcode-cuisine-price fixed effects of the previous specifications, but columns 2 and 4 
include week-cuisine-price fixed effects to estimate the effects of locational factors. The dependent 
variable is the log of the number of taxi passengers. PostNYT is an interaction term of two indicators 
capturing whether the restaurant is reviewed by NYT, and whether the week is a post-treatment period. 
Positive and Nonpositive are indicators capturing whether the review is positive or non-positive. All models 
rely on a 17-week time window, and control for a spatially lagged dependent variable and individual-
restaurant-specific time window fixed effects. Robust and neighborhood-level clustered standard errors are 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
To estimate an effect of locations, this section assumes that diners choose a restaurant 
across zip codes, not within a zip code.  To do so, following models rely on cross-sectional 
variation within week-cuisine-price groups. By using the number of passengers who left 
reviewed restaurants between 20:00 and 24:00, Table 2.11 shows that NYT reviews have 
a larger impact with the week-cuisine-price fixed effects (column 2) than with the week-
zipcode-cuisine-price fixed effects (column 1). Also, the coefficient on nonpositive 
reviews becomes more sizable than that on positive reviews (column 4). These results tell 
us that nonpositively reviewed restaurants are not significantly more demanded than the 
other comparables within the same zip code, but that they are more demanded than similar 
restaurants in another zip codes. Obviously, quality indicators are significant demand 
drivers when control groups are restricted to alternative restaurants within a zip code. 
However, more factors, particularly locational characteristics, are expected to play a key 
role in diners’ restaurant choice problems when across-zip code restaurants are considered 
as control groups. An empirical concern arising from the absence of location (zip code) in 
the week fixed effects might be non-parallel trends as hot or hip neighborhoods are likely 
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to have more restaurants reviewed and also to see increasing taxi trips. But a donut control, 
or a spatially lagged dependent variable, could substantially relieve the concern.  
To identify heterogeneity in consumer tastes for demographics of restaurant locations, as 
observed product characteristics, the usual approach is conditional logit discrete choice 
models which can consider both consumer tastes and product characteristics and also their 
interactions. However, the approach is not computationally feasible given millions of taxi 
trips and hundreds of alternative restaurants in my sample. Instead of the choice models, 
I use segmented aggregate demand to achieve similar results at an aggregate level rather 
than choice data at the individual level. Let  𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑑𝑑  be a fraction of demographic group 𝐿𝐿 in 
the destination tract of taxi trip 𝑗𝑗  that departed from restaurant 𝐿𝐿 during the peak hours. 
Then 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑, the inferred total number of diners in demographic segment 𝐿𝐿 who choose 
restaurant 𝐿𝐿, is obtained by summing the shares of the racial group: 
(2.4)   𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 = ∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗  
where 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is the number of passengers of trip 𝑗𝑗 that departed from restaurant 𝐿𝐿. This 
segmented demand would reflect a specific racial/ethnical group’s preference for each 
restaurant. Hence the following equation would capture demographic interactions 
between locations of homes and restaurants.  
(2.5)   𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1 (𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽2 �𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 × 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑� + 𝒙𝒙′𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 𝜸𝜸  + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  
where 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑  is the share of demographic segment 𝐿𝐿 in the census tract of restaurant 𝐿𝐿. 
Notably, Equation 2.5 interprets, for example, 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 as the probabilistic total number 
of Hispanic diners who visited restaurant 𝐿𝐿 in week 𝐿𝐿, but a precise interpretation is not 
whether Hispanic diners are more likely to visit a restaurant in a Hispanic neighborhood 
but whether diners residing in a Hispanic area are more likely to visit a restaurant in 
another predominantly Hispanic neighborhood. It is possible that diners choose reviewed 
restaurants not because of demographic similarity between the two locations but because 
the retailers are geographically near their post-dining destinations. Also, the specification 
may capture inter-neighborhood economic interactions rather than demographic 
similarity, as racial wealth divide is reportedly growing. For example, diners in a poor 
neighborhood are more likely to visit a restaurant in another poor neighborhood, and they 
are more likely black diners than white diners. For these reasons, this specification controls 
for a vector of covariates (𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕) including the log of average trip distance and the log of 
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average income of diners45 in addition to a Michelin-star indicator and a spatially-lagged 
dependent variable. 
The effect of New York Times reviews: Demographic interaction 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Var. ln(Asian) ln(Asian) ln(Black) ln(Black) ln(Hispanic) ln(Hispanic) 
PostNYT 0.0860*** 0.0803*** 0.0990*** 0.0640*** 0.0797*** 0.00711 
 (0.0170) (0.0228) (0.0175) (0.0190) (0.0159) (0.0232) 
PostNYT × %Asian  0.0366     
  (0.0858)     
PostNYT × %Black    0.601***   
    (0.149)   
PostNYT × %Hispanic      0.576*** 
      (0.109) 
Observations 152,795 152,795 152,798 152,798 152,802 152,802 
Adjusted R-squared 0.911 0.911 0.853 0.853 0.894 0.895 
Notes: This table shows regression results of Equation 2.5. The dependent variables are the log of the number of Asian diners 
(columns 1 & 2), Black diners (columns 3 & 4), and Hispanic diners (columns 5 & 6) inferred from destinations of post-dining 
taxi trips; for more details, see text. %Asian, %Black, and %Hispanic are the shares of Asian, Black, and Hispanic residents in the 
restaurant’s census tract, respectively. PostNYT is an interaction of two indicators capturing whether the restaurant is reviewed by 
NYT, and whether the week is a post-treatment period. All models rely on a 17-week time window, and control for a spatially-
lagged dependent variable, the log of average trip distance, the log of average (inferred) income of diners, and two fixed effects, 
restaurant × time window and week × cuisine × price. Robust and neighborhood-level clustered standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 2.12 uses the natural logarithms of the segmented aggregate demand of three 
groups, Asian, black, and Hispanic, as dependent variables, and interacts the variable of 
interest (PostNYT) with the share of each corresponding demographic group in a 
restaurant tract. When a reviewed restaurant is located in a neighborhood demographically 
more similar to diners’, diners are more likely to visit the venue than another restaurant of 
the same cuisine and price ranges but located in a demographically less similar location. 
Thus estimated coefficients in columns (2), (4), and (6) are expected to capture 
heterogeneous treatment effects caused by demographic similarity of two locations. The 
results indicate that customers’ post-dining destinations are significantly different by 
demographic characteristics of restaurant locations, so the marginal utility of location may 
vary according to demographic groups. Notably, black and Hispanic diners have stronger 
preference for demographic similarity than Asians. Specifically, 10% more shares of black 
or Hispanic population in a restaurant tract attract 6.0% more black or 5.8% more 
Hispanic diners, respectively (columns 4 and 6). This finding is fairly consistent with what 
existing literature on segregation reports; African Americans are the most segregated 
 
45 This study infers the aggregate income of diners by summing the tract-level incomes: 
𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = �𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗
 
where 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 is the aggregate income of diners who visited restaurant 𝐿𝐿. 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is the number of passengers of taxi trip 𝑗𝑗 that departed 
from restaurant 𝐿𝐿 during the peak hours, and 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is a median household income of the destination tract of the post-dining trip 𝑗𝑗. 
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minority, and Asians are the least segregated in term of both residence (Ihlanfeldt and 
Scafidi, 2002; Flores and Lobo, 2013) and restaurant choices (Davis et al., Forthcoming); 
Davis et al. (Forthcoming) identify racial and ethnic consumption segregation for the NYC 
residents from user reviews on Yelp.com. As Yelp users very rarely review a restaurant 
twice, the authors’ baseline model, a discrete-choice model of restaurant visits, suffers 
from a selection bias, and therefore assumes that individuals’ unobserved restaurant 
preferences are independent over time. However, this study is not likely to suffer from the 
same bias unless the restaurant review publications alter diners’ transportation mode 
choices or have a more significant effect on diners who depend on taxis.   
The effect of New York Times reviews : Demographic interaction 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Var. ln(Asian) ln(Asian) ln(Black) ln(Black) ln(Hispanic) ln(Hispanic) 
PostNYT × Positive 0.0731*** 0.0486** 0.0860*** 0.0536*** 0.0688*** 0.0493 
 (0.0182) (0.0243) (0.0196) (0.0198) (0.0183) (0.0325) 
PostNYT × Nonpositive 0.126*** 0.169*** 0.139*** 0.0970* 0.113*** -0.0607 
 (0.0365) (0.0583) (0.0417) (0.0491) (0.0342) (0.0768) 
PostNYT × Positive × %Asian  0.158*     
  (0.0929)     
PostNYT × Nonpositive × %Asian  -0.279     
  (0.215)     
PostNYT × Positive × %Black    0.571***   
    (0.130)   
PostNYT × Nonpositive × %Black    0.673*   
    (0.348)   
PostNYT × Positive × %Hispanic      0.155 
      (0.263) 
PostNYT × Nonpositive × %Hispanic      1.198*** 
      (0.447) 
Observations 165,462 165,462 165,465 165,465 165,486 165,486 
Adjusted R-squared 0.911 0.911 0.842 0.842 0.889 0.889 
Notes: Based on Equation 2.5, this table interacts each of the variables of interest with two dummies, Positive and Nonpositive, 
that capture whether the review is positive or non-positive. The dependent variables are the log of the number of Asian 
(columns 1 & 2), Black (columns 3 & 4), and Hispanic diners (columns 5 & 6). %Asian, %Black, and %Hispanic are the shares 
of Asian, Black, and Hispanic residents in the restaurant’s census tract, respectively. PostNYT is an interaction of two indicators 
capturing whether the restaurant is reviewed by NYT, and whether the week is a post-treatment period. All models rely on a 
17-week time window, and control for a spatially-lagged dependent variable, the log of average trip distance, the log of average 
(inferred) income of diners, and two fixed effects, restaurant × time window and week × cuisine × price. Robust and 
neighborhood-level clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 2.13 provides further support to the results. Even when a restaurant achieves no 
positive indicator, a 10 percentage point increase in the fraction of black (Hispanic) 
residents in a restaurant tract is significantly associated with a 6.7% (12.0%) increase in 
black (Hispanic) diners, as seen in columns 4 and 6. Interestingly, Hispanic diners do not 
appear to care about the demographical environment of a restaurant when the business is 
positively reviewed. In contrast, Asian consumers consider the locational characteristics 
only when the retailer wins positive indicators.  
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The effect of New York Times reviews by trip distance : Post-dining taxi trips 
Dependent Variable: ln(Passenger) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Trip Distance (miles) 0 to1 1 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 4 4 to 5 above 5 
PostNYT × Positive 0.0709*** 0.0611*** 0.0548*** 0.0439** 0.0502** 0.0808*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0196) (0.0166) (0.0192) (0.0208) (0.0253) 
PostNYT × Nonpositive 0.123*** 0.0950** 0.0786** 0.119*** 0.103** 0.0523 
 (0.0347) (0.0420) (0.0336) (0.0385) (0.0395) (0.0429) 
Observations 152,949 135,294 140,690 135,354 130,589 122,885 
Adj. R-squared 0.929 0.834 0.879 0.824 0.747 0.677 
Notes: This table shows whether geographical proximity has an effect on the coefficients of interest. The dependent variable is 
the log of the number of taxi passengers, but each model column uses only taxis of which trip distances are within the 
correspondingly specified range; for example, Model 1 counts the number of passengers whose trip distances are between 0 
and 1 mile. PostNYT is an interaction term of two indicators capturing whether the restaurant is reviewed by NYT, and whether 
the week is a post-treatment period. Positive and Nonpositive are indicators capturing whether the review is positive or non-
positive. All models rely on a 17-week time window, and control for a spatially-lagged dependent variable, and two fixed effects, 
restaurant × time window and week × cuisine × price. Robust and neighborhood-level clustered standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The effect of New York Times reviews : Income interaction 
 Dependent Variable: ln(Aggregate Income) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PostNYT 0.0873*** 1.004**   
 (0.0160) (0.474)   
PostNYT × ln(Income)  -0.0801*   
  (0.0409)   
PostNYT × Positive   0.0728*** 0.728 
   (0.0173) (0.470) 
PostNYT × Positive × ln(Income)    -0.0573 
    (0.0410) 
PostNYT × Nonpositive   0.133*** 1.518 
   (0.0377) (1.333) 
PostNYT × Nonpositive × ln(Income)    -0.122 
    (0.116) 
Observations 152,781 145,557 152,781 145,557 
Adjusted R-squared 0.927 0.928 0.927 0.928 
Notes: To capture economic interactions between locations of the restaurant and diners’ homes, this table 
uses the log of the aggregate income of diners as the dependent variable. ln(Income) is the log of median 
household income of the restaurant tract. PostNYT is an interaction of two indicators capturing whether the 
restaurant is reviewed by NYT, and whether the week is a post-treatment period. Positive and Nonpositive are 
indicators capturing whether the review is positive or non-positive. All models rely on a 17-week time 
window, and control for the log of spatially-lagged dependent variable, and the log of average trip distance, 
and include two fixed effects, restaurant × time window and week × cuisine × price. Robust and 
neighborhood-level clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Additionally, Table 2.14 tells us that the geographical proximity also has an effect. Diners 
might be willing to visit nearby restaurants in spite of non-positive reviews. To examine 
the possibility, I break the number of passengers down into six groups by taxi trip distance: 
0-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4, 4-5, above 5 miles. If proximity is a main driver, the number of taxi trips 
from nearer origins would increase more significantly in response to publicity. The size 
and statistical significance of coefficients decrease with taxi trip distance from column 1 
to 3 (or from 0 to 3 miles) even when the reviews are not positive. Spatial proximity may 
be an even more important consideration for diners who visit restaurants on foot or by 
public transport. However, the income interaction has no significant effect (Table 2.15); 
each model uses tract-level incomes instead of shares of a demographic group in a 
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restaurant tract, and the dependent variable is (inferred) aggregate income of diners. 
Overall, socio-demographic characteristics of restaurant locations can have a substantial 
impact on urban consumers’ decisions with geographical proximity also having an effect. 
The results suggest that media attention influences not only vertical but also horizontal 
consumer sorting, thereby possibly resulting in more demographically segregated 
consumption. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this internet era, media information could influence our decisions in several ways. A 
wide range of studies have emphasized its importance in social and economic contexts, 
but only a limited amount of empirical evidence has been documented. To add to existing 
literature, this paper characterizes how media attention could affect consumer choices. 
Before identifying potential channels, I begin with examining whether publicity has a 
causal effect on demand for restaurants, relying upon two information sources, the Michelin 
Guide and NYT restaurant reviews, and also the number of taxi drop-offs as a proxy of 
restaurant demand. The link between quality information and taxi trips is surprisingly 
strong and statistically significant.  
Then what drives such significant effects? Consumers’ expectations of product quality are 
a primary determinant of demand, and thus positive indicators can shape their 
expectations. At the same time, media information has a potential to improve a match 
between heterogeneous consumers and products by increasing product awareness. The 
regression results demonstrate that positive quality indicators, like stars, are strong demand 
drivers. Most of the existing studies have concentrated only on this mechanism mainly due 
to lack of individual-level characteristics. By inferring individual diners’ characteristics 
from destinations of post-dining taxi trips, this study overcomes the empirical obstacle, 
and empirically shows that demographic characteristics of locations play a key role in 
informed consumers’ restaurant choices. Thus this paper concludes from the findings that 
media information could affect economic outcomes of urban retailers not only by signaling 
product quality but also by catalyzing interactions between consumer and product 
characteristics.   
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Housing Prices and Consumption:  
The Role of News Media 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Housing prices can affect a wide range of socio-economic outcomes, particularly 
homeowner non-housing consumption.46 It is commonly assumed that lowering interest 
rates can induce an increase in asset prices including house prices, which can boost 
consumer spending and ultimately the economy. Therefore, a key question in 
macroeconomics and monetary policy is how strong is the link between asset prices and 
aggregate consumption. As a consequence, there exists a large literature on the wealth effect, 
with housing prices reportedly having larger and more important impacts on spending than 
do stock prices (Case et al., 2005; Bostic et al., 2009; Carroll et al., 2011; Calomiris et al., 
2012; Case et al., 2012). However, the existence of and mechanisms for the effects have 
been controversial with somewhat conflicting theoretical predictions.47 Recent research 
provides strong empirical evidence from clean identification (Mian et al., 2013; Aladangady, 
2017), but observed effects are still inconsistent over time. 48 
To provide an explanation to the heterogeneity in observed housing wealth effects, this 
paper examines whether information interventions may alter homeowners’ consumption 
decisions in response to house price fluctuations. The traditional view in the wealth effect 
literature is to assume that homeowners are making fully informed utility-maximizing 
 
46 A few more examples are fertility rates (Lovenheim and Mumford, 2013; Dettling and Kearney, 2014), college entrance (Lovenheim, 
2011), entrepreneurship (Corradin and Popov, 2015), and portfolio choice (Chetty and Szeidl, 2017). 
47 The standard channel relaxes the household lifetime resource constraint. That is, higher home values have a positive endowment effect, 
and thus rational households maximize their utility by consuming more. Another channel is collateralized lending. Rising housing prices 
allow households to borrow more by providing additional collateral. As housing is not only an investment asset but also a consumption 
good, however, rising home values could raise the future cost of living, and this negative effect could offset the positive wealth effect. 
Therefore, aggregate housing wealth effects should be small for aggregate non-housing consumption (Sinai and Souleles, 2005; Buiter, 
2008; Calomiris et al., 2012). 
48 For example, housing prices have already recovered to the pre-crisis level, but economic growth is slowing in the US and many other 
countries; see the newspaper article (https://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/01/debt-is-holding-back-the-global-economic-recovery-say-
central-bankers-dudley-rajan-and-zeti.html). 
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choices, so one would not expect provision of additional information about housing prices 
to change homeowners’ consumption behaviors. However, this paper takes a different view 
motivated by the behavioral economics literature that suggests that any forms of information 
disclosure can have a significant impact on household economic decisions (Choi et al., 2010; 
Bertrand and Morse, 2011; Beshears et al., 2018). If homeowners do not have high level of 
awareness of their home values, a sizable housing wealth effect can hardly be expected, given 
the considerable house price fluctuations that occur over time. In reality, many homeowners 
do not actively seek housing price information in their daily lives. Also, individuals’ cognitive 
resources are very limited, so it is possible that homeowners might be making a cognitive 
lapse. In this sense, media coverage on housing prices may affect homeowners’ consumption 
decisions by increasing homeowners’ awareness about their housing wealth and also by de-
biasing the cognitive lapse; one might expect their consumption decisions to respond to 
how much or how frequently information on housing price growth is being disclosed.  
To allow the size of the housing wealth effect to vary according to local media coverage on 
house prices, I exploit local newspapers, one of the main information sources for 
homeowners.49 People often base their economic, financial, and political decisions on the 
news that they read in newspapers or watch on television. For example, related studies 
suggest that geographic areas with reduced local media coverage see less stock trading 
volumes (Engelberg and Parsons 2011) and lower voter turnouts (Gentzkow, et al. 2011).50 
Therefore, information from local media outlets may increase people’s awareness on the 
given topic, and then the increasing awareness may shape individuals’ behaviors and 
decisions. Literature on the relation between news media and real estate/housing markets is 
particularly scarce, but several recent studies identify the causal effects of local newspapers 
and internet social media on homebuyer decisions. By employing textual analysis on local 
U.S. newspaper articles, Soo (2018) demonstrates that the qualitative tone of local housing 
news can predict future house prices. Bailey et al. (2018) also show that potential 
homebuyers rely on information from Facebook. These findings imply that the information 
channels of both print and online media may play a key role in informing homebuyers and 
shaping their economic decisions. Therefore, media coverage may make homeowners more 
 
49 More than a quarter of all adults in the US read at least one newspaper every day (https://www.statista.com/statistics/183408/number-
of-us-daily-newspapers-since-1975/) 
50 Engelberg and Parsons (2011) exploit the daily newspaper of each major U.S. city, and find that local newspaper coverage of earnings 
announcements significantly increases local trading volumes. Gentzkow et al. (2011) document that reading a newspaper increases the 
probability of voting by 4 percentage points. 
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aware of their housing wealth, and lead them to further learn their home values from 
previous sales or current listings by visiting real estate websites such as Zillow.com. 
This paper relates the local media coverage on housing prices to the housing wealth effects 
by regressing household-level consumption on the MSA-level housing price index interacted 
with the number of newspaper articles conveying house price information.51 First, 
household-level expenditures are from the public-use microdata of the quarterly Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CEX) across 22 MSAs over 11 years from 2006 to 2016. Second, I use 
the MSA-level house price index provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). 
I assume that homeowners learn their home values in part from the regional price growth 
covered by local newspapers. Last, I exploit local newspaper contents in the US in order to 
quantify media coverage on housing prices. From three newspaper databases, I collected 
newspaper articles including any of the search queries, “home price,” “house price,” and 
“housing price”, and then I counted the total number of news articles published by major 
local newspapers during each quarter in each city. 
Regression results robustly show that more newspaper articles conveying housing price 
information can make homeowner consumption more elastic with respect to regional 
housing prices. In other words, relative to less informed homeowners, the more informed 
consume more in response to high housing prices and consume less in response to low 
housing prices. By stratifying the analysis for homeowners and renters, I find that the 
regression results are statistically significant only for homeowners; an increase of one 
standard deviation in the number of housing price news articles is associated with a 0.08 
increase in homeowners’ consumption elasticity and only with an insignificant increase in 
renters’ elasticity. Since rising home values do not clearly benefit renters, this result alleviates 
the empirical concern regarding unobservable common factors, in particular, expected 
future income growth.  
For further causal investigations, I also identify the headline effect. Specifically, only housing 
news articles that include housing or real estate terms in their headline—headlined housing 
news—have a significant impact on the wealth effect. However, articles that convey housing 
price information in their body but do not include any housing or real estate terms in their 
 
51 MSA stands for Metropolitan Statistical Area, a U.S. geographical core area containing a substantial population nucleus, together with 
adjacent communities having a high degree of economic and social integration with that core (https://www.census.gov/programs-
surveys/metro-micro/about.html). 
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headline—non-headlined housing news—have no significant effect, thereby providing 
further support for the causality. It may be random whether or not each housing news article 
includes housing terms in its headline. That is, similar unobservable factors may influence 
supply of both headlined and non-headlined housing news articles, but demand sides, 
homeowner expenditures, respond differently to the exogenous changes in the headlines.  
Still, one may be concerned about omitted macroeconomic factors that may drive all of the 
variables of interest. Also, the effect of media coverage may be asymmetric in response to 
housing booms and busts. To address the concerns, this study employs two regression 
models. The first baseline model exploits both cross-sectional and time-series variation, but 
the second exploits only cross-sectional variation in media coverage by taking 11-year 
averages for each city. Estimates from the two specifications are consistently significant, 
confirming robustness of the baseline specification. 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first to relate information interventions to the 
housing wealth effect. Arguably, the dependence of the housing wealth effect on media 
reporting has a couple of important implications. First of all, this idea can shed light on 
inconsistent housing wealth effects, given the substantial variation in media reporting across 
cities and over time. Information interventions may make the aggregate consumption or 
economy more responsive to asset prices, impacting the effectiveness of related policies. 
Second, this paper shows that information disclosure has a nontrivial effect on homeowner 
consumption decisions. In contrast with the view that household decisions reflect fully 
informed and rational behaviors, the result suggests that providing relevant information can 
alter household economic decisions by helping them to make more informed choices and/or 
by making the information salient to the individuals. Thus, the finding has a potential to 
dramatically broaden our understanding of the role of news media and information 
disclosure across a large number of settings. 
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3.2 Data 
3.2.1 Data Sources 
For empirical tests, I construct a quarterly dataset for 22 U.S. metropolitan areas by 
exploiting the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) 
public-use microdata from 2006 to 2016.52 The CEX data provides a good measure of 
household consumption and consists of two surveys: the Diary survey and the Interview 
survey. While the Diary survey is designed to capture small expenditures on frequently 
purchased items such as food over a two-week period, the Interview survey is conducted 
quarterly for major expenses that occur on a regular basis. Although the surveys are 
reportedly subject to an underreporting issue, this paper nevertheless uses the Interview 
survey data53, following two papers (Bostic et al., 2009; Aladangady, 2017) that find 
significant wealth effects using the data. The Interview surveys collect detailed household-
level information on expenditures, incomes, and household characteristics. As each 
household is interviewed for only four consecutive quarters, with new families entering each 
quarter, the dataset is basically repeated cross-sections. 54 A limitation is that detailed 
geographical information has been de-identified. Only about 20 major metropolitan areas 
are identified in the public-use data.  
The household-level datasets enable me to compare different responses between 
homeowners and renters. Table 3.1 reports summary statistics of major economic and 
socio-demographic characteristics for each family or reference person included in the 
controls.55 For example, I control for household-level income levels in my models because 
both expenditures and incomes are noticeably higher for homeowners; all of the variables 
of interest, consumption, homeownership decisions and housing prices may be affected by 
income levels. In addition, the majority of homeowners are married, white, and hold a 
 
52 The CEX data is available from 1986, but the public-use microdata contains MSA-level geographical identifiers from 2006 onward. 
53 This paper assumes that the underreporting is independent of media coverage. 
54 The observation unit in the CEX is called the consumer unit (CU), which consists of any of the following: (1) all members of a particular 
household who are related by blood, marriage, adoption, or other legal arrangements; (2) a person living alone or sharing a household 
with others or living as a roomer in a private home or lodging house or in permanent living quarters in a hotel or motel, but who is 
financially independent; or (3) two or more persons living together who use their incomes to make joint expenditure decisions. However, 
the terms consumer unit, family, and household are used interchangeably. For further details, see the BLS webpage https://www.bls.gov/cex/ 
csxfaqs.htm.  
55 According to the BLS webpage (https://www.bls.gov/cex/csxfaqs.htm#PUMD), the reference person for the consumer unit is the 
first member mentioned by the respondent when asked "What are the names of all the persons living or staying here? Start with the name 
of the person or one of the persons who owns or rents the home." It is with respect to this person that the relationship of the other 
consumer unit members is determined. Thus, the two terms reference person and head of household are used interchangeably in related studies.  
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bachelor’s degree or higher, while renters are more likely to be single and black, with only 
29% holding a bachelor’s degree. 
 Summary statistics of Consumer Expenditure Survey (2006-2016) 
 Home owners (59.5%) Renters (40.5%) 
 Mean S.D Mean S.D. 
Total Expenditure (USD, quarterly) 16,579 14,666 9,814 7,667 
Income (USD, annual) 79,403 90,477 37,775 46,012 
Family size 2.68 1.51 2.34 1.53 
Age 53.55 15.48 43.68 17.24 
Public sector employer  0.42 0.49 0.37 0.48 
Private sector employer 0.49 0.50 0.57 0.49 
Married 0.63 0.48 0.32 0.47 
Never married 0.13 0.34 0.39 0.49 
Separated/divorced/widowed 0.24 0.43 0.28 0.45 
White 0.81 0.39 0.68 0.47 
Black 0.10 0.30 0.20 0.40 
Asian 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.29 
High school or lower 0.29 0.45 0.42 0.49 
Some college or Associate's degree 0.27 0.45 0.29 0.45 
Bachelor or higher 0.44 0.50 0.29 0.45 
Notes: This table summarizes descriptive statistics for variables from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) data. 
It presents differences in family characteristics between homeowners and renters. As each household is interviewed 
for at most four consecutive quarters, the quarterly dataset is repeated cross-sections, and the sample includes 38,938 
households or 110,677 observations from Q1.2006 to Q4.2016. 
To measure the housing wealth effects, I link the household-level spending data from the 
CEX to the MSA-level house price index provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA).56 Many empirical papers rely upon household balance sheet information to test 
whether household spending responds to the self-reported market value of their home. 
Instead of the household-level housing wealth measure, I exploit the local housing price 
index because this is the most common housing price information that homeowners can 
obtain from media outlets, assuming that they learn their home values in part from the 
regional price growth covered by local newspapers. By doing so, this study can identify the 
differential wealth effects on homeowners and renters. 
Lastly, I depend on three newspaper databases—Factiva, Nexis, and Newslibrary.com—to 
quantify the media coverage on housing price. First, I identified the dominant local 
newspapers for 22 cities (Table 3.2). U.S. newspapers have historically been local in nature. 
The number of US cities that can support multiple daily newspapers is fast declining 
(Chandra and Kaiser, 2015), and the median newspaper sells more than 90 percent of its 
copies in the county in which it is headquartered (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010). When 
multiple newspapers are presented for one city in Table 3.2, this is mostly due to the 
 
56 The FHFA All Transactions House Price Index is used in this study. 
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geographical boundaries of the metropolitan areas in the CEX data. For example, one 
sampling unit of the CEX consists of San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose. As a 
consequence, in addition to the San Francisco Chronicle, both the Oakland Tribune and the San 
Jose Mercury News are also included in my sample; importantly, this unique local monopoly 
(or duopoly) characteristic of newspapers enables researchers to exploit discontinuous cross-
sectional variations in media coverage for identification.57  
Then I collected news articles published by each newspaper, mainly from Newslibrary.com, 
and used the other two databases, Factiva and Nexis, to complement the datasets. I detail 
how I construct my measure of media coverage from this collection of newspaper articles 
in the following subsection. 
 List of newspapers in the sample 
Metropolitan Area Newspapers Included Missing Major Newspapers 
Atlanta Atlanta Journal-Constitution 
 
Baltimore Baltimore Sun 
 
Boston Boston Globe, Boston Herald 
 
Chicago Chicago Sun-Times, Daily Herald, Courier-News Chicago Tribune 
Cleveland Plain Dealer, Akron Beacon Journal 
 
Dallas Dallas Morning News, Star-Telegram 
 
Denver Denver Post 
 
Detroit Detroit News Detroit Free Press 
Honolulu Honolulu Star-Advertiser 
 
Houston Houston Chronicle 
 
Los Angeles Daily News Of Los Angeles, Orange County Register, Long Beach Press-Telegram Los Angeles Times 
Miami Miami Herald 
 
Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune, Pioneer Press 
 
New York City New York Times, New York Post, Daily News of New York, Star-Ledger 
 
Philadelphia Philadelphia Inquirer, Philadelphia Daily News 
 
Riverside-San Bernardino Press-Enterprise, San Bernardino Sun 
 
San Diego San Diego Union-Tribune 
 
San Francisco San Francisco Chronicle, San Jose Mercury News, Oakland Tribune 
 
Seattle Seattle Times, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, News Tribune 
 
St. Louis St. Louis Post-Dispatch 
 
Tampa Tampa Bay Times (St. Petersburg Times), Tampa Tribune 
 
Washington Washington Post, Washington Times 
 
Notes: Table 3.2 lists 22 metropolitan cities and corresponding local newspapers in my sample covering from January 2006 to 
December 2016. Most US cities have only one daily newspaper with some exceptions for that I include two major local newspapers 
(Boston, Philadelphia, Seattle, Tampa, and Washington) or three (New York City). The other cities with multiple newspapers presented 
in this table are due to the large geographical boundaries of the metropolitan areas in the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) data. In 
addition, three major newspapers (Chicago Tribune, Detroit Free Press, and Los Angeles Times) are missing in my sample.  
 
 
57 For instance, Engelberg and Parsons (2011) take advantage of the fact that local media outlets often differ in their coverage of the same 
underlying information events. As another example, Gentzkow et al. (2011) and Peress (2014) utilize exits and entries of newspapers and 
reductions in media coverage caused by newspaper strikes, respectively. 
 
 74 
 
3.2.2 Measuring Media Coverage 
The single most important variable in this study is a measure of local media coverage on 
housing prices. A wide range of literature identifies causal impacts of news media, suggesting 
that information environments influence economic agents’ behaviors and decisions.58 Media 
news conveying house price information can not only help readers form expectations about 
future housing price growth, but they can also inform readers about the realized housing 
price growth. I place particular emphasis on the second role of news media, while most 
related papers focus on the first role. In other words, this paper is mainly interested in how 
media reporting can increase awareness about realized housing wealth gains rather than how 
media can help form future price expectations, as news articles are essentially informative. 
The quantity of news articles about housing prices may be positively correlated with how 
well local homeowners are informed about or aware of the values of their homes. In the 
absence of media reporting, household spending might be less responsive to housing price 
fluctuations, while it may become more responsive when homeowners are more frequently 
informed. 
 An example of newspaper articles in the key independent variable 
The Philadelphia Inquirer 
August 26, 2009 
Region's Home Prices Gain In Second Quarter 
Driven by sales in the city, home prices in the Philadelphia region rose by an average 3.8 percent in the second quarter 
over the previous quarter - the first increase in two years. Data compiled by Kevin Gillen of Econsult Corp. in Philadelphia 
showed that even with sales volume nearly 50 percent below normal in the second quarter, homes that did sell sold for 
more. In the city, prices were 6.8 percent higher, while suburban counties showed an average price increase of 2.7 percent, 
Gillen said...  
Notes: This is an example of housing news articles used to generate the key independent variable (I call it “the number of 
housing news articles”) in my sample. The example article includes “home” in its headline, and “home price” in its body, 
conveying explicit information about local house price growth to readers.   
To quantify the housing price information from local papers, I counted the total number of 
articles including specific keywords by city–quarter, using the articles collected from the 
three newspaper archives. More specifically, each article must include “home price,” “house 
price,” or “housing price” in its headline or body to ensure that it provides readers with 
explicit information on housing prices. In addition, each article also includes “home,” 
“house,” “housing,” “real estate,” or “property” in its headline. The additional queries 
further narrow the search results down to articles supposedly written for homeowners or 
homebuyers. For example, The Philadelphia Inquirer’s article in Table 3.3 includes “home” in 
 
58 Largely in finance (Chan, 2003; Frazzini, 2006; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; Fang and Peress, 2009; Tetlock, 2010; Engelberg and 
Parsons, 2011; Tetlock, 2011; Da et al., 2014) and in political science (Gentzkow, 2006; Gerber et al., 2009; Gentzkow et al., 2011). 
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its headline and also “home price” in its body. This report provides readers with information 
on local housing price trends, and more importantly, the headline obviously indicates that 
the following body of the article is about housing markets and should therefore draw the 
attention of existing homeowners or potential homebuyers. Notably, the search query 
restrictions exclude articles that do not include the price keywords even though they discuss 
some aspects of housing markets or appear in the housing/real estate section. For instance, 
some housing news articles report on local building permits or new constructions, an 
important housing price determinant. Such information may help readers form expectations 
regarding their future house price growth but does not directly inform them about the 
realized housing wealth growth.  
An empirical concern is that the search results for these keywords might possibly capture 
not only the trends of local housing markets but also those of national or international 
housing markets that might be less relevant to local housing prices. However, attention to 
readers’ own properties is often triggered by spatially distant markets. A homeowner may 
search for the list prices of nearby similar properties after reading an article about a housing 
boom in another city. Bailey et al. (2018) also find that both local and out-of-state friends’ 
experiences affect housing investments. This finding implies that all news articles containing 
housing price information have the potential to influence households’ economic decisions, 
probably by making readers more and better aware of their housing wealth in any context.  
3.3 Empirical Analysis 
3.3.1 Housing Wealth Effect 
Before including the MSA-level quarterly number of housing articles as a key independent 
variable in the econometric models, I first test a simple wealth effect model. The standard 
empirical functional form to measure the housing wealth effect is given in Equation (3.1): 
(3.1)  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽 𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1 +  𝒙𝒙′𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 𝜸𝜸 +  𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 +  𝜙𝜙𝑐𝑐,𝑗𝑗 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖, 𝑡𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the total expenditures of 
household 𝐿𝐿 in city 𝑀𝑀  in year-quarter 𝐿𝐿, and 𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1 =  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐, 𝑡𝑡−1� is the natural logarithm of 
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the house price index for city 𝑀𝑀  in year-quarter 𝐿𝐿 − 1.58F59 This model controls for a vector 
of family characteristics (𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡: income, family size, age of household head), major factors 
affecting both consumption and housing demand. Also, I include year-quarter fixed effects 
(𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡) and cohort fixed effects determined along seven dimensions (𝜙𝜙𝑐𝑐,𝑗𝑗: city × housing 
tenure × employer × occupation × marital status × education × race).60 As discussed in 
the previous section, the dataset in this study is not a panel, but repeated cross-sections. 
In this context, Campbell and Cocco (2007) use sample cohort means from a time series 
of cross-sections to construct pseudo-panel data, following the methodology suggested by 
Deaton (1985). In doing this, Campbell and Cocco can exploit both time-series and cross-
sectional variation to identify wealth effects. To obtain similar results, this study employs 
the cohort fixed effects that would capture average differences across cohorts in omitted 
variables; in other words, the regression coefficients of interst are driven by the variation 
over time within each cohort. Lastly, standard errors are clustered by city × housing tenure 
to allow for correlation over time within each group in all of the following models. With 
this log-log specification,61 the estimated coefficient 𝛽𝛽 can be directly interpreted as the 
elasticity of consumption with respect to housing wealth.  
Then I split the variable of interest into two groups: owners and renters, as in Equation 
(3.2): 
(3.2)  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝒙𝒙′𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 𝜸𝜸 +  𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 +  𝜙𝜙𝑐𝑐,𝑗𝑗 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 
Renters do not clearly benefit from rising house prices. Thus, if this paper finds 
significantly positive relationship between housing wealth and the spending of renters, the 
estimated coefficients might be suggestive of an omitted variable bias. An empirical 
concern arising from splitting the independent variable is that home ownership decisions 
are endogenous (Campbell and Cocco, 2007). However, the cohort fixed effects can 
 
59 The main assumption of this specification is that consumption responds to home price information conveyed by local newspapers. 
Such information is usually a quarter lagged because home price indices are published with a few months’ lag. Therefore, I let the housing 
price term refer to the previous quarter (t-1) instead of the current quarter (t). 
60 Individuals sharing the following seven characteristics are grouped into cohorts: 1) MSA;  2) Housing Tenure, with six categories: 
Owned with mortgage, Owned without mortgage, Owned mortgage not reported, Rented, Occupied without payment of cash rent, or 
Student housing; 3) Employer, with three categories: Private company, Government, or Self-employed/Family business; 4) Occupation, 
with four categories: Manager/Professional, Admin/Sales/Retail/Technician, Service, or Laborer/Production/Farming/Armed Forces; 
5) Marital status, with five categories: Married, Widowed, Divorced, Separated, or Never married; 6) Education, with four categories: 
Master/Professional/Doctorate degree, Bachelor’s degree, College/Associate degree, or High School/Less; and 7) Race, with three 
categories: White, Black, or Others. 
61 One is added to the relevant variables to avoid logarithms of zero. 
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address this concern by exploiting variations within the homeowners or within the renters 
over time.  
Table 3.4 reports the estimated wealth effects for homeowners and renters. A well-known 
empirical issue in the related literature is that both consumption and housing prices can 
be driven by common factors, in particular, expectations about permanent income growth 
or economic prospects. Another issue of concern is reverse causality: higher consumption 
may increase local employment and thus lead to higher home values (Aladangady, 2017). 
Therefore, running the simple OLS models is likely to result in a biased estimate of the 
housing wealth effects. Indeed, the coefficients for renters are positive and significant 
across models, confirming this concern.62 Overall, the results suggest that while common 
factors may play a role across specifications, there seems to be a causal effect of housing 
wealth on consumption given that the wealth effects are strong for owners and relatively 
weak for renters. 
 Housing wealth effects  
 Dep. Var.: ln(Total Expenditure) (1) (2) (3) 
Owner × ln(HPI) 0.284*** 0.267*** 0.224*** 
 (0.0740) (0.0546) (0.0695) 
Renter × ln(HPI) 0.166* 0.165** 0.113* 
 (0.0967) (0.0639) (0.0621) 
ln(Income)  0.247*** 0.167*** 
  (0.00721) (0.00684) 
Age  -0.00195*** 0.000304 
  (0.000428) (0.000385) 
ln(Family Size)  0.244*** 0.258*** 
  (0.00961) (0.0102) 
Fixed Effects    
Year-Quarter YES YES YES 
MSA × Housing Tenure YES YES  
Cohort   YES 
Observations 110,622 96,776 96,776 
Adjusted R-squared 0.225 0.477 0.617 
Notes: This table presents regression results based on Equation 3.2. The dependent variable is the log of quarterly 
non-housing total expenditures of each individual household, and variables of interest are the logarithms of the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) MSA-level quarterly house price index (HPI) interacted with either a 
homeowner or a renter dummy. As the dataset is not a balanced panel but repeated cross-section survey data, Model 
3 includes the cohort fixed effects defined by City × Housing tenure × Employer × Occupation × Marital status × 
Education × Race. By doing so, Model 3 can exploit within-cohort temporal variation; the other specifications 
control for MSA-housing tenure instead of the cohort FEs. Additionally, all models include year–quarter fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by MSA-housing tenure. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 To address the endogeneity concern, recent empirical work uses the interaction between an exogenous demand shock and housing 
supply elasticity measured by Saiz (2010) as an instrument for house price growth, and popular demand shifters are national average house 
prices (Dettling and Kearney, 2014; Chetty and Szeidl, 2017) and long-term interest rates (Chaney et al., 2012; Aladangady, 2017). 
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Figure 3.1. Correlations between wealth effect elasticities and housing news volumes by MSA and by quarter-year 
Panel A: By MSA 
  
Notes: Each data point reflects estimated elasticity and a housing news quantity measure for each MSA. The MSA-level 
elasticity estimates are based on Model 3 of Table 3.4. By interacting the housing wealth measure with a group of MSA 
dummies in Equation 3.2, the estimated parameter on each interaction term can be interpreted as a MSA-specific 
consumption elasticity with respect to the local housing price index. The quarterly average number of housing news articles (Left) 
and The average share of housing news articles (Right) reflect averages over the period from Q1.2006 to Q4.2016. The share is a 
ratio of the number of housing news articles to the number of all news articles published in the corresponding city.  
Panel B: By quarter-year 
  
Notes: All data points reflect elasticities and housing news quantity measures for each quarter-year period. To calculate 
period-specific elasticities, I interact the housing price variable with a group of quarter-year dummies in Equation 3.2. The 
average number of housing news articles (Left) and The average share of housing news articles (Right) are averages across MSAs during 
the corresponding period.  
Figure 3.1 visually presents the relationship between the housing wealth effect estimates 
and the media coverage measure. First, I regress the household expenditures on the housing 
wealth interacted with a group of MSA dummies. By doing so, I can estimate housing wealth 
elasticity over time for each MSA. Then the estimated elasticity is plotted against the average 
quarterly number of housing price news articles for the corresponding city (the left graph) 
or against the average ratio of housing news articles to the total news articles for each city 
(the right graph) in Panel A. Instead of absolute quantity measures, I also use shares in the 
right graph because some major newspapers are missing in my sample, and thus differences 
in absolute quantities may not be comparable across cities. Likewise, Panel B plots the 
estimated quarterly elasticity against each quarter’s average number of housing reports and 
its share of housing reports in the left and right graphs, respectively.  
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The elasticity appears to be correlated with the housing news volumes both across cities and 
over time. For example, although New York City and Los Angeles are both major American 
metropolitan cities, New York City sees much less housing news and lower elasticity, while 
Los Angeles sees more housing news and higher elasticity (Panel A). The housing wealth 
effects are also larger when more housing reports are published (Panel B). For example, the 
effect was relatively large during the housing market bust period from 2008 to 2010, when 
housing markets received substantial media attention. However, the elasticity estimates 
declined in the recent years 2014–2016, with less housing news published.  
3.3.2 Baseline Specification 
If consumption responses to housing wealth shocks vary systematically with the number 
of housing news articles, Equation (3.3) can provide a valid identification by 
characterizing the link graphically displayed in Figure 3.1:  
(3.3)  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1 𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1 𝑧𝑧𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑧𝑧𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝒙𝒙′𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡  𝜸𝜸 +  𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 +  𝜙𝜙𝑐𝑐,𝑗𝑗 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 
where 𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1 is the house price index for the previous term (𝐿𝐿 − 1) and is interacted with 
𝑧𝑧𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡, the variable of interest in this study, which is the standardized number of housing 
news articles in city 𝑀𝑀  in year-quarter 𝐿𝐿.63 In addition to the same covariates and fixed 
effects that are used in Equation (3.1), this specification also controls for a square term 
of housing prices (𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡2 ), which could capture the correlation between the housing prices 
and the number of housing news. Unless publication of housing news (𝑧𝑧) is determined 
by common factors such as expected future income growth,64 the coefficients for housing 
prices and squared housing prices would capture the impacts of the omitted variable, 
thereby recovering an independent effect of media reporting on the elasticity (𝛽𝛽1). 
Just like in the previous subsection, this study interacts the three key independent variables 
with homeowner and renter dummies as in Equation (3.4). By doing so, I can disentangle 
the effects on owners and renters: 
(3.4)  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  [ 𝛽𝛽1𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1 𝑧𝑧𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑧𝑧𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1]  
      + 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  [ 𝛽𝛽4𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1 𝑧𝑧𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑧𝑧𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1] 
                    + 𝒙𝒙′𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡  𝜸𝜸 +  𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 +  𝜙𝜙𝑐𝑐,𝑗𝑗 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 
 
63 This study standardized the key variable mainly for easier interpretation. Using the logarithm of the number of articles does not make 
any noticeable differences. 
64 This is not very likely, given the low correlation between housing prices and the news volume. 
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This baseline specification is motivated by Figure 3.2. For simplicity, suppose that the log 
consumption is linear to the log housing wealth. Then dependence of the housing wealth 
effect on newspaper reports could be visually described as in the figure. The dashed line 
represents the optimal consumption set of the fully informed homeowners, characterizing 
an information environment with more housing news, and the solid line represents less 
informed homeowners in an environment with less housing news. The fully informed 
utility-maximizing homeowners should consume more than the less-informed in response 
to high housing prices. But the fully-informed should consume less than the less-informed 
when housing prices are very low. In other words, more news about housing prices has a 
positive impact on spending when house prices are high, but a negative impact when prices 
are low. Therefore, the wealth-spending elasticity should be a function of the volume of 
housing news, and the function (𝛽𝛽1𝑧𝑧𝑐𝑐, 𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3) can be obtained by simply reordering terms 
(Equation 3.5).65  
Figure 3.2. Expected effect of increasing newspaper reports on the link between house price index and spending 
When the number of housing reports increase, the relationship between housing wealth and consumption is expected to 
shift from the solid line to the dash line. The slope of the equation should go up with the y-intercept decreasing. 
 
(3.5)  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1 𝑧𝑧𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑧𝑧𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡  
                 = �𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑧𝑧𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡� + [𝛽𝛽1𝑧𝑧𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3] 𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 
Importantly, the validity of this specification depends not only on 𝛽𝛽1, but also on 𝛽𝛽2. In 
Figure 3.2, the slope of  the equation should go up, with the y-intercept decreasing when 
the number of  housing reports increases. Thus,  𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽2, respectively, are expected to be 
positive and negative.  
(3.6)  𝑦𝑦 = 𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽1𝜌𝜌𝑧𝑧 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑧𝑧 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝜌𝜌 + 𝜀𝜀   ⇒  𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿 =  𝜕𝜕𝜌𝜌 (𝛽𝛽1𝑧𝑧 + 𝛽𝛽3)���������
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐻𝐻𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  +  𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧 (𝛽𝛽1𝜌𝜌 + 𝛽𝛽2)���������𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  
 
65 This specification assumes that the elasticity of household expenditures with respect to housing wealth is linear to the housing news 
volumes. 
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To see this more clearly, Equation (3.6) disentangles housing wealth effects from media 
effects by partial differentiation.66 Regardless of the volume of housing price news (𝑧𝑧), the 
wealth effect is widely believed to be positive, but more housing reports combined with a 
positive 𝛽𝛽1 could make the consumption response more elastic. That is, an increase of one 
standard deviation in the number of housing price articles is associated with a 𝛽𝛽1 increase 
in the elasticity. In the meantime, the media effect (𝛽𝛽1𝜌𝜌 + 𝛽𝛽2) is negative when housing 
prices (𝜌𝜌) are low enough. Hence, 𝛽𝛽2 is expected to be negative. For example, more media 
reporting about distressed housing markets further discourages household consumption. 
As the housing wealth increases, the media effect becomes positive, and thus 𝛽𝛽1 should be 
positive.  
An empirical concern is unobservable common shocks driving up both housing news 
publications and the wealth-consumption elasticity. Even when the underlying information 
is fixed, a local paper’s reporting decisions may be correlated to unobserved determinants 
of the elasticity. For example, a local media outlet is more likely to report housing price 
dynamics in MSAs where local residents are more interested in the housing market and thus 
their consumption is more responsive to housing wealth. Therefore, the number of housing 
news articles may simply reflect local residents’ interest in or prior knowledge about housing 
prices, so it may be endogenous. Basically, this paper can substantially address this concern 
by including the cohort fixed effects that capture any time-invariant location- or group-
specific heterogeneity. However, it is not impossible that the local citizens’ interest in 
housing prices is time-varying for some reason or other. To further alleviate this concern, I 
include two additional control variables.  
The first control variable is the Google Trends Search Volume Index (GSVI), used as a 
measure of internet users’ attention to certain topics such as housing prices. Google Trends 
allows users to obtain a query index for a specific phrase. Attention to housing prices may 
be correlated with Google search volumes, as Google is the most commonly used online 
information source. Several recent works make use of the search query data to measure 
internet users’ attention. For example, Da et al. (2011) show that an increase in the search 
volume index predicts an increase in stock prices during the next two weeks, and more 
recently, Chauvet et al. (2016) develop a mortgage default risk index using the Google data 
 
66 It is challenging to empirically disentangle the effect of media reporting from the effect of the underlying information reported. Thus, 
this breakdown simply assumes that each article may be informative in several ways, but the MSA-level housing price index is the only 
information related to consumption consequences.   
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and find that their index is also predictive of housing market sentiment and performance. 
In this paper, I use “home price,” “housing price,” and “house price” as search queries on 
the Google Trends website in order to capture local residents’ general interest in housing 
prices by MSA-quarter; Figure 3.3 shows an example for Boston. I then add the indices for 
the three search terms to construct a quarterly panel for the MSA-level search index. Figure 
3.4 shows that local searches for housing prices on Google appear to be somewhat 
predictive of the number of housing news articles published during the U.S. subprime 
mortgage crisis period and the following Great Recession from 2007 to 2011.   
Figure 3.3. An example of Google Trends Search Index for Boston 
 
Notes: This figure shows a screen shot of the monthly Google Trends Search Indices for the search 
queries, “home price” (blue line), “housing price” (red line), and “house price” (yellow line) for the 
metropolitan Boston area. All three indices are normalized so that the period with the maximum 
search volume takes 100, which is assigned to March 2004 of the “home price” index. As a result, 
the other values of indices represent relative search volumes instead of absolute volumes. For 
example, the term “housing price” has relatively zero search volume over the period compared to 
the maximum value (March 2004, “home price”).    
Figure 3.4. Time-series trends of the number of housing articles and the Google search index  
 
Notes: The red solid line denotes the quarterly time-series trend of the MSA-
level average numbers of housing news articles published by all newspapers 
in the sample during each quarter (left axis). The blue dash line presents the 
average Google Trends Search Volume Index across MSAs in the sample 
(right axis). To calculate the Google index, I use three search queries, “home 
price”, “housing price”, and “house price”, for each MSA, and add up the 
indices from the three search terms to construct a quarterly MSA-level index. 
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The other control variable is the share of construction and real estate industries in the local 
GDP. Unobservable industry-specific shocks may exert an influence on media reporting as 
well as the consumption elasticity for the following two reasons.67 In MSAs where 
construction and real estate industries account for a larger fraction of the city economy, 
residents’ consumption may be more responsive to housing prices, not only because their 
current or future incomes are highly correlated with the housing market performance but 
also because they are likely to obtain more and better house price information from their 
workplace or peers. At the same time, the large contribution of related industries to the local 
GDP can possibly affect the number of housing price reports by contributing to the 
advertising revenues of local newspapers. When newspapers sell more advertising to these 
industries, the media outlets are more likely to decide to cover topics that are relevant to 
their clients. To address this issue, I add the share of construction and real estate industries 
in the state-level GDP, using the Gross-Domestic-Product-by-Industry Data provided by 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). As MSA-level data is available only on a yearly 
frequency, I instead use the state-level quarterly GDP shares of the industries as a control 
variable.  
Table 3.5 presents the baseline regression results. Model 1 is a standard specification for 
the wealth effect, and Model 3 allows the consumption elasticity to vary according to the 
number of news articles conveying house price information by including the interaction 
term. The number of housing news articles is strongly correlated with the consumption 
elasticity. Specifically, an increase of one standard deviation in the number of housing price 
reports raises homeowners’ consumption elasticity by 0.0813 (Model 3). Importantly, in the 
absence of the interaction term, housing prices have a significant effect on homeowner 
consumption while the housing news effect is insignificant (Model 2). However, adding the 
interaction term makes the housing wealth effect disappear, but the media effect becomes 
significant with a negative sign, as expected (Model 3). The findings indicate that the quantity 
of housing price news reports may be a main driver of the observed housing wealth effects, 
although interpretation of the coefficient for housing prices has strong limitations due to 
the omitted common shocks. A concern is that the effect of the interaction term is also 
 
67 A typical concern in the housing wealth literature is that the fall in housing wealth and consumption simply reflects the decline in the 
recession-prone construction industry (Mian et al., 2013). 
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sizable and significant for renters, implying that common factors may be driving up both 
the news publications and the consumption elasticity.68  
 Results: baseline specifications 
Dep. Var.: ln(Total Expenditure) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Owner × ln(HPI) 0.224*** 0.220*** -0.299 -1.268 -0.970 -0.134 
 (0.0695) (0.0796) (0.837) (0.920) (1.111) (1.208) 
Owner × z(#Housing News)  0.00576 -0.438***   -0.459*** 
  (0.00937) (0.154)   (0.153) 
Owner × ln(HPI) × z(#Housing News)   0.0813***   0.0852*** 
   (0.0280)   (0.0279) 
Owner × ln(Google Index)    0.293  0.386 
    (0.514)  (0.571) 
Owner × ln(HPI) × ln(Google Index)    -0.0579  -0.0742 
    (0.0964)  (0.107) 
Owner × GDP Share RE-Const.     -1.823 3.980 
     (8.506) (10.64) 
Owner × ln(HPI) × GDP Share RE-Const.     0.478 -0.605 
     (1.551) (1.957) 
Renter × ln(HPI) 0.113* 0.0828 -0.460 -0.285 -1.115 0.549 
 (0.0621) (0.0553) (0.865) (1.049) (1.085) (1.367) 
Renter × z(#Housing News)  0.0179** -0.292*   -0.350** 
  (0.00892) (0.154)   (0.164) 
Renter × ln(HPI) × z(#Housing News)   0.0564**   0.0672** 
   (0.0271)   (0.0290) 
Renter × ln(Google Index)    1.404**  1.276* 
    (0.696)  (0.747) 
Renter × ln(HPI) × ln(Google Index)    -0.265**  -0.240* 
    (0.126)  (0.134) 
Renter × GDP Share RE-Const.     -2.302 2.336 
     (8.667) (8.919) 
Renter × ln(HPI) × GDP Share RE-Const.     0.559 -0.311 
     (1.614) (1.680) 
Observations 96,776 90,052 90,052 96,199 96,776 89,475 
Adjusted R-squared 0.617 0.617 0.617 0.617 0.617 0.618 
Notes: This table presents regression results from Equation 3.4, the baseline specification. The dependent variable is the log of 
quarterly non-housing total expenditures of each individual household. ln(HPI) is the logarithm of the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (FHFA)’s MSA-level house price index. Owner and Renter are indicators capturing whether the household is a homeowner 
or a renter. z(#Housing News) is the standardized number of housing news articles varying by MSA and quarter-year. Google Index 
denotes Google Trends Search Indices for three search queries, “home price”, “housing price”, and “house price”. GDP Share RE-
Const. is the share of construction and real estate industries in the state-level quarterly GDP; I use the state-level GDP, as the MSA-
level GDP is available only at yearly frequency. As the dataset is repeated cross-sections, all models include the cohort fixed effects 
defined by City × Housing tenure × Employer × Occupation × Marital status × Education × Race in order to exploit within-cohort 
temporal variation for identification. All models also control for time-varying household characteristics and year-quarter fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by MSA-housing tenure. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Interestingly, the Google search index has a significantly negative effect on renters’ elasticity 
and an insignificant but negative effect on that of owners. While the number of newspaper 
articles may be a measure of information that is passively received, the Google search index 
may reflect the attention of active information seekers in housing markets, who are mostly 
renters or potential homebuyers. By googling, they become better informed about housing 
prices than homeowners, and therefore the search index volumes should have a negative 
impact on renters’ consumption responses to rising house prices, as seen in column 4. Some 
 
68 Despite the fact that rising house prices could have negative effects on renters because they are potential homebuyers, the estimated 
coefficients for renters are consistently positive. 
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homeowners may plan to move and therefore probably actively search for housing prices 
on the internet. That might be the reason for the negative coefficient for homeowners.  
3.3.3 Placebo Tests 
The findings of Table 3.5 may be due to random chance as opposed to a true causal effect. 
To relieve the concern, this paper conducts a couple of placebo tests.  
The first placebo treatment is the number of wage news articles. It is plausible that housing 
price news contains information about incomes or wages that can affect consumption. 
When house prices go up, wage expectations may go up concurrently. Wage news is 
identified as newspaper articles that include the keyword “wage” but exclude “home,” 
“housing,” and “house”. The housing terms are excluded to isolate the effect of information 
on wages or future income expectations from that of housing price information. If this study 
finds similar regression results for the wage news conveying no housing market information, 
then the estimated impact of housing news can be considered badly biased. 
Figure 3.5. Time-series trends of the number of housing news, all news, and wage news articles 
  
Notes: These figures show time-series relationships between the variable of interest (the number of housing news article) and 
two control variables (the numbers of all news and wage news articles). The left graph plots the quarterly time-series trends of 
the MSA-level average numbers of housing news articles (red solid line, left axis) and all news articles (yellow dash line, right 
axis) published by all newspapers in the sample during each quarter. In the right graph, the blue solid line denotes the MSA-level 
average number of wage news articles published by all the sample newspapers during each quarter. A wage news includes a 
keyword, “wage”, but excludes all the three queries, “home”, “housing”, and “house”, in its headline and body. 
The second is the number of all news articles. The number of housing price reports may 
simply capture general trends in the media markets. The growth of local media markets or 
advertising revenues is possibly associated with household consumption, not only because 
more advertising sales are affected by a strong local economy but also because more 
advertising may boost consumption. Generally speaking, advertising revenues for U.S. 
newspapers have dropped since 2004, largely due to declining circulation and the growing 
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domination of online advertising options (Chandra and Kaiser, 2015). As a result, the total 
number of newspaper reports have also declined, as shown in Figure 3.5.   
 Results: placebo tests 
Dep. Var.: ln(Total Expenditure) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Owner × ln(HPI) -0.134 -2.311* -2.576** -1.328 
 (1.208) (1.219) (1.190) (1.203) 
Owner × z(#Housing News) -0.459***   -0.368** 
 (0.153)   (0.151) 
Owner × ln(HPI) × z(#Housing News) 0.0852***   0.0681** 
 (0.0279)   (0.0276) 
Owner × z(#All News)  0.389*  0.0803 
  (0.199)  (0.192) 
Owner × ln(HPI) × z(#All News)  -0.0718*  -0.0123 
  (0.0381)  (0.0365) 
Owner × z(#Wage News)   0.378*** 0.325** 
   (0.144) (0.157) 
Owner × ln(HPI) × z(#Wage News)   -0.0704*** -0.0609** 
   (0.0269) (0.0293) 
Renter × ln(HPI) 0.549 -1.638 -1.765 -0.338 
 (1.367) (1.183) (1.251) (1.478) 
Renter × z(#Housing News) -0.350**   -0.269 
 (0.164)   (0.216) 
Renter × ln(HPI) × z(#Housing News) 0.0672**   0.0524 
 (0.0290)   (0.0385) 
Renter × z(#All News)  0.179  0.0978 
  (0.142)  (0.191) 
Renter × ln(HPI) × z(#All News)  -0.0388  -0.0227 
  (0.0271)  (0.0351) 
Renter × z(#Wage News)   0.132 -0.0136 
   (0.196) (0.216) 
Renter × ln(HPI) × z(#Wage News)   -0.0253 0.00238 
   (0.0368) (0.0402) 
Observations 89,475 91,734 91,734 88,572 
Adjusted R-squared 0.618 0.619 0.619 0.618 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of quarterly non-housing total expenditures of each individual household. 
ln(HPI) stands for the log of the FHFA’s MSA-level house price index. Owner and Renter are indicators capturing whether 
the household is a homeowner or a renter. z(#Housing News) is the standardized number of housing news articles varying 
by MSA and quarter-year. z(#All News) and z(#Wage News) are the standardized numbers of all news and wage news 
articles, respectively. As the dataset is repeated cross-sections, all models include the cohort fixed effects. All models also 
control for time-varying household characteristics, the Google Trends Search Index, the share of construction and real estate 
industries in the state-level quarterly GDP, and year-quarter fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered by MSA-housing tenure. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
However, both all news and wage news articles present negative impacts (Models 2 and 3 of 
Table 3.6). A plausible reason for the negative effect of all news is that more information 
simply means more divided attention to news about a specific topic such as housing prices, 
considering that people have only limited amounts of time and cognitive resources to 
process information. As a consequence, household consumption may become less 
responsive to housing wealth. Also, it may be a spurious correlation. In recent years, housing 
prices have recovered, whereas the number of newspaper articles has drastically declined. 
Yet there are no causal relationships between the two trends. The negative coefficient for 
wage news might be due to macroeconomic policies. Wage-related policies are strongly 
determined by present economic conditions. During a recession, politicians usually call for 
an increase in the minimum wage to stimulate consumption, but their concern is the negative 
impact of high labor costs during the next phases of a business cycle. Thus, such discussions 
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in newspapers may have a countereffect on the consumption elasticity. Media coverage of 
policy discussions on an increase in the minimum wage could encourage households to 
consume more even during an economic downturn, when housing prices usually plummet. 
Notably, using both placebo news articles as additional control variables helps to further 
recover the causal effect of media coverage (Model 4), implying that the wage information 
may be to some extent correlated with the housing price information. As the effects of the 
interaction and housing price news for renters become insignificant, the endogeneity issue 
is considerably alleviated.  
3.3.4 Headline Effect 
For further causal investigations, this subsection identifies the headline effect. The variable 
of interest in this study is the number of newspaper articles for which the headline includes 
“home,” “house,” “housing,” “property,” or “real estate,” and the headline or the body 
includes “housing price,” “house price,” or “home price.” If an article conveying house price 
information captures local readers’ dynamic interest in housing prices or any other omitted 
variables that can affect local elasticity, then the article should do so even without housing 
terms in its headline. Table 3.7 presents an example. The left panel shows one of the articles 
included in the key variable; it has “home” in its headline and “home price” in its body. The 
article on the right also provides readers with similar information about housing prices, but 
its headline does not include any housing term. Considering the underlined phrases, “the 
first quarter-over-quarter improvement in three years” (left) and “its first quarterly increase 
in three years” (right), a common information source seems to have influenced both of these 
articles published on the same date by two neighboring local papers.69 The article on the left 
is obviously about housing market trends, and the one on the right is more about general 
economic conditions. However, both of the articles appear to reflect local readers’ interest 
in housing prices or similar supply-side factors affecting media reporting.  
 
 
 
 
69 It is possible that housing report volumes simply capture time-varying local residents’ interests in housing markets or prices that 
potentially are influenced by other information channels rather than local newspapers in the sample. Therefore, coverage of other media 
outlets could jointly determine the newspaper reporting and the consumption responses to housing wealth. 
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 Examples: headlined and non-headlined housing news articles 
 Headlined housing news article Non-headlined housing news article 
Newspaper Chicago Sun-Times (Chicago, IL) Daily Herald (Arlington Heights, IL) 
Date Aug 25, 2009 Aug 25, 2009 
Headline Chicago home prices rise in June Consumer sentiment improves more than expected 
Body 
Home prices in the Chicago metropolitan area rose 1.1 
percent in June over May, but were down 16.7 percent 
from a year earlier according to the latest Standard & 
Poor's Case-Shiller home price index. Nationally, prices 
rose 2.9 percent in the second quarter from the first 
quarter, the first quarter-over-quarter improvement in 
three years. But prices were down 14.9 percent from a 
year earlier. "For the second month in a row, we're 
seeing some positive signs," David Blitzer, chairman... 
Consumer sentiment rose more than expected in 
August and expectations hit the highest level since the 
recession began, indications that Americans' pessimism 
about the economy may be lifting. The housing sector 
also showed signs of life as a national measure of home 
prices posted its first quarterly increase in three years. 
The New York-based Conference Board said today its 
Consumer Confidence index rose to 54.1 from an 
upwardly revised 47.4 in July. Economists surveyed... 
Notes: Both the articles were published on the same date by two local newspapers within a metropolitan area. The left article is included 
in the key explanatory variable whereas the right is included in the control variable. In this study, a housing news article includes 
“home”, “house”, “housing”, “property” or “real estate” in its headline, and also includes “housing price”, “house price” or “home 
price” in its headline or body. In contrast, a non-housing-headlined news article includes “housing price”, “house price” or “home 
price” in its body, but does not include any of the five terms, “home”, “house”, “housing”, “property”, and “real estate” in its headline. 
As examples, the left article (a housing news article) includes “home” in its headline, as well as “Home prices” in its body. The right (a 
non-housing-headline news article) includes “home prices” in its body without any housing terms in its headline. Given the underlined 
phrases, both may be influenced by an unobservable common factor, but may have different effects on readers.  
Figure 3.6. Relationships between the numbers of headlined and non-headlined housing artcles  
  
Notes: These figures show relationships between the number of headlined housing news articles and the number of non-
headlined housing news articles by newspaper (left) and over time (right). Each data point in the left panel reflects the total 
number of housing news articles and that of non-headlined news articles published by a local newspaper from 2006 to 2016. 
The right graph plots the quarterly time-series trends of the MSA-level average numbers of housing (red solid line) and non-
housing-headlined news articles (green dash line) published by all newspapers in the sample during each quarter.   
By taking advantage of this pattern, I estimate the effect of the number of articles in which 
the body includes “housing price,” “house price,” or “home price” but whose headline does 
not include any of the five terms “home,” “house,” “housing,” “property,” and “real estate”; 
I call these “non-headlined housing news” or “non-headlined news” hereafter. The non-
headlined news articles largely consist of two groups. Most of them focus on non-housing 
economic issues but more or less relate the main issues to housing prices. Thus, the number 
of such reports could capture the extent to which local readers are interested in housing 
markets. The other group includes reports about the housing market with a less 
straightforward headline. In this case, I assume that whether the headline includes any of 
the housing terms is random, so this group can partially capture the treatment effect but 
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does not bias the estimated treatment effect. Figure 3.6 displays strong correlations between 
the headlined and non-headlined housing news articles across newspapers and over time.  
 Results: headline effect 
Dep. Var.: ln(Total Expenditure) (1) (2) (3) 
Owner × ln(HPI) -1.328 -2.439** -1.537 
 (1.203) (1.202) (1.212) 
Owner × z(#Housing News) -0.368**  -0.418*** 
 (0.151)  (0.156) 
Owner × ln(HPI) × z(#Housing News) 0.0681**  0.0780*** 
 (0.0276)  (0.0286) 
Owner × z(#Non-Headlined)  -0.104 0.0718 
  (0.124) (0.121) 
Owner × ln(HPI) × z(#Non-Headlined)  0.0173 -0.0152 
  (0.0229) (0.0221) 
Renter × ln(HPI) -0.338 -1.546 -0.579 
 (1.478) (1.491) (1.503) 
Renter × z(#Housing News) -0.269  -0.286 
 (0.216)  (0.269) 
Renter × ln(HPI) × z(#Housing News) 0.0524  0.0558 
 (0.0385)  (0.0479) 
Renter × z(#Non-Headlined)  -0.0584 0.0449 
  (0.189) (0.215) 
Renter × ln(HPI) × z(#Non-Headlined)  0.0107 -0.00903 
  (0.0345) (0.0392) 
Observations 88,572 88,572 88,572 
Adjusted R-squared 0.618 0.618 0.618 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of quarterly non-housing total expenditures of each individual 
household. ln(HPI) stands for the log of the FHFA’s MSA-level house price index. Owner and Renter 
are indicators capturing whether the household is a homeowner or a renter. z(#Housing News) and 
z(#Non-Headlined) are the standardized numbers of respectively headlined and non-headlined 
housing news articles varying by MSA and quarter-year. As the dataset is repeated cross-sections, all 
models include the cohort fixed effects. All models also control for time-varying household 
characteristics, the Google Trends Search Index, the share of construction and real estate industries in 
the state-level quarterly GDP, the standardized numbers of all news and wage news articles, and year-
quarter fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by MSA-housing tenure.      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
However, only headlined housing news has a statistically significant effect on the wealth 
effect elasticity (Table 3.8). If the number of housing news is endogenous, then the non-
headlined news also should have a significant effect, but it does not.70 Thus this result 
substantially alleviates the endogeneity issue. Controlling for the number of non-headlined 
news articles, the treatment effect becomes statistically more significant for homeowners 
(Model 3). Due to the non-headlined news, the treatment effect may largely capture the 
effect of headlining, and this result is consistent with a recent study’s finding that about 60% 
of news articles are shared on Twitter without even being read (Gabielkov et al., 2016). 
3.3.5 Alternative Specification 
There is no doubt that media reporting, housing prices, and consumer spending are all 
strongly influenced by macroeconomic fluctuations. Given what housing and financial 
markets have gone through during the recent decade, unobservable macroeconomic factors 
 
70 I assume that it is random whether or not each housing news article includes housing terms in its headline. 
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are likely to have exerted a large influence on both housing price news and household 
consumption elasticity. After the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis of 2007–2009, the following 
Great Recession saw a collapse in housing prices and household consumption. Such 
economic events strongly impact expectations of permanent income, a common shock 
affecting both housing prices and spending, by drawing substantial media attention to 
housing markets. Thus, time-varying unobservable macro factors may have a great potential 
to bias empirical results by driving up both the wealth-consumption elasticity and media 
reporting over the boom and bust. Figure 3.7 presents relationships among the three key 
variables in this study. The relations between housing prices and consumption are 
consistently positive, both across cities and over time (Panel A). However, the link between 
housing prices and the volume of housing price news appears to be positive across cities but 
negative over time (Panel B). Media outlets tend to publish more articles conveying housing 
price information in the MSAs where house prices are higher, but they seem to provide 
readers with more housing price news when housing prices are lower over time. At the least, 
this conflicting pattern confirms that housing prices and housing price news reporting are 
not systematically correlated. More importantly, the visual depiction may highlight the 
strong influence of time-series macro factors; because it is widely believed that time-series 
correlations are more vulnerable to omitted variables. Homeowners may simply consume 
more during housing booms and less during busts, with both extreme cases endogenously 
seeing more media news about housing prices than usual.  
To address this issue arising from time-varying unobservable factors, this section exploits 
only cross-sectional variation in media reporting by averaging the variable of interest over 
the entire period from 2006 to 2016 for each MSA. In principle, the panel estimation 
employed in the previous section enables a more powerful test by taking full advantage of 
variation across cities and over time. However, the estimates could be biased because the 
media decision to report may heavily depend on the macroeconomic fundamentals. Hence, 
I identify the media effects from the interaction of local housing price swings and 
presumably less correlated time-invariant local housing price news volumes. Exploiting only 
cross-sectional variation in housing news lends additional credibility that the estimates are 
less biased by common factors, as city-level heterogeneity in housing price news volumes 
might be less correlated with the information events being reported over time and therefore, 
more exogenous to time-series fluctuations of the elasticity. 
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Figure 3.7. Correlations among median housing prices, consumption, and housing news volumes 
These figures show cross-sectional (left graphs) and time-series (right graphs) correlations among housing prices, household 
consumption, and housing news volumes, the three key variables in this study. 
Panel A: Median housing prices (USD, 2006) – Average quarterly expenditures by MSA (Left) and by quarter (Right) 
  
Notes: Panel A displays the relationships between median housing prices and homeowner expenditures by MSA (left) and 
by quarter-year (right). In the left graph, median housing prices are MSA-level from the National Association of Realtors 
(www.nar.realtor), and homeowners’ quarterly expenditures are MSA-level averages over the period from Q1.2006 to 
Q4.2016. In the right, the x-axis presents the Federal Housing Finance Agency quarterly national house price index (HPI), 
and the y-axis presents the average homeowner expeditures across MSAs in the sample for the corresponding quarter-year.  
Panel B: Median housing prices (USD, 2006) – Share of housing news by MSA (Left) and by quarter (Right) 
  
Notes: Panel B displays the relationships between the median housing prices and the shares of housing news articles, the 
ratios of housing news to all news articles. The share of housing news articles are MSA-level averages over the period in 
the left graph, and averages across MSAs in the sample for the corresponding quarter-year in the right graph.  
Panel C: Average quarterly expenditures(USD) – Share of housing news by MSA (Left) and by quarter (Right) 
  
Notes: Panel C displays the relationships between the homeowner expenditures and the shares of housing news articles. 
See Panels A and B for details on the x- and y-axises. 
 
To do this, I employ Equation (3.7) in this section: 
(3.7)  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  [ 𝛽𝛽1 𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1 %𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐  + 𝛽𝛽2 𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1]  + 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  [ 𝛽𝛽3 𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1 %𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1]  
                   + 𝒙𝒙′𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡  𝜸𝜸 +  𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 +  𝜙𝜙𝑐𝑐,𝑗𝑗 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 
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where %𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐 denotes the city-level percentage ratio of housing news to all news articles 
published during the period from 2006 to 2016.71  
Table 3.9 robustly confirms the effects of the media coverage on housing prices. Household 
consumption is more responsive to volatile housing prices in cities with a larger share of 
housing price news. Model 1 is the baseline specification and shows a statistically significant 
effect only on homeowners. Models 2 and 3 employ the time-invariant percentage share of 
non-headlined housing news and that of wage news, respectively, as additional control 
variables as well as placebo news. Yet both have no significant impact. Lastly, Model 5 
instruments for the long-term share of housing news with the long-term share of stock news 
over the same period. The stock news articles are identified through the search queries “S&P 
500,” “Dow Jones,” and “Nasdaq,” and a part of the variation in housing news reporting is 
explained by the variation in stock news reporting (Figure 3.8). It is plausible that some 
newspapers publish more pages in the economy and finance sections with a larger team of 
staff members, and these sections are likely to cover more housing price news when stock 
markets are calm than newspapers that are otherwise similar. If this is the case, then the 
share of housing price news should be strongly correlated with the share of stock news in 
the long term. More importantly, the stock market event information reported by 
newspapers rarely reflects local economic conditions, since the search keywords are not 
location-specific. Therefore, the share of stock news is not likely to have a direct impact on 
the local housing wealth elasticity. Unobservable local factors may influence a local media 
outlet’s decisions to report stock market events, but the reporting decisions are not likely to 
vary systematically with households’ consumption responses to local housing prices. In 
other words, the instrument variable is predictive of long-term housing price news volumes 
but uncorrelated to unobservable factors that affect the local consumption elasticities, 
suggesting that the exclusion restriction is not violated. With the IV, the key interaction term 
has a more sizable impact on homeowner spending with an insignificant but negative impact 
on renters. The results provide some evidence that the IV estimator further alleviates the 
concern regarding common factors that are expected to affect the consumption elasticities 
of both homeowners and renters along with housing price news. Overall, a 0.01 percentage 
point increase in the housing price news share raises the elasticity by 0.0447–0.0684. 
However, a limitation is that cross-sectional variation in media reporting comes from only 
 
71 The reason for using the share measure instead of the quantity measure was discussed in section 3.3.2. 
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22 cities, so the first-stage F-test does not exceed the Stock and Yogo (2005) thresholds at 
20 percent level, suggesting that the instrument is weak.  
 Results: alternative specifications 
 Dep. Var.: ln(Total Expenditure) (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) OLS (5) IV 
Owner × ln(HPI) -0.480 -1.051 -0.938 0.206 0.425 
 (0.986) (0.996) (0.895) (1.119) (1.270) 
Owner × ln(HPI) × % Housing News 1.793**   4.471*** 6.842*** 
 (0.719)   (0.935) (2.591) 
Owner × ln(HPI) × % Non-headlined News  1.485  -7.311** -12.27** 
  (2.362)  (3.430) (6.104) 
Owner × ln(HPI) × % Wage News   -0.224 -0.399 -0.460* 
   (0.278) (0.278) (0.270) 
Renter × ln(HPI) -0.550 -1.173 -1.131 -0.0350 -0.00782 
 (1.017) (1.016) (0.952) (1.172) (1.297) 
Renter × ln(HPI) × % Housing News 0.637   1.266 -1.888 
 (0.583)   (1.232) (1.726) 
Renter × ln(HPI) × % Non-headlined News  0.717  -1.260 6.684 
  (1.616)  (3.604) (5.383) 
Renter × ln(HPI) × % Wage News   -0.141 -0.289 -0.271 
   (0.207) (0.242) (0.280) 
Observations 92,311 92,311 92,311 92,311 88,819 
Adjusted R-squared 0.619 0.619 0.619 0.619 0.093 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of quarterly non-housing total expenditures of each individual household. HPI is 
the MSA-level quarterly house price index. Owner and Renter are indicators capturing whether the household is a homeowner 
or a renter. %Housing News is a MSA-level percentage ratio of housing news to all news articles published during the period 
from 2006 to 2016. %Non-Headlined News and %Wage News are also percentage ratios of non-housing-headlined news and 
wage news, respectively, to all news articles, varying only by MSA. Model 5 instruments for the share of housing news articles 
with the share of stock news articles that include search queries, “S&P 500”, “Dow Jones”, or “Nasdaq”. As the dataset is 
repeated cross-sections, all models include the cohort fixed effects. All models also control for time-varying household 
characteristics and year-quarter fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by MSA-housing tenure. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Figure 3.8. Correlation between the shares of housing news and stock news 
 
Notes: The fitted line excludes two outliers of which the share of housing 
news is greater than 0.15%, the Daily News of Los Angeles and The Orange County 
Register. Without the two LA media outlets, the correlation is statistically 
significant with p<0.01. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
Different economic decisions may come from different information environments. In 
particular, many homeowners do not actively seek housing price information in their 
everyday lives and are therefore unaware of the precise values of their homes, given the 
imperfect information and a high degree of uncertainty in housing markets. To what extent, 
then, might publicity affect the behavior of consumers who are not actively seeking 
information? This paper pays particular attention to the volume and frequency of 
information and tests whether homeowner awareness of housing prices can increase 
consumption responses to house prices. By using the number of articles conveying house 
price information in local newspapers as a proxy for homeowner awareness of their housing 
wealth, I robustly find that information from news media can alter homeowner decisions, 
thereby increasing the elasticity of consumption with respect to housing wealth. The more 
frequently households are informed about house prices, the larger consumption growth we 
can expect in response to similar housing price appreciation.  
The core contribution of this paper is twofold. First, I show that the quantity of information 
is predictive of agents’ economic decisions. Second, understanding the relationship between 
information quantity/frequency and outcomes, and finding a more effective way to inform 
citizens can be very important to practitioners/policymakers for having more accurate 
predictions and making right choices. Disparity in the amount of information available to 
different individuals may function as a friction in the macroeconomic policy process and 
thereby render interventions less effective or less consistent than anticipated.  
 95 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
ALADANGADY, A. (2017): "Housing Wealth and Consumption: Evidence from 
Geographically-Linked Microdata," American Economic Review, 107, 3415-46. 
ALBOUY, D. (2016): "What Are Cities Worth? Land Rents, Local Productivity, and the 
Total Value of Amenities," The Review of Economics and Statistics, 98, 477-487. 
ALBOUY, D., AND B. LUE (2015): "Driving to Opportunity: Local Rents, Wages, 
Commuting, and Sub-Metropolitan Quality of Life," Journal of Urban Economics, 
89, 74-92. 
ALLCOTT, H., AND M. GENTZKOW (2017): "Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 
Election," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31, 211-36. 
ANDERSON, M., AND J. MAGRUDER (2012): "Learning from the Crowd: Regression 
Discontinuity Estimates of the Effects of an Online Review Database," The 
Economic Journal, 122, 957-989. 
ANGRIST, J. D., AND J.-S. PISCHKE (2009): Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's 
Companion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Pres. 
BAILEY, M., R. CAO, T. KUCHLER, AND J. STROEBEL (2018): "The Economic Effects of 
Social Networks: Evidence from the Housing Market," Journal of Political Economy, 
126, 2224-2276. 
BARBER, B. M., AND D. LOEFFLER (1993): "The “Dartboard” Column: Second-Hand 
Information and Price Pressure," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 28, 
273-284. 
BAUM-SNOW, N., AND F. FERREIRA (2015): "Causal Inference in Urban Economics," in 
Handbook of Urban and Regional Economics Vol. 5. 
BERGER, J., A. T. SORENSEN, AND S. J. RASMUSSEN (2010): "Positive Effects of Negative 
Publicity: When Negative Reviews Increase Sales," Marketing Science, 29, 815-827. 
BERTRAND, M., AND A. MORSE (2011): "Information Disclosure, Cognitive Biases, and 
Payday Borrowing," Journal of Finance, 66, 1865-1893. 
BESHEARS, J., J. J. CHOI, D. LAIBSON, AND B. C. MADRIAN (2018): "Chapter 3 - 
Behavioral Household Finance," in Handbook of Behavioral Economics: Applications 
and Foundations 1, ed. by B. D. Bernheim, S. DellaVigna, and D. Laibson: North-
Holland, 177-276. 
BLOMQUIST, G. C., M. C. BERGER, AND J. P. HOEHN (1988): "New Estimates of Quality 
of Life in Urban Areas," The American Economic Review, 78, 89-107. 
BOSTIC, R., S. GABRIEL, AND G. PAINTER (2009): "Housing Wealth, Financial Wealth, 
and Consumption: New Evidence from Micro Data," Regional Science and Urban 
Economics, 39, 79-89. 
 96 
 
BUITER, W. H. (2008): "Housing Wealth Isn't Wealth," National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper Series, No. 14204. 
BUSSO, M., J. GREGORY, AND P. KLINE (2013): "Assessing the Incidence and Efficiency 
of a Prominent Place Based Policy," American Economic Review, 103, 897-947. 
CALOMIRIS, C., S. D. LONGHOFER, AND W. MILES (2012): "The Housing Wealth Effect: 
The Crucial Roles of Demographics, Wealth Distribution and Wealth Shares," 
Critical Finance Review, 2, 49-99. 
CAMPBELL, J. Y., AND J. F. COCCO (2007): "How Do House Prices Affect Consumption? 
Evidence from Micro Data," Journal of Monetary Economics, 54, 591-621. 
CARROLL, C. D., M. OTSUKA, AND J. SLACALEK (2011): "How Large Are Housing and 
Financial Wealth Effects? A New Approach," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 
43, 55-79. 
CASE, K., E., J. QUIGLEY, M., AND R. SHILLER, J. (2005): "Comparing Wealth Effects: 
The Stock Market Versus the Housing Market," Advances in Macroeconomics, 5. 
CASE, K. E., J. M. QUIGLEY, AND R. J. SHILLER (2012): "Wealth Effects Revisited 1975-
2012," Critical Finance Review, 2, 101-128. 
CASE, K. E., AND R. J. SHILLER (1989a): "The Behavior of Home Buyers in Boom and 
Post-Boom Markets," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, No. 
2748. 
— (1989b): "The Efficiency of the Market for Single-Family Homes," The American 
Economic Review, 79, 125-137. 
CHAN, W. S. (2003): "Stock Price Reaction to News and No-News: Drift and Reversal 
after Headlines," Journal of Financial Economics, 70, 223-260. 
CHANDRA, A., AND U. KAISER (2015): "Chapter 9 - Newspapers and Magazines," in 
Handbook of Media Economics, ed. by S. P. Anderson, J. Waldfogel, and D. 
Strömberg: North-Holland, 397-444. 
CHANEY, T., D. SRAER, AND D. THESMAR (2012): "The Collateral Channel: How Real 
Estate Shocks Affect Corporate Investment," American Economic Review, 102, 
2381-2409. 
CHAUVET, M., S. GABRIEL, AND C. LUTZ (2016): "Mortgage Default Risk: New Evidence 
from Internet Search Queries," Journal of Urban Economics, 96, 91-111. 
CHEN, Y., Y. LIU, AND J. ZHANG (2012): "When Do Third-Party Product Reviews Affect 
Firm Value and What Can Firms Do? The Case of Media Critics and 
Professional Movie Reviews," Journal of Marketing, 76, 116-134. 
CHETTY, R., AND A. SZEIDL (2017): "The Effect of Housing on Portfolio Choice," The 
Journal of Finance, 72, 1171-1212. 
 97 
 
CHOI, J. J., D. LAIBSON, AND B. C. MADRIAN (2010): "Why Does the Law of One Price 
Fail? An Experiment on Index Mutual Funds," The Review of Financial Studies, 23, 
1405-1432. 
CORRADIN, S., AND A. POPOV (2015): "House Prices, Home Equity Borrowing, and 
Entrepreneurship," The Review of Financial Studies, 28, 2399-2428. 
DA, Z., U. G. GURUN, AND M. WARACHKA (2014): "Frog in the Pan: Continuous 
Information and Momentum," The Review of Financial Studies, 27, 2171-2218. 
DA, Z. H. I., J. ENGELBERG, AND P. GAO (2011): "In Search of Attention," The Journal of 
Finance, 66, 1461-1499. 
DAVIS, D. R., J. I. DINGEL, J. MONRAS, AND E. MORALES (Forthcoming): "How 
Segregated Is Urban Consumption? Evidence from Yelp," Journal of Political 
Economy. 
DEATON, A. (1985): "Panel Data from Time Series of Cross-Sections," Journal of 
Econometrics, 30, 109-126. 
DELLAVIGNA, S., AND J. M. POLLET (2009): "Investor Inattention and Friday Earnings 
Announcements," The Journal of Finance, 64, 709-749. 
DETTLING, L. J., AND M. S. KEARNEY (2014): "House Prices and Birth Rates: The 
Impact of the Real Estate Market on the Decision to Have a Baby," Journal of 
Public Economics, 110, 82-100. 
DRANOVE, D., AND G. Z. JIN (2010): "Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and 
Practice," Journal of Economic Literature, 48, 935-63. 
ELIASHBERG, J., AND S. M. SHUGAN (1997): "Film Critics: Influencers or Predictors?," 
Journal of Marketing, 61, 68-78. 
ENGELBERG, J. E., AND C. A. PARSONS (2011): "The Causal Impact of Media in Financial 
Markets," The Journal of Finance, 66, 67-97. 
FANG, L., AND J. PERESS (2009): "Media Coverage and the Cross-Section of Stock 
Returns," The Journal of Finance, 64, 2023-2052. 
FIGLIO, D. N., AND M. E. LUCAS (2004): "What's in a Grade? School Report Cards and 
the Housing Market," The American Economic Review, 94, 591-604. 
FLAVIN, M., AND T. YAMASHITA (2002): "Owner-Occupied Housing and the 
Composition of the Household Portfolio," The American Economic Review, 92, 345-
362. 
FLORES, R. J. O., AND A. P. LOBO (2013): "The Reassertion of Black/Non-Black Color 
Line: The Rise in Integrated Neighborhoods without Blacks in New York City, 
1970–2010," Journal of Urban Affairs, 35, 255-282. 
FRAZZINI, A. (2006): "The Disposition Effect and Underreaction to News," The Journal of 
Finance, 61, 2017-2046. 
 98 
 
FRIBERG, R., AND E. GRÖNQVIST (2012): "Do Expert Reviews Affect the Demand for 
Wine?," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 4, 193-211. 
GABIELKOV, M., A. RAMACHANDRAN, A. CHAINTREAU, AND A. LEGOUT (2016): "Social 
Clicks: What and Who Gets Read on Twitter?," ACM SIGMETRICS Performance 
Evaluation Review, 44, 179-192. 
GABRIEL, S. A., J. P. MATTEY, AND W. L. WASCHER (2003): "Compensating Differentials 
and Evolution in the Quality-of-Life among U.S. States," Regional Science and 
Urban Economics, 33, 619-649. 
GAO, P., C. LEE, AND D. MURPHY (2018): "Financing Dies in Darkness? The Impact of 
Newspaper Closures on Public Finance." 
GENTZKOW, M. (2006): "Television and Voter Turnout," The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 121, 931-972. 
GENTZKOW, M., AND J. M. SHAPIRO (2010): "What Drives Media Slant? Evidence from 
U.S. Daily Newspapers," Econometrica, 78, 35-71. 
GENTZKOW, M., J. M. SHAPIRO, AND M. SINKINSON (2011): "The Effect of Newspaper 
Entry and Exit on Electoral Politics," American Economic Review, 101, 2980-3018. 
GERBER, A. S., D. KARLAN, AND D. BERGAN (2009): "Does the Media Matter? A Field 
Experiment Measuring the Effect of Newspapers on Voting Behavior and 
Political Opinions," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1, 35-52. 
GOBILLON, L., T. MAGNAC, AND H. SELOD (2012): "Do Unemployed Workers Benefit 
from Enterprise Zones? The French Experience," Journal of Public Economics, 96, 
881-892. 
GREENWOOD, M. J., G. L. HUNT, D. S. RICKMAN, AND G. I. TREYZ (1991): "Migration, 
Regional Equilibrium, and the Estimation of Compensating Differentials," The 
American Economic Review, 81, 1382-1390. 
GUTERBOCK, T. M. (1997): "Review: Why Money Magazine's "Best Places" Keep 
Changing," The Public Opinion Quarterly, 61, 339-355. 
HILGER, J., G. RAFERT, AND S. VILLAS-BOAS (2010): "Expert Opinion and the Demand 
for Experience Goods: An Experimental Approach in the Retail Wine Market," 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 93, 1289-1296. 
HONG, H., AND J. C. STEIN (1999): "A Unified Theory of Underreaction, Momentum 
Trading, and Overreaction in Asset Markets," The Journal of Finance, 54, 2143-
2184. 
IHLANFELDT, K. R., AND B. SCAFIDI (2002): "Black Self-Segregation as a Cause of 
Housing Segregation: Evidence from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality," 
Journal of Urban Economics, 51, 366-390. 
 99 
 
KLINE, P., AND E. MORETTI (2014): "Local Economic Development, Agglomeration 
Economies, and the Big Push: 100 Years of Evidence from the Tennessee Valley 
Authority," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129, 275-331. 
KUANG, C. (2017): "Does Quality Matter in Local Consumption Amenities? An 
Empirical Investigation with Yelp," Journal of Urban Economics, 100, 1-18. 
LOVENHEIM, M. F. (2011): "The Effect of Liquid Housing Wealth on College 
Enrollment," Journal of Labor Economics, 29, 741-771. 
LOVENHEIM, M. F., AND K. J. MUMFORD (2013): "Do Family Wealth Shocks Affect 
Fertility Choices? Evidence from the Housing Market," Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 95, 464-475. 
LUCA, M. (2016): "“Reviews, Reputation, and Revenue: The Case of Yelp.Com," Harvard 
Business School Working Paper, No. 12-016. 
MIAN, A., K. RAO, AND A. SUFI (2013): "Household Balance Sheets, Consumption, and 
the Economic Slump," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128, 1687-1726. 
NELSON, P. (1970): "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, 
78, 311-329. 
— (1974): "Advertising as Information," Journal of Political Economy, 82, 729-754. 
OLIVER, J. E., AND T. J. WOOD (2014): "Conspiracy Theories and the Paranoid Style(S) 
of Mass Opinion," American Journal of Political Science, 58, 952-966. 
PERESS, J. (2014): "The Media and the Diffusion of Information in Financial Markets: 
Evidence from Newspaper Strikes," The Journal of Finance, 69, 2007-2043. 
PIAZZESI, M., M. SCHNEIDER, AND S. TUZEL (2007): "Housing, Consumption and Asset 
Pricing," Journal of Financial Economics, 83, 531-569. 
REINSTEIN, D. A., AND C. M. SNYDER (2005): "The Influence of Expert Reviews on 
Consumer Demand for Experience Goods: A Case Study of Movie Critics," The 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 53, 27-51. 
ROBACK, J. (1982): "Wages, Rents, and the Quality of Life," Journal of Political Economy, 
90, 1257-1278. 
SAIZ, A. (2010): "The Geographic Determinants of Housing Supply," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 125, 1253-1296. 
SILVERMAN, C., AND J. SINGER-VINE (2016): "Most Americans Who See Fake News 
Believe It, New Survey Says.," BuzzFeed News, 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/fake-news-survey. 
SINAI, T., AND N. S. SOULELES (2005): "Owner-Occupied Housing as a Hedge against 
Rent Risk," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120, 763-789. 
 100 
 
SOO, C. K. (2018): "Quantifying Sentiment with News Media across Local Housing 
Markets," The Review of Financial Studies, 31, 3689-3719. 
STOCK, J. H., AND M. YOGO (2005): "Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear Iv 
Regression," in Identification and Inference for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of 
Thomas Rothenberg, ed. by D. W. K. Andrews, and J. H. Stock. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 80-108. 
TETLOCK, P. C. (2007): "Giving Content to Investor Sentiment: The Role of Media in 
the Stock Market," The Journal of Finance, 62, 1139-1168. 
— (2010): "Does Public Financial News Resolve Asymmetric Information?," The Review 
of Financial Studies, 23, 3520-3557. 
— (2011): "All the News That's Fit to Reprint: Do Investors React to Stale 
Information?," The Review of Financial Studies, 24, 1481-1512. 
TETLOCK, P. C., M. SAAR-TSECHANSKY, AND S. MACSKASSY (2008): "More Than Words: 
Quantifying Language to Measure Firms' Fundamentals," The Journal of Finance, 
63, 1437-1467. 
TIEBOUT, C. M. (1956): "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of political 
economy, 64, 416-424. 
YAMASHITA, T. (2007): "House Price Appreciation, Liquidity Constraints, and Second 
Mortgages," Journal of Urban Economics, 62, 424-440. 
 
